People vs. Pantoja

For the defense of insanity to exempt from criminal liability under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of or immediately preceding the commission of the crime, he suffered a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; mere abnormality of mental faculties, prior confinement in a mental institution, or odd behavior is insufficient. Even if the accused suffers from a mental illness that diminishes the exercise of willpower without completely depriving him of consciousness of his acts, the mitigating circumstance thus arising cannot alter the nature of the crime or reduce an indivisible penalty like reclusion perpetua. The killing of a child of tender years is treacherous per se because the victim’s weakness presents no danger to the assailant, qualifying the crime as murder.

Jonas Pantoja y Astorga resided with his mother Cederina Pantoja. He had a history of mental disturbance that began after he sustained head injuries in a 2003 altercation. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and had been confined at the Philippine General Hospital and the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). On 8 July 2010 he was admitted to the NCMH but escaped on 14 July 2010; he found his way home by remembering the correct jeepney route. He continued taking prescribed medication but exhibited odd behavior, such as repeatedly going in and out of the house. On the morning of 22 July 2010, Cederina noticed he had disappeared from their balcony; she then discovered him inside the neighbor’s house, holding a knife, with six-year-old AAA already bloodied and sprawled on the floor. The child died of multiple stab wounds.

Nature of the Charge: The accused was indicted for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that on 22 July 2010, in Taguig City, he, armed with a kitchen knife and with treachery and abuse of superior strength, attacked and repeatedly stabbed six-year-old AAA, causing fatal injuries.

Prosecution’s Evidence: The prosecution presented Cederina Pantoja (the accused’s mother, as hostile witness), the victim’s father BBB, and Dr. Voltaire P. Nulud, a medico-legal officer. Cederina testified that the accused had been admitted to the NCMH on 8 July 2010 but escaped on 14 July 2010. He had previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia and had been taking medication. On the morning of 22 July 2010, she was washing dishes while the accused sat on their balcony. She later noticed he was gone, saw the neighbors’ front door open—unusually—and heard a child crying. She entered, went upstairs, and found the accused holding a knife and the child AAA bloodied on the floor. She took the knife, led the accused outside, and called for help. The accused appeared dazed and unresponsive. Barangay officials later took him into custody. Dr. Nulud testified that the victim sustained four stab wounds—on the forehead, neck, right shoulder, and below the collar bone. BBB, who was working in Qatar at the time, returned to the Philippines and testified on funeral expenses and the wake.

Defense’s Evidence: The defense presented the accused and Cederina. The accused testified that he had been confined for mental illness since 2003 because he “spoke differently” and started hurting people; he had been in and out of the hospital, released when doctors deemed him well after examinations; he had been taking prescribed medication from 2003 onward; he sometimes stopped taking medicine when he felt well; he knew the victim as his younger brother’s playmate; and he could not recall the events of 22 July 2010. The defense also offered documentary evidence: a letter from the NCMH informing Cederina of the escape, patient identification cards from NCMH and PGH, a clinical abstract from PGH diagnosing “paranoid schizophrenia” in 2007, and prescription slips.

Lower Courts’ Findings: The RTC found all elements of murder present and, rejecting the insanity defense, applied the presumption of sanity. The CA agreed, holding that the evidence did not establish that the accused was completely deprived of intelligence at the time of the crime; it also recognized a history of mental illness that diminished the exercise of willpower but could not lower the indivisible penalty.

• Insanity as Exempting Circumstance: Whether the accused proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was insane—i.e., completely deprived of intelligence, reason, or free will—at the time of or immediately preceding the commission of the crime.
• Mitigating Circumstance and Penalty: Whether, in the event insanity was not established, the accused’s mental condition constituted diminished willpower that could mitigate his liability and either alter the nature of the crime or reduce the penalty imposed.

