People vs. Juliano

The prima facie evidence of deceit under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code does not arise when the payee, upon giving verbal notice of the dishonor of a postdated check, contemporaneously accepts replacement checks and surrenders the original check, thereby releasing the drawer from the obligation to deposit the covering amount within three days from notice.

On July 27, 1991, Lea Sagan Juliano purchased 190 sacks of milled rice worth ₱89,800 from JCT Agro-Development Corporation (JCT) in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. She issued a postdated check — PCIB Check No. 142254 dated July 30, 1991 — drawn against Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB), Isulan Branch. The sale was evidenced by an Ordered Goods Slip bearing the check number. When JCT’s acting manager, Remedios Torres, presented the check for encashment on its due date, it was dishonored for “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” Torres verbally informed Juliano of the dishonor. Thereafter, the parties dealt with the bounced check through replacement checks and a promissory note, giving rise to the criminal charge for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), in relation to the original check.

• The Purchase and Initial Postdated Check: On July 27, 1991, appellant Lea Sagan Juliano purchased 190 sacks of milled rice valued at ₱89,800 from complainant JCT Agro-Development Corporation. As payment, she issued PCIB Check No. 142254, postdated July 30, 1991, drawn against PCIB Isulan Branch. JCT’s acting manager, Remedios Torres, accepted the check and recorded the transaction in Ordered Goods Slip No. 5452, which reflected the check number.

• Dishonor and Verbal Notice: On July 30, 1991, Torres presented the check for encashment; the drawee bank dishonored it for “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” Torres then asked a third person to tell appellant to visit JCT’s office because the check had bounced. Appellant went to the office, where Torres showed her the dishonored check.

• Replacement Checks and Surrender of the Original: During the same visit, appellant pleaded for consideration and asked to issue replacement checks. Torres agreed, accepting: (1) PCIB Check No. 145452 dated August 20, 1991 for ₱50,000; and (2) PCIB Check No. 145454 dated August 22, 1991 for ₱39,800. Torres simultaneously surrendered the original dishonored check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant and revised the Ordered Goods Slip accordingly. Torres did not demand that appellant fund the original check within three days.

• Dishonor of Replacement Checks and Demand: On their respective due dates, both replacement checks were likewise dishonored for “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” JCT, through Torres, sent a demand letter dated August 31, 1991, which appellant received on September 6, 1991.

• Promissory Note and Partial Payment: Appellant went to JCT’s office again. Torres brought her before a PNP officer, Major Salvador. On September 10, 1991, appellant executed a promissory note undertaking to pay ₱89,800 in five staggered installments. Through her driver, appellant later sent ₱10,000 for the first installment due on September 16, 1991; JCT rejected it because it was short by ₱10,000. Appellant made no further payments.

• Final Demand: JCT sent another demand letter dated October 21, 1991, by registered mail, reiterating the dishonor and giving appellant five days from receipt to pay ₱89,800; otherwise, legal action would be initiated.

• Trial Court’s Factual Basis: The RTC convicted appellant of estafa on the strength of the original check (PCIB Check No. 142254), finding that the insufficiency of funds at the time of issuance and her failure to deposit the covering amount within three days from verbal notice of dishonor constituted the prima facie evidence of deceit under Article 315, paragraph 2(d).

• Proof of Deceit: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) when she issued the original postdated check.

• Prima Facie Presumption: Whether the prima facie evidence of deceit under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) — arising from failure to deposit the covering amount within three days from notice of dishonor — attached despite the complainant’s contemporaneous acceptance of replacement checks and surrender of the original dishonored check.

• Liability Based on Replacement Checks: Whether appellant could be convicted of estafa based on the dishonor of replacement checks issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation. (Not reached)

• Proof of Deceit: Deceit was not established. The prosecution’s own evidence showed that JCT, through its acting manager, knew at the time of issuance that the postdated check was not yet funded and would rely on a clearing transaction on the maturity date. Appellant did not falsely represent that she had sufficient funds on the date of issuance; she merely assured the payee that the check would be covered by July 30. Because there was no misrepresentation as to present funds, the element of false pretense or fraudulent act attendant at issuance was lacking.

• Prima Facie Presumption: The prima facie presumption of deceit did not arise because the payee’s own conduct prevented the condition from maturing. When Torres verbally informed appellant of the dishonor, she did not demand funding of the original check within three days. Instead, she accepted two replacement checks and simultaneously surrendered the original dishonored check. This act communicated that JCT no longer held appellant liable under the original check, thereby relieving her of the obligation to deposit the covering amount within the three-day window. The failure to fund could not, under those circumstances, be treated as prima facie evidence of deceit. The prosecution’s case was further weakened by the non-production of the original check, which had been surrendered to appellant.

• Liability Based on Replacement Checks: The issue was not discussed, as the trial court did not base the estafa conviction on the replacement checks.

• Prima Facie Evidence of Deceit under Article 315(2)(d) — Contingent Nature — Under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), the failure of the drawer to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor constitutes prima facie evidence of deceit. This presumption, however, is contingent upon the existence of a subsisting obligation to fund the check. If the payee’s own contemporaneous act — such as accepting replacement checks and surrendering the dishonored check — releases the drawer from liability under that original instrument, the drawer is no longer obliged to fund it within the three-day period, and the presumption does not attach. The payee’s conduct thus extinguishes the factual predicate for the statutory inference of fraud.

• Elements of Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) — The elements are: (1) the offender postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of postdating or issuance; (2) at that time, the offender had no funds or insufficient funds in the bank; and (3) the payee was defrauded. Deceit and damage are essential; the false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneous with the issuance of the bad check. A mere failure to make good the check is not equivalent to deceit if the circumstances negate the required fraudulent intent.

• “Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant no longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, within the required period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant. For it was due to complainant JCT’s own act of accepting the replacement checks and surrendering the first check to appellant that appellant was no longer obliged to deposit the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor as JCT was no longer holding her liable for payment under the said check.”

• “It would have been different if JCT accepted the replacement checks three days after appellant’s receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor of the first check, because by then the prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant for failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, would have been established.”

• “JCT led appellant to believe that she no longer had to deposit the necessary amount to cover the first check within three days from the verbal notice of dishonor.”

• People v. Holzer, 319 Phil. 196 — Enumerated the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) and was applied as the governing framework for the offense.
• People v. Chua, 315 SCRA 326 (1999) — Cited for the rule that damage and deceit are essential elements that must be proved with satisfactory proof, and that the false pretense or fraudulent act must be prior to or simultaneous with the issuance of the bad check.
• People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004 — Referenced for the three-day period within which the drawer must cover the check to avoid the prima facie presumption of deceit.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa by postdating or issuing a check with insufficient funds and establishes the prima facie presumption of deceit upon failure to deposit the covering amount within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor. The provision was the sole basis of the charge. The conviction was set aside because the statutory presumption did not operate under the facts.
• Presidential Decree No. 818, Section 1 — Amended the penalty for estafa under Article 315(2)(d) by providing a graduated scale; under its terms, an amount of ₱89,800 would warrant reclusion perpetua. Cited only by the Court of Appeals in determining the penalty that necessitated certification to the Supreme Court, and rendered moot by the acquittal.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concurred.