People vs. Maquilan

A petition for habeas corpus as a post‑conviction remedy presupposes a final judgment; where an appeal remains pending, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to order the release of the accused, and any release obtained on the basis of a misrepresentation that the conviction is final is void and constitutes unlawful interference with the appellate court’s proceedings.

Emma Maquilan was charged with selling 55 sticks of marijuana cigarettes and one matchbox of marijuana seeds in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The crime was allegedly committed in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. The prosecution presented evidence that a poseur‑buyer purchased marijuana from her and that additional sticks were seized from a cabinet in her possession. The trial court found her guilty and imposed reclusion perpetua.

• Conviction and Appeal: Emma Maquilan was convicted by the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, for selling 55 sticks of marijuana cigarettes and one matchbox of marijuana seeds. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered the destruction of the seized items. She timely appealed, and the records were transmitted to the Supreme Court, where the case was docketed as G.R. No. 126170.

• Motion to Withdraw Appeal: Before the Supreme Court could require the filing of an appellant’s brief, Maquilan submitted a handwritten motion to withdraw her appeal. She expressed her intention to file a petition for habeas corpus to seek her release, invoking the welfare of her children. The Solicitor General interposed no objection, relying on the ruling in People v. Mendoza that withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee’s brief is allowed.

• Habeas Corpus Petition and Release: Without awaiting the Court’s resolution on her motion to withdraw, Maquilan, assisted by Atty. Editha C. Pio of the Public Attorney’s Office, filed a petition for habeas corpus before Branch 71 of the RTC of Pasig City. She alleged that she was detained “by reason of a final decision” of the trial court — a statement she knew to be false because her appeal remained pending. The respondent, Correctional Institution for Women Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo, filed a comment interposing no objection. The RTC conducted hearings, received evidence on the weight of the marijuana (a certification placed the total weight below 250 grams), and applied the penalty reduction under R.A. No. 7659 as interpreted in People v. Simon. Concluding that Maquilan had already served more than the maximum imposable penalty, the RTC granted the petition and ordered her immediate release on July 7, 1997.

• Discovery by the Supreme Court: After learning that Maquilan had been released, the Supreme Court directed Judge Laviña to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for interfering with a pending appeal. Judge Laviña explained that his court had been misled by the petition’s averment that the criminal decision was final and that, based on the evidence and prevailing jurisprudence, the penalty had been fully served.

• Voluntariness of Withdrawal: Accused-appellant Maquilan argued that her motion to withdraw the appeal was made freely and voluntarily, as certified by prison authorities, to enable her to pursue habeas corpus.

• Entitlement to Release: She maintained that under the retroactive application of the reduced penalties introduced by R.A. No. 7659, the marijuana involved weighed less than 250 grams, making the correct penalty prision correccional; she had already served a period exceeding the maximum, rendering her continued detention illegal.

• No Objection to Withdrawal: The Solicitor General, as counsel for the People, stated he had no objection to the withdrawal of the appeal, citing the rule in People v. Mendoza that an appeal may be withdrawn before the appellee’s brief is filed.

• Propriety of Habeas Corpus: After the release, the Solicitor General maintained that the habeas corpus petition was the proper remedy, supported by evidence and jurisprudence, and reiterated his non‑objection to the withdrawal.

• Withdrawal of Appeal: Whether the motion to withdraw her appeal should be granted given that the accused had already been released on the basis of a habeas corpus petition that misrepresented the finality of the conviction.

• Validity of Habeas Corpus Release: Whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City had jurisdiction to grant the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the accused while her appeal remained pending and the conviction had not attained finality.

• Contempt for Misrepresentation: Whether the accused, her counsel, and the prison superintendent should be held in contempt for falsely representing to the trial court that the criminal case had been finally decided.

• Withdrawal of Appeal: The motion to withdraw the appeal was denied. The release secured through habeas corpus was void because the RTC lacked jurisdiction; allowing withdrawal of the appeal under these circumstances would lend validity to an unlawful interference with the appellate process. The Court refused to sanction a subterfuge designed to circumvent the pendency of an appeal.

• Validity of Habeas Corpus Release: The RTC order granting habeas corpus and directing release was void for lack of jurisdiction. Habeas corpus as a post‑conviction remedy presupposes a final judgment by virtue of which the accused is detained. Because the conviction was still under appeal, the decision had not become final, and the RTC had no authority to order Maquilan’s release on the ground that the penalty had been served. The Court analogized to the rule on pardons established in People v. Salle, Jr. and People v. Bacang: no post‑conviction remedy requiring a final judgment can be granted during the pendency of an appeal; any release obtained without prior withdrawal of the appeal renders the officials responsible administratively liable.

• Contempt for Misrepresentation: Maquilan, Atty. Pio, and Superintendent Ruelo were required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for misrepresenting to the Pasig RTC that Criminal Case No. S‑2191 had been decided by final judgment, when in truth an appeal was still pending before the Supreme Court.

• Final Judgment Requirement for Post‑Conviction Remedies — A conviction that is on appeal is not a “final judgment” for purposes of post‑conviction remedies such as habeas corpus or pardon. The pendency of an appeal deprives the convict of the right to seek release based solely on the supposed illegality of detention arising from the conviction, because the judgment is not yet final and executory. The Court applied this principle to void the habeas corpus order and to require rearrest.

• Unlawful Interference with Appellate Proceedings — The premature release of an accused by virtue of pardon, commutation, parole, or habeas corpus while an appeal is pending constitutes unlawful interference with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Those responsible — including the custodial official and the convict — may be held administratively liable and cited for contempt. The acceptance of such a release does not operate as a withdrawal or abandonment of the appeal.

• Withdrawal of Appeal Before Appellee’s Brief — While an appeal may generally be withdrawn before the filing of the appellee’s brief, the Court may deny the motion when the withdrawal is part of a scheme to validate an otherwise void release and would prejudice the orderly administration of justice.

• “The use of the high prerogative writ as a post‑conviction remedy presupposes a final judgment by virtue of which accused is detained for the service of his sentence.”

• “The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable.” (Quoting People v. Salle, Jr. and People v. Bacang)

• People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44 (1996) — Applied as controlling by analogy: the Court reiterated that pardon cannot be granted while an appeal is pending, and release before withdrawal of appeal renders the responsible parties administratively liable, requiring rearrest.

• People v. Salle, Jr., 250 SCRA 581 (1996) — The doctrinal source of the rule that conviction must be final before post‑conviction remedies like pardon may be granted; quoted extensively to support the voiding of the habeas corpus release.

• People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994) — Cited by the RTC in reducing the penalty based on the weight of marijuana under R.A. No. 7659; acknowledged by the Supreme Court as correct law but applicable only upon final judgment.

• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Retroactivity of penal laws favorable to the accused. The Court acknowledged that this provision applies to special laws like R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659, but it may be invoked only after final conviction, not during the pendency of an appeal.

• Section 19, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional limitation that the President’s pardon power applies only to “conviction by final judgment”; invoked in the Salle and Bacang line of cases that the Court extended by analogy to habeas corpus as a post‑conviction remedy.

Justices Melo, Puno, and Martinez concurred. Justice Regalado was on leave.