• Insanity as Exempting Circumstance: The defense of insanity failed because the evidence did not demonstrate a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or free will at the critical time. The accused relied on his mother’s testimony, which described only that he was sitting on the balcony moments before the incident and that he had been going in and out of the house—behavior that, while odd, did not equal legal insanity. His admission that doctors would release him after deeming him well indicated that his condition was not continuous; lucid intervals were presumed. The documentary evidence—escape letter, patient cards, a 2007 clinical abstract, and prescriptions—did not speak to his mental state on 22 July 2010, and no expert psychiatric testimony was offered to establish that he was completely bereft of discernment at the time of the stabbing. The stringent standard from People v. Madarang requiring “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act” was not met. The escape itself, which involved his remembering the correct jeepney route home, evidenced reasonable intelligence just days before the crime. Consequently, the presumption of sanity stood.
• Mitigating Circumstance and Penalty: The accused was nonetheless entitled to the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower because his history of schizophrenia and observed abnormalities indicated an impairment of his mental faculties, albeit without total loss of consciousness of his acts. This mitigating circumstance, however, could not alter the nature of the crime from murder to homicide; a mitigating circumstance affects only the penalty, not the classification of the offense. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death—a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the Code provides that when the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance is present, the lesser indivisible penalty must be applied. Here, no aggravating circumstance was alleged or proved; therefore, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. The presence of the mitigating circumstance did not allow a further reduction because the penalty is indivisible. Treachery was correctly appreciated: the victim’s age of six years automatically eliminates any danger to the assailant, satisfying both the inability of the victim to defend himself and the deliberate adoption of the means of execution.

• Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance (Article 12, RPC, and People v. Madarang) — To exempt from criminal liability, the defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the accused’s insanity constituted a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment, and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of or immediately preceding the commission of the crime. Mere abnormality of mental faculties, odd behavior, or prior confinement in a mental institution is insufficient. The term “crazy” in its popular sense does not equate to legal insanity. The proof may come from opinion testimony of an intimate acquaintance, a percipient witness with rational basis, or a qualified expert such as a psychiatrist. In this case, the Court held that the lay testimony and pre-existing medical records failed to satisfy the required completeness and contemporaneity.

• Treachery in the Killing of a Child of Tender Years — The killing of a child is per se treacherous because the victim’s weakness due to tender age eliminates any danger to the accused. The elements of treachery—(1) the accused employs means that give the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (2) the means were deliberately or consciously adopted—are both satisfied by the victim’s extreme youth, regardless of whether the specific manner of assault is shown. (People v. Umawid, 735 Phil. 737)

• Effect of Mitigating Circumstances on Indivisible Penalties (Article 63, RPC) — When the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties (such as reclusion perpetua to death), and the commission of the offense is attended by some mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty applies. The mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower cannot reduce an indivisible penalty below its minimum prescribed term. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.

• Award of Damages in Murder Cases with Reclusion Perpetua — When the circumstances warrant the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, without any ordinary aggravating circumstance, the proper amounts are: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at six percent per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid. (People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016)

• “In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.” (People v. Madarang)

• “The prevalent meaning of the word ‘crazy’ is not synonymous with the legal terms ‘insane,’ ‘non compos mentis,’ ‘unsound mind,’ ‘idiot,’ or ‘lunatic.’ The popular conception of the word ‘crazy’ is being used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.” (People v. Florendo)

• “Well-settled is the rule that treachery exists when the prosecution has sufficiently proven the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the accused employs means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted. This Court has held that the killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victim due to his tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.” (People v. Umawid)

• People v. Madarang, 387 Phil. 847, 859 (2000) — Established the stringent criterion for insanity as exempting: complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act; mere abnormality insufficient. Followed.

• People v. Florendo, 459 Phil. 470, 479 (2003) — Distinguished between the popular notion of “crazy” and legal insanity; behavioral oddities do not automatically constitute legal insanity. Followed.

• People v. Tibon, 636 Phil. 521, 530 (2010) — Held that the defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance; the burden shifts to the accused to prove it with clear and convincing evidence. Followed.

• People v. Opuran, 469 Phil. 698, 713 (2004) — Prior confinement at a mental institution does not, by itself, prove insanity at the time of the crime. Cited.

• People v. Umawid, 735 Phil. 737, 746 (2014) — Treachery exists in the killing of a child due to the victim’s tender age. Followed.

• People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016, 788 SCRA 331, 373 — Updated the schedule of damages in criminal cases; when reclusion perpetua is imposed without ordinary aggravating circumstances, civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are each fixed at P75,000.00. Applied.

• Article 12, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter acted during a lucid interval. Applied to define the defense; the accused failed to establish that he acted without a lucid interval or with complete deprivation of intelligence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7659) — Defines murder and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Treachery was correctly appreciated; the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties. Because only a mitigating circumstance attended the crime and no aggravating circumstance was present, the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua was applied.

• Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines) — Reference cited by the trial court; the Court did not further elaborate but the law reinforces that only reclusion perpetua may be imposed.

Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen concurred. Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo was on leave.

None.