People vs. Hanasan

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender requires that the offender has not been actually arrested and surrenders voluntarily to a person in authority; a confession made after an escape attempt while in custody does not satisfy these requisites. Evident premeditation is present when the lapse of time between the formulation of the plan and its execution is sufficient for meditation and reflection; abuse of confidence obtains when the victim’s trust in the offender facilitates the commission of the offense.

Sometime in mid-1964, Armingol Hanasan met Guillermo Literal, an illiterate man. They became close, and by January 1965 Literal moved into Hanasan’s house on Manga Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Manila, working as a helper in Hanasan’s buy-and-sell appliance business. Hanasan then persuaded Literal to obtain a P10,000 life insurance policy from Philippine American Life Insurance Company, with Hanasan — who posed as Jose N. Literal, allegedly the victim’s younger brother — as the principal beneficiary. The policy was issued on March 5, 1965. Hanasan waited for an opportunity to poison Literal with arsenic to collect the insurance proceeds.

• Relationship and Insurance Scheme: In mid-1964, Armingol Hanasan met Guillermo Literal, an illiterate man. By January 1965, Literal resided with Hanasan at 692 Manga Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Manila, and worked as a helper in Hanasan’s appliance business. Hanasan convinced Literal to insure his life for P10,000 with Philippine American Life Insurance Company, with Hanasan posing as Jose N. Literal, the victim’s younger brother, and being designated principal beneficiary. The application was thumbmarked by Literal on March 5, 1965, and the policy issued the same day.

• The Poisoning: On March 25, 1965, Hanasan decided to execute his plan. He sent his other companion, Rebecca, out of the house to avoid accidental poisoning. At lunchtime, while the table was set with rice and paksiw na galunggong, Hanasan poured an arsenic solution — which he had mixed with lye to make it more soluble and potent — onto Literal’s plate of rice and the fish dish. He distracted Literal by asking him to fetch drinking water and poured the solution while Literal’s back was turned. Literal consumed about three-fourths of the rice and six pieces of fish, and drank part of the sauce.

• Aftermath of Poisoning: More than an hour after eating, Literal began vomiting, complained of dizziness, and had loose bowels. Hanasan did nothing to alleviate his suffering except to heat water for a bath upon request. He initially claimed to have brought Literal to Dr. Ligaya C. Santos later that afternoon but concealed the arsenic poisoning, telling the doctor that the symptoms were caused by the fish. The doctor prescribed tablets, but Literal’s condition worsened. Hanasan did not bring him to a hospital. Literal died around 4:00 or 5:00 a.m. on March 27, 1965.

• Investigation and Confession: The NBI investigated Hanasan in connection with the death of another person, Rebecca Hernando. While in NBI custody, Hanasan denied poisoning Literal in statements dated November 18 and 21, 1965. Sometime in the first week of December 1965, he escaped from NBI custody but was immediately recaptured. On December 8, 1965, still in custody, he gave an extrajudicial confession in which he admitted pouring arsenic solution on Literal’s food and acknowledged responsibility for the deaths of three other persons. He affirmed this confession during trial.

• Toxicology Evidence: The NBI exhumed Literal’s remains. Toxicology Report No. T-65-826 showed that spectrographic examination of the right pelvic bone gave a positive result for traces of arsenic. Hanasan read and expressed belief in the findings.

• Death Certificate: The death certificate listed “gastro-enteritis” as the cause of death, with Hanasan as the informant. He had misled the attending physician, Dr. Santos, about the true cause of the illness.

• Cause of Death: Whether the victim died from arsenic poisoning.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly disregarded.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether evident premeditation and abuse of confidence were correctly appreciated.

• Cause of Death: The proof of record was indubitable that the effective cause of death was arsenic poisoning. Appellant admitted mixing arsenic with lye and pouring the solution on the victim’s food; the victim immediately exhibited symptoms of nausea, vomiting, and loose bowels after consuming it. The toxicology report on the exhumed pelvic bone yielded traces of arsenic. The death certificate’s mention of “gastro-enteritis” carried no weight because the informant was the appellant himself, who deliberately misled the physician by attributing the symptoms to the fish and concealing the arsenic administration.

