People vs. Flores

Treachery qualifies a killing to murder when the victim is unconscious and utterly defenseless, ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the offender. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is properly appreciated when the offender’s deliberate acts reveal an intention only to cause injury, not death. The proper penalty for murder committed with one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to fix a minimum term within the penalty next lower in degree.

On 20 June 1993, Emperatriz Lazarte confronted Lyndon Flores over a missing cassette recorder that she had traced to a pawnshop and redeemed after it had been pawned in Flores’ name. A heated exchange ensued outside her residence in Barangay Malusak, Boac, Marinduque. Manuel Lazarte, her son, was lying dead drunk and unconscious on the pavement nearby during the altercation. Flores turned away from Emperatriz and delivered several forceful kicks with leather shoe-clad feet to Manuel’s stomach and chest. Manuel was hospitalized that afternoon; he died two days later from intestinal rupture caused by the blows.

Nature of the Incident:
On 20 June 1993, at about noon, Emperatriz Lazarte and accused Lyndon Flores had a verbal dispute over a cassette recorder. Emperatriz had redeemed the item from a pawnshop after learning it was pawned in Flores’ name. She instructed the pawnshop to inform any complainant to see her directly. Flores became angry during the confrontation.

The Attack:
While the argument unfolded, Manuel Lazarte—Emperatriz’s son—was lying totally unconscious from drunkenness on the pavement opposite Rustico Malvar’s house. Flores approached the prostrate Manuel and kicked him two to three times on the stomach and chest with his right foot, shod in Topsider leather shoes. One prosecution witness (Cesar Lanot) attested that Flores delivered two kicks to the stomach; another (Alfredo Azaula) testified he saw three kicks land on the chest and stomach. Chic-Chic, a companion of Flores, held Manuel by the collar, slapped him, and dropped him onto the cement. Lanot pacified Flores, telling him to stop because Manuel could not fight back.

Medical Findings and Death:
Manuel was brought to the Marinduque Provincial Hospital the same afternoon with epigastric tenderness and alcoholic breath. By the next afternoon, his abdomen was distended and tender; X-rays revealed intra‑abdominal air. Dr. Edgardo Marquez performed emergency exploratory laparotomy and found the jejunum (small intestine) ruptured in two areas, with bloody chocolate‑colored fluid and spilled intestinal contents filling the abdomen. He opined that the rupture was caused by a strong blow, such as repeated kicking. Manuel died on the evening of 21 June 1993.

Defense Version:
Flores denied kicking the victim. He claimed he merely touched or nudged Manuel with his right foot to wake him so Manuel could explain to his mother that he had pawned the cassette recorder, not Flores. The trial court rejected this account as inconsistent with the severe internal injuries.

Trial Court’s Findings:
The court a quo declared the prosecution witnesses credible—candid, categorical, and consistent—and found no improper motive to testify falsely. It convicted Flores of murder, noting the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing of Manuel Lazarte.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13, paragraph 3 should have been appreciated in favor of the accused.
• Proper Penalty: What was the correct penalty, considering the presence of a mitigating circumstance and the applicable provisions of law.

• Treachery: Treachery was established because the victim was totally unconscious, dead drunk, and lying helpless on the pavement when the accused delivered powerful and fatal kicks to his abdomen. The victim could not have put up any defense; the attack ensured the commission of the crime without risk to the offender. This squarely fell within the definition under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code. The conviction for murder was therefore affirmed.

• Mitigating Circumstance: The trial court erred in failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. Although the accused is liable for all consequences of his voluntary felonious acts—including death that supervenes from his intentional infliction of injury—the evidence demonstrated that he intended only to harm the victim, not to kill him. The kicks were an expression of anger during the altercation, not an execution-style killing. Under Article 13, paragraph 3, the absence of homicidal intent mitigated the offense.

• Proper Penalty: With one mitigating circumstance (lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong) and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty for murder under Article 248 is the minimum period of the prescribed penalty, which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 20 years). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower in degree—anywhere within prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium (10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). The Supreme Court fixed the indeterminate sentence at 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Republic Act No. 7659, which increased the penalty for murder to reclusion perpetua to death, did not apply because it took effect after the crime.

• Treachery when the victim is unconscious — Treachery requires that the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. An attack on a completely unconscious and defenseless victim satisfies this standard because no risk is posed to the assailant.

• Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong (Article 13, par. 3, RPC) — This mitigating circumstance may be appreciated when the offender’s deliberate acts show that he intended only to cause injury, not death, even if death results from the injuries inflicted. It is based on the disparity between the intended and actual consequences of the criminal act.

• Liability for the consequences of a felonious act (Article 4, par. 1, RPC) — A person who voluntarily commits a felony incurs criminal liability for all the direct and natural consequences of the act, even if the result is different from that which he intended.

• Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law after mitigating circumstance — When a mitigating circumstance is present and no aggravating circumstance exists, the penalty imposable is the minimum period of the statutory penalty. The Indeterminate Sentence Law then fixes the minimum term within the range of the penalty next lower in degree.

• “An attack upon an unconscious victim who could not have put up any defense whatsoever is treacherous. There was absolutely no risk to accused-appellant from any defense that the victim might have made.” — This passage distills the ratio on treachery in the context of an unconscious victim.

• “Nonetheless, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Paragraph 3, Article 13, Revised Penal Code) should be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant for he had no intent to kill when he attacked the victim. His intention was merely to inflict injuries on the victim.” — The Court’s rationale for applying the mitigating circumstance.

• “Thus, anyone who inflicts injuries voluntarily and with intent is liable for all the consequences of his criminal act, such as death that supervenes as a consequence of the injuries.” — The statement of the principle in Article 4(1).

• People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) and People vs. Sadia, Jr., 203 SCRA 62 (1991) — Cited by the trial court as authority for the penalty of reclusion perpetua under the application of penalty rules; implicitly modified on appeal.

• People vs. Barte, 230 SCRA 401 (1994); People vs. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754 (1994) — Relied on for the rule that credible and untarnished testimony of prosecution witnesses is entitled to full faith and credit, especially when untainted by improper motive.

• People vs. Gomes, 230 SCRA 270 (1994) — Cited for the doctrine that appellate courts respect the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility barring overlooked facts of substance.

• People vs. Espinosa, 243 SCRA 7 (1995) and People vs. Ponayo, G.R. No. 111523 (1994) — Applied to determine the penalty next lower in degree for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code (Treachery) — The Court found that the means employed (kicking an unconscious man) directly ensured execution without risk, satisfying the provision.

• Article 13, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code (Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong) — Appreciated because the accused intended to cause physical injuries, not death.

• Article 4, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Imposed criminal liability for all direct consequences of the voluntary felony, even if the resulting death was not intended.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (Murder, penalty prior to R.A. 7659) — Prescribed reclusion temporal maximum to death; the minimum period of this range applied due to the mitigating circumstance.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103) — Applied to fix a minimum term from the penalty next lower in degree.

• Republic Act No. 7659 — The amendment increasing the murder penalty to reclusion perpetua to death was held inapplicable because the crime occurred before its effectivity.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.

N/A — The decision was unanimous; no dissenting opinions were recorded.