People vs. Hernando

A judgment of acquittal cannot be set aside through certiorari — even if it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion — unless the criminal proceedings were an absolute nullity for lack of due process; where the prosecution had the opportunity to present evidence, cross‑examine witnesses, and seek reconsideration or a timely petition before the acquittal was promulgated, the acquittal is not void, and the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy attaches and bars any appeal or review.

On November 27, 1978, Romeo Dukinal was stabbed and his companion William Gonzales was stoned inside a beerhouse in Dolores, Abra. Three persons — Cosme Calibuso, Ernesto Calibuso, and Rey Tubana — together with two others who remained at large, were charged with frustrated murder. After trial, the presiding judge of the Abra Court of First Instance, respondent Harold M. Hernando, credited the positive identification by Dukinal and Gonzales and convicted the three respondents of the crime charged. The convicted accused then sought a new trial on the strength of affidavits from two individuals who claimed that it was actually William Gonzales who stabbed Dukinal during a quarrel between the two companions. Respondent judge granted the motion, immediately heard a new witness, and on the same evidentiary record issued an amended decision acquitting all the accused. The People challenged the acquittal directly before the Supreme Court, alleging deprivation of due process and grave abuse of discretion.

• The Stabbing Incident: On November 27, 1978, at about 4:30 p.m., inside a beerhouse in Modiit, Dolores, Abra, Romeo Dukinal was stabbed and his companion William Gonzales was stoned. The prosecution’s evidence showed that Cosme Calibuso, after being refused the use of a motorcycle, ordered his co‑accused to “kill them and give them reminder,” whereupon Rey Tubana stabbed Dukinal and the others threw stones at Dukinal and Gonzales. Both victims identified the three accused as the perpetrators.

• The Original Trial and Conviction: The accused pleaded not guilty and set up a general denial. On July 10, 1980, respondent judge rendered a decision finding the three private respondents guilty of frustrated murder. The conviction rested on the clear and positive identification by the victims, the existence of conspiracy, and the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.

• Post‑Conviction Motions: On July 18, 1980, the Calibusos moved for reconsideration. On July 23, 1980, all three accused filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion for New Trial. They alleged the discovery of new evidence: an affidavit from Leonico Talingdan stating that William Gonzales had stabbed Dukinal after an argument between the two companions, and an affidavit from Nory S. Fernandez, a waitress, confirming the quarrel. The prosecution opposed, arguing that the proposed testimony was not newly discovered because the witnesses were known and present during trial, and that it would not alter the judgment.

• The July 25, 1980 Hearing: During the joint hearing on July 25, 1980, respondent judge orally denied the motion for reconsideration and declared: “New trial is given due course. You can present now your witness companero.” The Fiscal was allowed to cross‑examine Leonico Talingdan at length. A written order issued that same day provided: “For lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration from the decision of this Court is hereby denied. Set the promulgation of the decision on the basis of the new trial on August 1, 1980 at 8:00 o’clock in the morning.”

• The Amended Decision of Acquittal: On August 1, 1980, respondent judge issued an Amended Decision. It recounted Talingdan’s testimony that Gonzales had quarreled with Dukinal, threatened him, and then stabbed him with a knife taken from his waist. Finding that this testimony had “completely erased any and all criminal liability” of the accused, the judge acquitted all respondents and ordered their bail bonds released.

• Denial of Reconsideration: The prosecution sought reconsideration, asserting that the Amended Decision violated due process, that the evidence was not newly discovered, and that it was insufficient to overturn the conviction. Respondent judge denied reconsideration, grounding his ruling on the principle of double jeopardy.

• Denial of Due Process: The People argued that the prosecution was deprived of its day in court because the Fiscal was not permitted to fully argue against the motion for new trial before the court granted it and proceeded directly to hear the new witness.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of discretion in granting new trial and issuing the Amended Decision of acquittal. The evidence offered — the testimonies of Talingdan and Fernandez — was not newly discovered; the witnesses were known to the defense during the trial, their testimony could have been produced with reasonable diligence, and it was merely impeaching in nature, incapable of altering the judgment of conviction.

• Double Jeopardy Not a Bar: The People contended that the acquittal was void for having been rendered without due process and could therefore be set aside without offending the proscription against double jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy Bar: Private respondents and respondent judge premised their defense on the finality of the acquittal and the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Because the accused had been formally acquitted, the judgment could no longer be appealed or reopened.

