People vs. Olarte

A final decision on a prior appeal in the same case is the law of the case and is binding on all lower courts, even if later jurisprudence adopts a contrary doctrine, and cannot be disturbed or modified on a subsequent appeal. Additionally, the filing of a complaint with a court for preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, regardless of whether that court has jurisdiction to try the case on the merits.

Ascension P. Olarte was alleged to have written and sent multiple libelous letters to Visitacion M. Meris between February 27 and May 9, 1954. The crime of libel prescribes in two years under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. On February 22, 1956 — within two years of the last letter — Meris filed a complaint for libel with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. Olarte waived preliminary investigation, and the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the information was filed on July 3, 1956 — more than two years after the last alleged libelous communication. The central question from the outset was whether the prescriptive period had already expired before the information was filed in the trial court.

• Nature of the Case: Ascension P. Olarte was charged with libel in an information filed on July 3, 1956, with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The information alleged that on or about February 24, 1954, and subsequently thereafter, Olarte willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously wrote letters that were libelous, contemptuous, and derogatory to Visitacion M. Meris, with the evident and malicious purpose of insulting, dishonoring, humiliating, and bringing into contempt her good name and reputation.

• The Libelous Letters: Meris stated in an affidavit attached to the complaint that one defamatory letter was received on February 27, 1954, and that other libelous letters were subsequently written and received on or about March 1 and 13, April 26, and May 9, 1954.

• Filing of the Complaint: On January 7, 1956, Meris lodged a charge of libel with the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan. Upon advice of an assistant provincial fiscal, she filed a complaint for libel with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, on February 22, 1956. Olarte waived her right to a preliminary investigation, and the justice of the peace court forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance, where the information was filed on July 3, 1956.

• The First Motion to Quash and First Appeal: Olarte moved to quash the information on the ground that the offense had prescribed. The crime of libel prescribes in two years under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 91, prescription commences to run from the day the crime is discovered and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The trial court dismissed the case, adopting the position that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court did not interrupt prescription and that it continued to run until the information was filed on July 3, 1956 — by which time more than two years had elapsed from the last letter. On appeal (G.R. No. L-13027), the Supreme Court reversed, holding through Justice Roberto Concepcion that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court did interrupt the running of the prescriptive period and that the crime had not been extinguished by prescription. This decision became final and executory.

• The Second Motion to Quash: After the case was remanded and trial had commenced, Olarte filed a new motion to quash on August 26, 1963, invoking People v. Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456 (June 29, 1963), a later Supreme Court ruling that declared that to interrupt prescription, the complaint or information must be filed in the proper court with jurisdiction to try the case on its merits. The trial court compared the facts of Coquia with the case at bar, found them practically identical, and concluded that Coquia indicated this Court intended to abandon its earlier 1960 ruling in the first appeal of the very same case. The lower court accordingly sustained the motion and dismissed the case on January 16, 1964.

• The Solicitor General's Position: The Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating it was submitting the case without a brief and expressed the opinion that the order of dismissal was well taken.

• On Law of the Case: The prosecution argued that the Supreme Court's decision in the first appeal (G.R. No. L-13027) had become final and executory and constituted the law of the case. The issue of prescription had been conclusively determined and could no longer be relitigated.

• On the Effect of Coquia: The prosecution maintained that a subsequent ruling in a different case (People v. Coquia) could not retroactively nullify a final decision in the same proceeding, and that the lower court erred in treating Coquia as having overruled the prior final adjudication binding on the parties.

• On the Effect of Coquia: Respondent Olarte argued that the Supreme Court's ruling in People v. Coquia (June 29, 1963) — holding that only a complaint or information filed in a court with jurisdiction to try the case on the merits interrupts prescription — contradicted and effectively abandoned the earlier ruling in the first appeal of this case. Since the facts of the present case were practically identical to Coquia, the dismissal was warranted.

• On Prescription: Respondent maintained that the prescriptive period continued to run until the information was filed in the Court of First Instance on July 3, 1956, by which time more than two years had elapsed since the last libelous letter of May 9, 1954. The complaint filed with the justice of the peace court, being merely for preliminary investigation, did not interrupt prescription under the Coquia doctrine.

• Law of the Case: Whether the final decision in the first appeal of this case (G.R. No. L-13027) constituted the law of the case and foreclosed relitigation of the prescription issue, notwithstanding a contrary ruling in People v. Coquia.

