People vs. Judavar

Treachery qualifies a killing to murder when the victim is attacked suddenly from behind while unarmed and unaware, leaving no opportunity for self-defense, but evident premeditation requires clear proof of deliberate planning over a sufficient period of reflection, not mere inferences from prior threats or altercations. Without evident premeditation, and in the absence of any other generic aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty for murder is the lesser of the two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua.

In the early hours of February 15, 1995, during a Valentine’s dance at the Caranday Public Market in Baao, Camarines Sur, Arnel Dato was stabbed to death. The accused, Francisco M. Judavar, had a history of conflict with the victim over the affections of Margie Malazarte, their high school classmate. Two prior incidents in 1994 involved Judavar punching and threatening Dato. On the night of the killing, Judavar approached Dato from behind, stabbed him with a ten-inch knife, and fled. The commotion led to another stabbing of a barangay tanod. The accused could not be located in the municipality afterward and was eventually arrested only in August 1997.

• Nature: Automatic review of a conviction for murder and imposition of the death penalty by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Iriga City.
• Prosecution’s Version: On February 14, 1995, a Valentine’s dance was held at the Caranday Public Market. Arnel Dato, 18, attended with his sweetheart Margie Malazarte. At around 2:00 a.m. on February 15, Margie briefly left Arnel, who stood watching the dancers. Francisco M. Judavar approached Arnel from behind and, without warning, swung a ten-inch knife into Arnel’s right chest. Arnel fell bleeding. Margie screamed Judavar’s name as the attacker. Judavar fled with the knife. Barangay tanod Francisco Cabalquinto, who witnessed the stabbing, was stabbed twice in the back by Brigido Bustarda, a friend of accused, and was about to be attacked further when chief tanod Nardito Dato sprayed tear gas. Nardito chased Judavar but failed to catch him. Arnel was declared dead at the hospital due to hemorrhagic shock from the stab wound.
• Motive and Prior Incidents: In 1993, Judavar and Arnel were rivals for Margie’s affection; she chose Arnel. On September 24, 1994, at a chapel novena, Judavar punched Arnel and warned he would kill him if he did not leave Margie. On October 12, 1994, at a barangay fiesta dance, Judavar again punched and attempted to stab Arnel; Margie screamed and Judavar fled.
• Defense’s Version: Judavar claimed he was at the dance with friends when a commotion occurred; they left hurriedly. His witness Juansus Botor saw a man with an icepick stab someone but could not identify the person. Judavar denied courting Margie and any grudge.
• Identification and Flight: Three witnesses—Roberto Robosa (five meters away), Nardito Dato (ten meters away), and Francisco Cabalquinto (more than a meter away)—positively identified Judavar as the assailant under adequate lighting. After the incident, Judavar could not be located in Caranday or Baao; he was reportedly in Metro Manila and was finally arrested in Iriga City in August 1997, over two years later.
• Medical Evidence: Dr. Ruperto Alfelor found a stab wound at the right hypochondrium, with an upward trajectory from lower ribs towards the liver, consistent with a right-handed assailant striking from behind. Judavar claimed left-handedness, demonstrated in court by catching a pen and writing with his left hand, but Margie knew him as right-handed, and no evidence was presented that he could not use his right hand.
• Damages: Nonito Dato, the victim’s father, spent for funeral and wake. Official receipts showed P17,500 for funeral services and P22,433.30 for food and drinks, totaling P39,933.30. The trial court awarded P60,358.30 based partly on unofficial receipts.

(Note: The caption names the People as plaintiff-appellee, but the appealing party is the accused, referred to as defendant-appellant. For digest purposes, the “petitioner” here is the accused-appellant raising errors.)

• Error in Conviction and Penalty: The trial court gravely erred in convicting appellant of murder and imposing the death penalty.
• Absence of Treachery and Evident Premeditation: The killing was not attended by treachery or evident premeditation; it was death in a tumultuous affray, arising from a commotion involving several persons.
• Error in Damages: The awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages were erroneous.
• Left-handedness: Appellant demonstrated left-handedness, making it improbable he delivered the fatal right-handed stab wound; the prosecution failed to rebut this.
• Motion for New Trial: Appellant sought reconsideration of the denial of his motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence—testimonies that would show Nicolas Saniel was the real culprit, which he had withheld because Saniel was his best friend and he believed other witnesses would come forward.

The Office of the Solicitor General (appellee) defended the conviction and the qualifying circumstances, filing a Comment opposing the motion for new trial.

• Sufficiency of Identification: Three credible eyewitnesses, including a disinterested witness, positively identified appellant as the assailant, outweighing any claim of left-handedness.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: The attack from behind without warning constituted treachery; the prior threats and physical assaults demonstrated evident premeditation.
• Propriety of Damages: The awards were proper and supported by the evidence.
• Motion for New Trial: The purported newly-discovered evidence was not actually discovered after trial (appellant knew of it), could have been produced with reasonable diligence, and was merely corroborative.

• Tumultuous Affray: Whether the killing occurred in the course of a tumultuous affray, negating individual criminal responsibility.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses, some of whom were relatives of the victim, was credible and sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Left-handedness: Whether appellant’s claim of left-handedness cast reasonable doubt on his identification as the person who inflicted the upward, right-handed stab wound.
• Flight: Whether appellant’s flight and absence from Caranday for over two years indicated guilt.
• Treachery: Whether the killing was attended by treachery to qualify the crime as murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Damages: Whether the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages were proper.
• Motion for New Trial: Whether the motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence should be granted.

