People vs. Naag

An extrajudicial confession is inadmissible where the accused was interrogated without counsel and did not effectively waive his Miranda rights, a valid waiver requiring not merely a recitation of rights but an express inquiry whether the accused was willing to testify without counsel and, if he cannot afford one, whether he desired appointment of counsel. Nevertheless, a dying declaration that is complete so far as the declarant intended and is corroborated by circumstantial evidence of presence, flight, and motive can sustain a murder conviction.

Spouses Atty. Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. and Rosita Fontelera were repeatedly stabbed inside their residence in Olongapo City on the afternoon of November 15, 1990. Rosita Fontelera, despite sustaining fatal wounds, fled to a neighboring pizza parlor crying out “Edwin, Edwin” and “Edwin, Novaliches.” The Fonteleras’ former caretaker, Edwin Naag, who had been evicted from their Novaliches property, was arrested in Quezon City the following day and brought to Olongapo, where he executed an extrajudicial confession after being informed of his rights in the presence of a lawyer. He was charged with two counts of murder, tried, and convicted by the Regional Trial Court.

• Charges: Edwin Naag y Roque and Joselito Alcantara were charged in an amended information with two counts of murder for the killing of spouses Atty. Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. and Rosita Fontelera, allegedly committed with treachery, evident premeditation, and conspiracy. Only Naag was arrested; Alcantara remained at large.

• The Incident and Discovery: On November 15, 1990, at around 5:00 p.m., the Fonteleras were attacked inside their home at 21 21st Street, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. Police received a report at 6:20 p.m. and proceeded to the residence, where they found the body of Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. bearing multiple wounds. A kitchen knife with a brown handle was recovered on top of the lavatory. Rosita Fontelera, seriously wounded, managed to reach the nearby Siesta Pizza parlor, where she repeatedly cried out “Si Edwin, si Edwin” and “Edwin, taga-Novaliches.” She died upon arrival at the hospital.

• Autopsy Findings: Dr. Richard Patilano conducted autopsies the same evening. Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. sustained 46 stab wounds, many fatal, severing the right jugular vessels and penetrating the lung and liver. Rosita Fontelera suffered seven stab wounds, one of which pierced the right side of the heart causing massive bleeding. The medico-legal officer opined that Rosita did not die immediately; both victims were stabbed with a pointed, non-double-bladed instrument. The cause of death for each was hypovolemic shock due to multiple stab wounds.

• The Dying Declarations: Eufracio Banal, a churchmate, testified that when he reached Rosita Fontelera at the pizza parlor, she uttered “Si Edwin, si Edwin” twice. A sworn statement to that effect was taken the next day. Police investigator Pfc. Leo Batinga testified that a worker at the pizza parlor, Mercy Salapanti Seballa, likewise reported that Rosita said “Edwin, taga-Novaliches” four times. Accused-appellant himself admitted that as he was coming out of the house, Rosita Fontelera was running away from him and shouting “Edwin, Novaliches, Edwin, Novaliches.”

• The Extrajudicial Confession: After his warrantless arrest by barangay tanods in Novaliches, Quezon City, Naag was taken to Olongapo City where, on November 16, 1990, he executed a confession before Pfc. Leo Batinga and P/Lt. Esteban. The confession bore the signature of Atty. Norberto de la Cruz as assisting counsel. Atty. de la Cruz testified that he was presented with a ready-made statement which he refused to sign, insisting that a new investigation be conducted in his presence. The resulting confession (Exh. O) contained an opening statement indicating it was taken “sa harap ni P/LT Esteban” and recited the Miranda rights; Naag answered “Opo” when asked if he understood and wished to proceed. In the confession, Naag admitted stabbing Atty. Fontelera three times with a balisong after his companions Joel and Joselito Alcantara had initially attacked the couple. He claimed the motive was a planned robbery and acknowledged his resentment over eviction.

