People vs. Fernandez

A minor over fifteen and under eighteen years of age who commits rape is entitled to the penalty next lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied on the basis of the penalty actually imposed, not the penalty originally prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Positive identification by the victim, particularly a young child without improper motive, is conclusive and cannot be overcome by a mere denial and alibi that do not demonstrate physical impossibility of presence at the scene of the crime.

On March 8, 1985, around noontime, seven-year-old Marites C. Soriano, a Grade I student at Padilla Elementary School in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was walking home from school. Edgar B. Fernandez, then sixteen years old, approached her, offered her two cashew fruits, and led her to a cemented dike near Colegio of Pangasinan Sur. There, he forced her to lie down, placed his body over her, and had carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Marites went home crying and bleeding, reported the incident to her parents, and was taken for medical examination. The initial suspicion fell on one Danny Miranda, a helper of a barangay kagawad whose bloodstained short pants and brief were found near the scene, but the victim did not identify him. Weeks later, at a basketball game, Marites spontaneously identified Fernandez as her rapist, leading to his arrest and prosecution.

• The Incident: On March 8, 1985, at about noontime, seven-year-old Marites C. Soriano, a Grade I student, was walking home from Padilla Elementary School in Lingayen, Pangasinan. The accused, Edgar B. Fernandez, a sixteen-year-old boy, offered her two cashew fruits and led her toward the Colegio of Pangasinan Sur. There, he forced her to lie down on a cemented dike, positioned himself over her, and had carnal knowledge of her without her consent.
• Immediate Aftermath: After the assault, the accused left. Marites went home crying and bleeding and immediately told her parents what had happened. She was brought to Sto. Niño Hospital in Lingayen and later to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where a medical report confirmed she had been sexually abused. Her father Eduardo Soriano reported the incident to the police.
• Initial Investigation and Danny Miranda: Prior to the police report, barangay authorities brought a certain Danny Miranda to Marites for identification. Miranda was a helper of Municipal Kagawad Jimmy Joves, whose house stood near the cemented dike. Miranda’s short pants and brief, found smeared with blood, were submitted to the NBI and tested positive for human blood. Marites, however, did not identify Danny Miranda as the offender.
• Identification of the Accused: On March 23, 1985, Marites was taken by her father to watch a basketball game at the public plaza of Lingayen. She saw the accused, Edgar B. Fernandez, as one of the players and confidently pointed him out to her father as the one who raped her. Barangay Tanod Oscar de los Santos brought Fernandez to the police station for investigation. A police line-up was conducted, and Marites again identified him.
• Defense Evidence: The accused interposed denial and alibi, asserting he was in school at the time. He pointed to Danny Miranda as the real culprit, citing Miranda’s bloodstained clothing, his workplace near the dike, and the cashew trees in the yard. School records from Pangasinan Memorial College showed Fernandez was present on March 8, 1985, but the trial court found no evidence that he was physically inside his classroom at the precise time of the crime, rendering the alibi less than airtight. The accused’s birth date was established as November 13, 1968, making him sixteen years, three months, and twenty-four days old at the time of the offense.

• Denial and Alibi: Accused-appellant maintained that he was innocent and that the true culprit was Danny Miranda, who worked near the scene, had bloodstained shorts, and had access to cashew fruits. He argued that these circumstances pointed to Miranda as the primary suspect.
• Minority: Accused-appellant invoked his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. Being under eighteen at the time of the crime, he asserted that the penalty should be reduced pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code and that the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied to the reduced penalty.