• Tumultuous Affray: The killing was not committed in a tumultuous affray. Three witnesses testified directly to seeing appellant approach the victim from behind and stab him. The commotion ensued after the stabbing, as people scattered and a barangay tanod was assaulted. The stabbing itself caused the chaos, not vice versa.
• Credibility of Witnesses: The positive identification by Roberto Robosa, Nardito Dato, and Francisco Cabalquinto was credible, candid, straightforward, and free from material inconsistencies. The fact that two witnesses were uncles of the victim did not ipso facto render their testimonies biased; there was no evidence of ill motive to testify falsely. Their accounts were corroborated by Robosa, who was not a relative.
• Left-handedness: Appellant’s demonstration of left-handedness did not preclude the possibility that he could use his right hand; ambidexterity is common knowledge. He failed to present proof of inability to use his right hand. Margie Malazarte knew him as right-handed. More importantly, regardless of handedness, three credible witnesses positively identified him as the assailant.
• Flight: Appellant’s unexplained flight from Caranday immediately after the stabbing and his absence for over two years, resulting in unserved warrants, indicated consciousness of guilt.
• Treachery: Treachery attended the killing. The victim was standing alone watching dancers when appellant approached him from behind and stabbed him suddenly and unexpectedly, without warning. This mode of attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate and ensured the assailant’s safety. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated, elevating the crime to murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The requisites—(a) time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) overt act indicating he clung to that determination, and (c) sufficient lapse of time for reflection—were not established by clear and positive evidence. The two prior incidents of punching and threats, while showing jealousy and animosity, did not demonstrate cool reflection and deliberate planning. They could have been impulsive acts of a spurned lover. Mere inferences are insufficient.
• Damages: Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 was affirmed per prevailing jurisprudence. Moral damages of P20,000.00 were justified by the father’s testimony of the family’s loss. Actual damages were reduced to P39,933.30, representing only the amounts supported by official receipts; the trial court erroneously included sums based on unofficial scraps of paper.
• Motion for New Trial: The motion for new trial was properly denied. The evidence was not newly discovered because appellant allegedly knew the real culprit’s identity all along. His detention did not excuse failure to produce witnesses with reasonable diligence; there was no showing he was deprived of legal counsel or assistance, nor that he sought court assistance to summon unwilling witnesses. The proposed testimonies were merely cumulative and corroborative of the defense of denial already presented.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. A sudden and unexpected attack from behind on an unarmed and unaware victim, giving no opportunity to defend or retaliate, constitutes treachery.
• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating the offender clung to that determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The essence is cool thought and reflection. Mere presumptions and inferences from prior threats or altercations are insufficient; the evidence must demonstrate deliberate planning based on external facts that are evident, not merely suspected.
• Positive Identification vs. Denial and Alibi — Positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over denial and uncorroborated alibi. Relationship to the victim does not automatically impair credibility absent proof of improper motive.
• Flight as Indication of Guilt — The unexplained flight of the accused immediately after the crime and subsequent unlocated absence are indications of guilt.
• Motion for New Trial on Newly-Discovered Evidence — The requisites are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) it could not have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable diligence; (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it would probably change the judgment if admitted. Evidence known to the accused during trial does not qualify.
• Actual Damages — Actual damages must be supported by competent proof, such as official receipts; sums proved only by unofficial documents cannot be awarded.

• “The fact that appellant is left-handed does not rule out the possibility that he is also right-handed. If indeed he is left-handed, he should have presented proof that he could not perform manual work with his right hand or that he has lost the use of his right hand. It is common knowledge that some people are ambidextrous, meaning, that they are capable of using both hands with equal ease.” — The Court disposed of the handedness argument by shifting the burden to the appellant to show complete inability, while emphasizing that positive identification overrides physical speculation.
• “The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.” — This clarifies the core requirement of a reflective interval, distinguishing premeditated murder from impulsive acts.
• “Evident premeditation must be clearly proven, established beyond reasonable doubt and must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning.” — The standard of proof is emphasized, rejecting reliance on inferences from prior quarrels.

• People v. Guillermo, 302 SCRA 257 (1999) — Cited for the propositions that relationship to a victim does not ipso facto render witness testimony biased, and for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People v. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66 (1999) — Followed for the rule that relatives’ testimonies are not automatically tainted with bias.
• People v. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996) and People v. Lopez, 246 SCRA 95 (1995) — Cited for the principle that flight is an indication of guilt.
• People v. Timblor, 285 SCRA 64 (1998) — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation and the standard award of civil indemnity.
• People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 (1998) — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation.
• People v. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27 (1998) — Followed for the definition of the essence of evident premeditation as cool thought and reflection.
• People v. Pena, 291 SCRA 606 (1998) and People v. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451 (1998) — Cited for the standard that evident premeditation must be based on clear external facts, not mere presumptions.
• People v. Chua, 297 SCRA 229 (1998) — Followed for the insufficiency of mere inferences to prove evident premeditation.
• People v. Tirona, 300 SCRA 431 (1998) — Cited for the requisites of a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. Applied to the killing qualified by treachery, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The absence of evident premeditation and any generic aggravating circumstance led to the imposition of the lesser penalty, reclusion perpetua.
• Rule 121, Section 2(b), 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (now also Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) — Enumerates the requisites for a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence. Applied in denying appellant’s motion because the evidence was not newly-discovered and was merely cumulative.
• Civil Code provisions on damages — Applied in determining the proper awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages, specifically requiring competent proof for actual damages.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concurred.

N/A (Decision was unanimous; no dissents recorded.)