• Motive and Relationship: Rodrigo Fontelera, Jr., the victims’ son, testified that accused-appellant was known to the family—his father had been caretaker of the Fontelera lot in Novaliches. Naag had told Fontelera, Jr. that he felt bad because Atty. Fontelera was ejecting his family. In his own testimony, Naag admitted that Atty. Fontelera had “fired” his father.

• Defense Evidence: Accused-appellant testified that he went to Olongapo with Alcantara and a certain Joel to do repair work at the Fontelera house. He claimed that while he was outside talking with Rosita, he heard a commotion inside and saw his two companions stabbing Atty. Fontelera. He allegedly stopped Joel, but on returning inside found Joselito still attacking the victim. When he went out to inform Rosita, he saw her being stabbed; she then fled, shouting his name. He maintained he fled out of confusion and surrendered to barangay authorities upon his father’s advice. He denied the voluntariness of his confession, alleging he was tortured, doused with water from a urinal, and that Atty. de la Cruz did not sign in his presence. His uncle Jose Naag corroborated his surrender.

• Validity of the Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession (Exh. O) is admissible despite the alleged violation of accused-appellant’s right to counsel under Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.

• Admissibility of the Dying Declaration: Whether Rosita Fontelera’s statements “Si Edwin, si Edwin” constitute an admissible dying declaration or part of the res gestae sufficient to identify accused-appellant as a perpetrator.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence—accused-appellant’s presence at the scene, his flight, and his motive—is sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt independent of the extrajudicial confession.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the trial court correctly appreciated treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and dwelling, and whether the proper penalty was imposed.

• Validity of the Extrajudicial Confession: The confession was declared inadmissible. The opening statement of Exh. O noted only the presence of P/Lt. Esteban, not Atty. de la Cruz, and the attorney’s name was merely appended at the end. The typewriter ribbon discrepancies suggested the name was added later, corroborating accused-appellant’s claim that the interrogation occurred without counsel, in violation of Article III, Section 12(1). Moreover, no valid waiver of the Miranda rights was effected because, although the rights were recited, the accused was never asked whether he was willing to testify without counsel or, if he could not afford one, whether he wanted counsel appointed. Consequently, the confession was excluded from evidence.

• Admissibility of the Dying Declaration: The dying declaration was admissible. Unlike People v. De Joya, where the words “Si Paqui” were held incomplete, Rosita Fontelera’s cries of “Si Edwin, si Edwin” were made not only inside the pizza parlor but as she fled from her attacker. The circumstances in which the words were uttered made it clear that she was identifying accused-appellant as her assailant. The declaration was complete so far as she intended to communicate. Additionally, the statements qualified as part of the res gestae under Rule 130, §42, having been made immediately after a startling occurrence and relating to its circumstances.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Circumstantial evidence, even without the confession, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Accused‑appellant admitted being present at the crime scene; his explanation for traveling from Novaliches to Olongapo to perform repairs was belied by the victims’ son. He fled the scene and went into hiding, which is evidence of guilt. He harbored a motive—resentment over his family’s eviction from the Fontelera property. These circumstances, combined with the dying declarations, formed an unbroken chain producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt, satisfying the requisites of Rule 133, §4.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was properly appreciated given the number and severity of the wounds, which demonstrated that the attackers ensured the victims’ deaths without risk to themselves. Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength, obviating the need to separately consider the latter. Evident premeditation was not proven for lack of evidence of the planning and preparation. Dwelling was established as an aggravating circumstance because the crime was committed inside the victims’ home. With one aggravating circumstance (dwelling) and no mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty would have been death, but since the offense occurred after the 1987 Constitution took effect and prior to the reimposition of the death penalty by R.A. No. 7659, the trial court correctly imposed two terms of reclusion perpetua. The award of funeral expenses was reduced to P25,050.00 based on receipts; civil indemnity of P100,000.00 and moral damages of P100,000.00 for each death were affirmed.