• Interruption of Prescription: Whether the filing of a complaint for preliminary investigation in a court that cannot try the case on its merits interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Law of the Case: The ruling in the first appeal (G.R. No. L-13027), having become final long ago, constituted the law of the case. Whatever was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts before the court. A subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined. Judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided. The principle of immutability of the law of the case applies whether the case is civil or criminal in nature. The lower court thus had no power or authority to alter or modify the final Supreme Court decision binding it.

• Interruption of Prescription: The Court, acknowledging a division in its precedents, reexamined the issue and settled the doctrine: the filing of a complaint in a municipal or justice of the peace court, even solely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, does interrupt the period of prescription of criminal responsibility, even if that court cannot try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: First, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code declares that prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed merely for preliminary investigation or for action on the merits. Second, even where the court may only proceed to investigate, its actuations represent the initial step of proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays beyond his control — all that the victim can do to initiate prosecution is file the requisite complaint. It is no argument that Article 91 also states that interrupted prescription shall "commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted," thereby supposedly indicating the court must have power to acquit or convict; precisely, it is in a court conducting preliminary investigation where proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal if the accused is discharged for lack of prima facie case. The doctrines in People v. Del Rosario and People v. Coquia were expressly overruled.

• Law of the Case Doctrine — The opinion delivered on a former appeal; whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts before the court. A decision on a prior appeal is held to be the law of the case whether right or wrong, the remedy of the aggrieved party being to seek a rehearing. Once a Supreme Court judgment becomes final, it is binding on all inferior courts, which are without power or authority to alter or modify it.

• Prospective Operation of Judicial Doctrines — Judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided by final judgment. A subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined. This rule applies to both civil and criminal cases.

• Interruption of Prescription by Filing of Complaint — The filing of a complaint even in a court that may only conduct a preliminary investigation or examination — and which lacks jurisdiction to try the case on its merits — interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements applied by the Court are: (1) Article 91 does not distinguish between complaints filed for preliminary investigation and those filed for trial on the merits; (2) the preliminary investigation represents the initial step of proceedings against the offender; (3) the victim of the offense cannot control delays and should not be deprived of vindication when the only step within his power — filing the complaint — has been taken; and (4) the statutory provision that interrupted prescription runs again when proceedings "terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted" is precisely accommodated, because preliminary investigations may terminate without conviction or acquittal if the accused is discharged for lack of prima facie case.

• "Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court." — This passage defines the law of the case doctrine as applied here.

• "Our recent interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined." — Quoting from People v. Pinuila, this captures the prospective-only effect of new judicial doctrines.

• "It is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint." — This reasoning supports the holding on interruption of prescription and emphasizes the practical limitation on a private complainant's power.

• "The text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits." — The textual basis for the Court's interpretation that no distinction should be drawn where the statute draws none.

• People v. Olarte, G.R. No. L-13027 (June 30, 1960) — The prior decision in the first appeal of this same case; held that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court interrupted prescription. Constituted the law of the case and was controlling authority binding the lower court.

• People v. Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456 (June 29, 1963) — Invoked by the accused and lower court as authority for dismissal; held that interruption of prescription requires filing in a court with jurisdiction to try the case on its merits. Expressly overruled by the Court in this decision.

• People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. L-15140 (December 29, 1960) — Adhered to the same doctrine as Coquia; also expressly overruled.

• People v. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374 (May 30, 1958) — Applied; established the immutability of the law of the case notwithstanding subsequent changes in judicial opinion; quoted for the rule that later interpretations apply only to new cases.

• People v. Uba, G.R. No. L-13106 (October 16, 1959) and People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588 — Cited as part of the line of precedents holding that filing a complaint with the justice of the peace court interrupts prescription.

• Kabigting v. Acting Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-15548 (October 30, 1962) — Applied for the principle that a final Supreme Court decision is binding on all inferior courts, which lack power and authority to alter or modify it.

• Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, G.R. Nos. L-14284-85 (February 24, 1960) — Applied for the rule that judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided by final judgment.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the crime of libel shall prescribe in two years. The applicable prescriptive period for the offense charged.

• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The Court interpreted the phrase "filing of the complaint or information" as not distinguishing between a complaint filed for preliminary investigation and one filed for trial on the merits; both interrupt prescription. The provision that prescriptive period "shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted" was harmonized by noting that termination without conviction or acquittal occurs precisely in preliminary investigations where the accused is discharged for lack of prima facie case.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous; no dissents were recorded.