• Positive Identification: The People argued that the victim’s immediate report to her parents, her submission to medical examination, and her unwavering identification of the accused at the basketball game and in the police line-up constituted proof beyond reasonable doubt. No improper motive to falsely accuse Fernandez was shown.
• Insufficiency of Alibi: The prosecution countered that the defense of alibi failed because the accused did not prove physical impossibility of being at the scene; mere presence in school that day did not exclude his presence at the nearby cemented dike at noon.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the trial court correctly found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite his defense of denial and alibi, and in light of the initial suspicion that fell on another person.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: Whether the accused, being a minor over fifteen but under eighteen years of age, was entitled to the penalty reduction under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies where the penalty actually imposed is the degree lower than reclusion perpetua, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence that the law applies to the penalty imposed, not the penalty originally prescribed.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The conviction was affirmed. The positive identification by the victim, a seven-year-old girl who reported the rape immediately, underwent an embarrassing medical examination, and unhesitatingly pointed to the accused, was conclusive. Her failure to identify Danny Miranda, the alternative suspect, reinforced the credibility of her identification. No improper motive was attributable to the child other than a desire for truth and justice. The accused’s alibi — that he was in school — was held insufficient because there was no showing he was physically inside his classroom at the exact hour of the crime, thus failing to meet the standard of physical impossibility. Denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by a credible witness.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: The accused was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code because he was over fifteen and under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense. The penalty next lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua — a single indivisible penalty — is reclusion temporal.
• Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: The Indeterminate Sentence Law was applied to the penalty actually imposed, not the penalty imposable under the Revised Penal Code, following the doctrine in People v. Moises. Consequently, the minimum term was taken from the proper period of prision mayor (the penalty next lower than reclusion temporal), and the maximum term was fixed within the medium period of reclusion temporal. The resulting sentence was six years and one day of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The provision of Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) on suspension of sentence was unavailable because the offender was over fifteen at the time of the crime; Article 189 of the same Code applied only to offenders over nine and under fifteen years of age.

• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority (Art. 68, par. 2, RPC) — When an offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, the penalty imposed shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, always in the proper period. The prescribed penalty for rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty; the penalty next lower is reclusion temporal. The Court applied this doctrine to reduce the appellant’s sentence by one degree.
• Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to Reduced Penalties — The Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied on the basis of the penalty actually imposed, not the penalty imposable under the Revised Penal Code. As established in People v. Moises, once the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority reduces the penalty to reclusion temporal, the Indeterminate Sentence Law requires a minimum term from the penalty next lower than that actually imposed (here, prision mayor) and a maximum term within the proper period of reclusion temporal.
• Alibi versus Positive Identification — Alibi, to be credited, must be clearly established and must leave no room for doubt as to its plausibility and verity; mere presence in school does not prove physical impossibility of being at the scene of the crime. Positive identification by the victim, especially when untainted by improper motive, prevails over denial and alibi.

• "The victim never pointed to Danny Miranda as the one who raped her. It would be unnatural and illogical for a seven (7) year old girl to point to another person as the one who raped her when in truth and in fact, he is not. The harrowing and gruesome experience and the pain will always be remembered and felt by the victim and because of this, Marites could not have mistakenly identified the appellant."
• "Alibi, in order to be given full faith and credit, must be clearly established and must not leave any room for doubt as to its plausibility and verity. It can not prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely against the accused."
• "We apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law to accused-appellant's case because of the established jurisprudence that what is controlling is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the Revised Penal Code."

• People vs. Mustacisa, No. L-51777, 159 SCRA 227 (1988) — Cited for the principle that positive identification is decisive and cannot be denied.
• People vs. Mancilla, G.R. No. 47628, 173 SCRA 373 (1989) — Used to underscore the credibility of a young victim who promptly reports the crime and submits to medical examination.
• People vs. Cayago, G.R. No. 47398, 158 SCRA 586 (1988) — Referenced for the rule that no improper motive can be ascribed to a child victim seeking redress.
• People vs. Moises, L-32495, 66 SCRA 151 (1975) — Applied as controlling on the point that the Indeterminate Sentence Law governs the penalty actually imposed, not the imposable penalty under the Code. This overruled the earlier doctrine in People vs. Colman.
• People vs. Boduso, No. L-30450-51, 60 SCRA 60 (1974) — Cited for the proposition that a minor over fifteen and under eighteen is entitled to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law.

• Article 335, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age. Applied as the basis for the conviction of the accused for raping a seven-year-old child.
• Article 68, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — When the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. Applied to reduce reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) — Prescribes the imposition of an indeterminate sentence consisting of a minimum and a maximum term for offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Applied to the reduced penalty of reclusion temporal, resulting in a minimum of prision mayor and a maximum within the medium period of reclusion temporal.
• Presidential Decree No. 603, Articles 189 and 192 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) — Article 189 applies to youthful offenders over nine and under fifteen years of age; Article 192 provides for suspension of sentence. Held inapplicable because the accused was over sixteen at the time of the offense.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.