• Waiver of Miranda Rights Under Article III, Section 12(1) — A valid waiver of the rights to remain silent and to counsel during custodial investigation requires that the accused be informed of these rights and, in addition, be asked whether he is willing to testify without the assistance of counsel. If he is willing to testify only with counsel, he must be asked whether he has one, and if he cannot afford counsel, whether he desires one to be appointed. The absence of such a specific inquiry renders the waiver ineffective and the ensuing confession inadmissible.

• Completeness Rule for Dying Declarations — A dying declaration must be complete as far as the declarant intended; a fragmentary statement cut short by death or interruption is not admissible because the intended whole might differ from the fragment. However, if the declarant finishes what he wished to say, it is no objection that he told only a portion of the relevant facts. The words “Si Edwin, si Edwin,” when shouted by a victim while fleeing from her attacker, sufficiently constitute a complete identification.

• Res Gestae — Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto concerning the circumstances of the occurrence may be received as part of the res gestae under Rule 130, §42. A victim’s cries identifying her assailant while running away and moments after sustaining fatal wounds fall within this hearsay exception.

• Flight as Evidence of Guilt — Flight from the scene of a crime, when unexplained by any justifiable reason, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn, consistent with the adage that “the wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion.”

• Absorption of Abuse of Superior Strength by Treachery — Where treachery is established, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed and need not be separately considered as an aggravating circumstance.

• Circumstantial Evidence Standard — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Rule 133, §4).

• “As a result of the investigator’s failure to ask these questions before taking down accused-appellant’s statement, there was no effective waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel.” — This statement captures the ratio for excluding the confession, emphasizing that mere recitation of rights and affirmative answers are inadequate.

• “The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making.” — The Court here explains the rationale behind the completeness rule for dying declarations, drawn from Wigmore.

• “In this case, the deceased was saying ‘Si Edwin, si Edwin’ not only when found inside the pizza parlor by Banal and Seballa but also as she was running away wounded. The circumstances in which she was saying ‘Si Edwin, si Edwin’ make it clear that she was referring to accused-appellant as her assailant or at least one of her assailants.” — This passage illustrates how context establishes the admissibility and probative value of a dying declaration.

• “Flight is evidence of guilt. For as the proverb says, ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’” — A concise articulation of the inference drawn from unexplained flight.

• People v. De Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991) — Distinguished. The incomplete phrase “Si Paqui” in that case lacked the contextual clarity present here, where the victim repeatedly named the accused while fleeing.

• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) — The source of the Miranda rule; referred to as the basis for the constitutional requirements under Article III, Section 12(1).

• People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981) — Cited for the authoritative interpretation that custodial interrogations require warning of the four specific Miranda rights.

• People v. Bacor, G.R. No. 122895, April 30, 1999 — Applied for the requirement that a valid waiver demands inquiry into the accused’s willingness to testify without counsel and the need for appointed counsel.

• People v. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107 (1986) — Cited on the res gestae rule.

• People v. Payot, G.R. No. 119352, June 8, 1999 — Cited for the principle that flight is evidence of guilt.

• People v. Paragua, 257 SCRA 118 (1996) — Referred to for the appreciation of treachery based on the number and severity of wounds.

• People v. Ching, 279 SCRA 129 (1997) — Applied for the doctrine that treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.

• People v. Floro, G.R. No. 120641, Oct. 7, 1999 and People v. Suplito, G.R. No. 104944, Sept. 16, 1999** — Cited as current rulings for the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages.

• Article III, Section 12(1), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel during custodial investigation. The confession was held inadmissible because the accused was interrogated without counsel and did not effectively waive these rights.

• Rule 130, Section 42, Rules of Court — Res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. Rosita Fontelera’s statements were admitted as part of the res gestae, having been made immediately after the startling occurrence of the stabbing.

• Rule 133, Section 4, Revised Rules on Evidence — Circumstantial evidence rule. The chain of circumstances—presence, flight, motive, and dying declarations—was found sufficient to sustain conviction.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Definition and penalty for murder. Treachery qualified the killing to murder; with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and no mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty at the time was reclusion perpetua in its medium period, imposed as two terms.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.