People vs. Gado

Statements made by a stabbing victim identifying his assailant, uttered under a consciousness of impending death and immediately after the startling event, are admissible both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, and may support a murder conviction where the attack was executed in a manner that deprived the victim of any chance to defend himself.

On the evening of January 30, 1992, Melencio Manalang, Jr. and some friends had been drinking at the house of Juanito Vicente. The victim decided to leave, and Rey Gado, Juanito Vicente, Emma Gallos, and her brother accompanied him home. While they were walking along Fleur De Liz Street, the victim was held by his companions and stabbed in the abdomen by Rey Gado. The assailants fled after the victim freed himself. He threw a stone at them, then made his way home. A barangay tanod, Fernando Reyes, saw him and helped him. Upon reaching his house, the victim slumped to the floor, told his father he was weakening, identified Rey Gado as his assailant, and pleaded to be taken to the hospital. While being transported to Perpetual Help Hospital in Las Piñas, he again narrated the attack and named his attackers. He died at the hospital at around 2:00 a.m. on January 31, 1992.

• Prosecution Evidence: On January 30, 1992, the victim Melencio Manalang, Jr. was drinking with friends at Juanito Vicente’s house. When he decided to leave, appellant Rey Gado, Juanito Vicente, Emma Gallos, and Emma’s brother accompanied him. Along Fleur De Liz Street, his companions held him while appellant stabbed him in the abdomen. He freed himself, threw a stone at the fleeing assailants, and headed home. Barangay tanod Fernando Reyes met him and assisted him. Upon arriving home, the victim sat on the floor, weak and bleeding, told his father Melencio Manalang, Sr. that he was getting weak and had been stabbed by Rey Gado, and asked to be taken to the hospital. While riding a jeep to Perpetual Help Hospital, the victim again recounted the incident and identified Rey Gado, Emma Gallos, Juanito Vicente, and a tall man as his attackers. He died at the hospital around 2:00 a.m. on January 31, 1992. Dr. Alberto Reyes of the NBI Medico-Legal Division testified on the cause of death. The sworn statement of Fernando Reyes, who had purportedly witnessed the stabbing, was initially part of the prosecution’s evidence but was later retracted.

• Defense Evidence: Appellant Rey Gado denied involvement and interposed alibi, claiming he was tending his brother’s store at Sucat, Cupang, Muntinlupa, about five kilometers from the scene. Emma Gallos also claimed she was at home tending her sick daughter.

• Trial Court Findings: The trial court gave weight to the victim’s declarations as related by his father, considered them a dying declaration, and found treachery in the manner the attack was executed. Emma Gallos was acquitted.

• Recanted Eyewitness Affidavit: The trial court erred in considering the affidavit of Fernando Reyes, which the affiant had retracted.
• Inadmissibility of Dying Declaration: The victim’s statements to his father did not qualify as a dying declaration because they were not made under a clear consciousness of impending death, given that the victim was still able to stand, walk, and throw a stone after the stabbing.
• Rejection of Alibi: The trial court failed to give credence to appellant’s alibi that he was at his brother’s store five kilometers away when the crime occurred.
• Reasonable Doubt: The evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Dying Declaration: The victim’s statements were properly admitted as a dying declaration, the requisites having been met: the declaration concerned the cause and circumstances of death, the victim was conscious of impending death as shown by his statement that he was weakening and his insistence on immediate hospital treatment, he was competent, and the statement was offered in a murder case.
• Alternative Admissibility as Res Gestae: Even if the statements did not strictly qualify as a dying declaration, they were admissible as part of the res gestae because they were made immediately after the startling occurrence and before the victim had an opportunity to contrive.
• Weakness of Alibi: Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by the victim. Appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
• Treachery Properly Appreciated: The victim was held by appellant’s companions while appellant stabbed him, ensuring execution without risk to the assailants and depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself, constituting alevosia.

• Dying Declaration: Whether the statements of the victim to his father were admissible as a dying declaration.
• Res Gestae: Whether the same statements were admissible as part of the res gestae.
• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi should be given credence.
• Treachery: Whether the killing was qualified by treachery.
• Damages: Whether the award of actual damages was properly supported by evidence.