• Voluntary Surrender: The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly denied. The requisites — that the offender has not been actually arrested, surrenders to a person in authority, and the surrender is voluntary — were not met. At the time of his confession on December 8, 1965, appellant was under NBI custody, had previously denied the crime, attempted escape, and was recaptured. Because he was already under arrest, voluntary surrender was no longer possible.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Evident premeditation was established. From the time appellant first conceived of insuring the victim’s life in January 1965, through the procurement of the policy on March 5, 1965, until the poisoning on March 25, 1965, a sufficient period elapsed to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. The crime was the product of cold-blooded scheming and persistent determination. Abuse of confidence was likewise present. Appellant befriended the illiterate victim, took him into his home, provided for his needs, and thereby gained the victim’s complete trust. This confidence enabled him to deceive the victim into thumbmarking the insurance application and to distract him during the meal to administer the poison unnoticed. The victim’s reliance on appellant as a benefactor directly facilitated the commission of the offense.

• Requisites for Voluntary Surrender — The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code requires: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (c) the surrender is voluntary. A confession made while already in custody, particularly after an attempted escape and recapture, lacks the essential element of surrender while at liberty.

• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation is present when: (a) the offender determines to commit the crime; (b) an interval of time sufficient for meditation and reflection elapses; and (c) the offender persists in the criminal determination. The period between the conception of the plan and its execution must allow the conscience to overcome the determination of the will if the offender desired to heed its warnings.

• Abuse of Confidence — Abuse of confidence as an aggravating circumstance requires that the offender took advantage of the victim’s trust and belief that no harm would come from him. It is present when the victim’s confidence directly facilitated the commission of the crime, such as when the offender acted as a benefactor or protector, and the victim’s trust allowed the offender to execute the criminal design without resistance or suspicion.

• “So that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may properly be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following requisites must concur: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (c) the surrender was voluntary.” — This passage articulates the controlling test for voluntary surrender, which the appellant failed to satisfy.

• “Undeniably present here is that period of time sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and long enough to allow the appellant’s conscience to overcome the determination of his will if he had desired to harken to its warnings.” — This language defines the evident premeditation standard applied to the two-month interval between the insurance scheme and the poisoning.

• “The victim’s confidence and trust in the appellant facilitated the commission of the crime, the latter taking advantage of the victim’s belief that he would not abuse the confidence reposed in him.” — This captures the essence of abuse of confidence in the relationship between appellant and the deceased.

• People vs. Conwi, 71 Phil. 595 — Applied as controlling authority on the requisites of voluntary surrender and the rule that surrender while already under arrest cannot be mitigating.

• People vs. Sarmiento, L-19146, May 31, 1963; People vs. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534; U.S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 531 — Cited to support the finding of evident premeditation, establishing that a sufficient lapse of time for reflection constitutes the aggravating circumstance.

• People vs. Luchico, 49 Phil. 689; Mariano vs. People, 68 Phil. 724 — Invoked as precedents on abuse of confidence, where the offender took advantage of the victim’s trust.

• People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 469 — Cited to justify increasing the civil indemnity to P12,000 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (Murder) — Applied as the offense committed; the killing qualified by means of poison, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of confidence, resulting in the imposition of death.

• Article 13, Revised Penal Code (Mitigating Circumstances) — Voluntary plea of guilty was credited pursuant to paragraph 7; voluntary surrender under paragraph 7 was disallowed because the requisites were not met.

• Article 14, Revised Penal Code (Aggravating Circumstances) — Evident premeditation (paragraph 13) and abuse of confidence (paragraph 4) were appreciated based on the factual findings.

• Section 9, Rule 122, Rules of Court — The automatic review of the death sentence by the Supreme Court was pursuant to this rule.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concurred. Barredo, J., took no part. Reyes, J.B.L., J., was on leave.