• No Denial of Due Process: It was argued that the prosecution had the opportunity to cross‑examine the new witness, to argue against the motion, and to seek reconsideration or an appropriate remedy before promulgation of the acquittal. Hence, the proceedings were not a nullity.

• Due Process: Whether the People was deprived of its day in court without due process of law.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse of discretion in granting new trial and issuing the Amended Decision of acquittal.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether granting the petition for certiorari would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

• Due Process: No denial of due process occurred. The transcript of the July 25, 1980 hearing showed that the Fiscal was given an opportunity to oppose the motion for new trial, albeit the judge halted his argument for being discursive, and was permitted to cross‑examine the new witness extensively. The written order of that date plainly granted a new trial and set the promulgation for August 1, 1980. Between the grant of new trial and the promulgation of the amended decision, the prosecution could have moved for reconsideration of the order granting new trial or filed a petition for certiorari to challenge it, but it did not. Consequently, the proceedings did not amount to an absolute nullity.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The testimony sought to be introduced was not “newly discovered evidence” within the contemplation of Section 2(b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. The witnesses were known to the accused and could have been produced at trial with reasonable diligence; their testimony was “forgotten evidence,” not a proper ground for new trial. Moreover, the proffered evidence was essentially impeaching and could not have altered the original judgment, which rested on the victims’ positive identification of the accused.

• Double Jeopardy: Relief was barred by the fundamental principle of double jeopardy. The judgment of acquittal was not void because the proceedings were not an absolute nullity. The prosecution was not completely prevented from presenting its evidence or from rebutting the new testimony; it had its day in court. Errors or irregularities that do not render the proceedings a nullity will not defeat a plea of autrefois acquit. Although the acquittal was rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the error was a reversible one, not a jurisdictional defect that would strip the judgment of its character as a final verdict protected by the double jeopardy clause.

• Newly Discovered Evidence as Ground for New Trial — Under Section 2(b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, evidence qualifies as newly discovered only if it was discovered after trial, could not have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence, and would probably change the judgment. Forgotten evidence — evidence known to a party before or during trial but not presented — is not newly discovered evidence. Impeaching evidence that merely affects the credibility of witnesses is likewise insufficient to support a new trial.

• Double Jeopardy and Void Judgments of Acquittal — The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy bars review of an acquittal unless the judgment is void. An acquittal is void only when the proceedings that produced it were an absolute nullity, such as when the prosecution was entirely denied its day in court or deprived of due process. Where the prosecution had the opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, to cross‑examine witnesses, and to seek timely judicial recourse before the acquittal was promulgated, the judgment of acquittal is not void, and double jeopardy attaches even if the acquittal was infected with grave abuse of discretion.

• “Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of autrefois acquit.”

• “The facts sought to be established by the testimonies of witnesses Talingdan and Fernandez could not be considered newly discovered evidence within the meaning of the law (Sec. 2(b), Rule 121, Rules of Court). They could have been discovered and produced during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. They were forgotten evidence, which is not a ground for new trial.”

• “What was committed by respondent Judge was a reversible error but which did not render the proceedings an absolute nullity.”

• People vs. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 (1948) — Cited for the rule that forgotten evidence is not newly discovered evidence within the meaning of the rule on new trial.

• People vs. Evaristo, 13 SCRA 172, 184 (1965); Lee Cheng Poe, 39 Phil. 466 (1919) — Relied upon for the principle that evidence which is essentially impeaching cannot serve as a basis for a new trial.

• Commonwealth vs. Goddard, 13 Mass. 458 — Invoked for the cardinal rule that errors not rendering the proceedings a nullity cannot defeat a plea of autrefois acquit.

• People vs. Balicasan, 17 SCRA 1119 (1966) — Referred to for the proposition that a judgment of acquittal rendered without due process is a nullity and does not give rise to double jeopardy.

• Section 2(b), Rule 121, Rules of Court — Governs new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Court applied the provision strictly, holding that the proffered testimony was forgotten evidence and could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, thus failing the statutory standard.

• Article IV, Section 22, 1973 Constitution — Enshrines the prohibition against double jeopardy. The judgment of acquittal, although erroneous, was not void; therefore, the constitutional guarantee precluded its review.

Acting Chairman Makasiar, and Justices Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro (designated to sit in the First Division in lieu of Justice Teehankee, who was on official leave) concurred.