• Dying Declaration: The victim’s statements were correctly admitted as a dying declaration. The requisite consciousness of impending death was inferred from the victim’s insistence that he be brought to the hospital immediately, his statement that he was getting weaker, the gravity of the stab wound, and his death within hours thereafter. The declaration concerned the identity of the assailant and the circumstances of the stabbing, the victim was competent, and it was offered in a prosecution for murder.
• Res Gestae: The same statements were also admissible as part of the res gestae. The stabbing was a startling occurrence; the statements were made shortly after, before the victim had time to contrive; and they referred directly to the incident and its attending circumstances. The victim identified the same assailant on two occasions — at home and while en route to the hospital. Where the elements of both a dying declaration and part of the res gestae are present, the statement may be admitted under both exceptions to the hearsay rule.
• Alibi: Appellant’s alibi failed because he did not demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene, which was only five kilometers from his claimed location. Positive identification by the victim prevailed over the defense of alibi.
• Treachery: The killing was qualified to murder by treachery. Appellant and his companions were supposed to bring the victim home safely; instead, they held him defenseless while appellant stabbed him. The manner of attack ensured execution without risk to the assailants and deprived the victim of any opportunity to put up a defense.
• Damages: The award of actual damages was reduced from P50,000.00 to P23,217.65, the amount actually proved at trial. Actual damages cannot be presumed and must be established with reasonable certainty.

• Dying Declaration (Requisites): A hearsay statement is admissible as a dying declaration when: (1) it concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (4) it is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the declarant is the victim. The Court applied these requisites and found them satisfied, noting that consciousness of impending death may be inferred from the declarant’s acknowledgement of weakening, the seriousness of the wound, and the fact of death shortly afterwards.
• Res Gestae (Requisites): A statement is admissible as part of the res gestae when: (a) the principal act is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had the opportunity to contrive; and (c) the statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending circumstances. The Court applied this doctrine, holding that the victim’s statements immediately after the stabbing met all three requisites.
• Concurrent Admissibility: Where the elements of both a dying declaration and a statement as part of the res gestae are present, the declaration may be admitted under both exceptions simultaneously.
• Alibi (Physical Impossibility): For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

• “From the established facts in the case at bar, the trial court correctly considered the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible. The declarant was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only from the victim's insistence right after he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the hospital and that he was becoming weaker by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his wounds and the fact that the said victim died shortly afterwards.” — Articulates the factual basis for finding consciousness of impending death.
• “Where the elements of both a dying declaration and a statement as part of the res gestae are present, as in the case at bar, the statement may be admitted as a dying declaration and at the same time as part of the res gestae.” — States the rule on concurrent admissibility under both exceptions to the hearsay rule.
• “For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he has been elsewhere when the crime was committed but he must further demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.” — Restates the stringent standard for the defense of alibi.

• People vs. Israel, 231 SCRA 155 (1994); People vs. Lazarte, 200 SCRA 361 (1991) — Cited for the four requisites of a dying declaration.
• People vs. Sarabia, 127 SCRA 100 (1984); People vs. Araja, 105 SCRA 133 (1981) — Relied upon for the rule that consciousness of impending death may be inferred from the serious nature of the wound and the death occurring shortly after the declaration.
• People vs. Siscar, 140 SCRA 316 (1985) — Enumerated the requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae.
• People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil. 601 (1926); People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538 (1928); People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303 (1974) — Established that a victim’s statement, though not a dying declaration, may still be part of the res gestae if made immediately after or a few hours after the incident.
• People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859 (1983) — Held that a statement may be admitted simultaneously as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.
• People vs. Esquilona, 248 SCRA 139 (1995) — Stated the rule that for alibi to prosper, physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene must be shown.
• Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 348 (1995) — Cited for the principle that actual damages must be proved with reasonable certainty and cannot be presumed.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The trial court convicted appellant of Murder under this article, which punishes the killing of a person with qualifying circumstances such as treachery. The penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Puno, J., and Mendoza, J., concurred. Martinez, J., took no part.