People vs. Perreras

An aggravating circumstance not pleaded in the Information cannot be appreciated to raise the penalty, even if established at trial, where the procedural rules requiring its allegation are given retroactive effect as favorable to the accused.

On the evening of 21 July 1998 in Bacayao Norte, Dagupan City, Estanislao Salo was shot through the window of his home while seated watching television. Prosecution witnesses identified Pedro Perreras as the gunman; he was seen rolling up his sleeves, drawing a firearm, and firing at close range. The victim’s wife witnessed Perreras holding the gun and staring at her husband’s body immediately after the shot. Perreras was arrested in Isabela and purportedly signed the warrant attesting to the killing. He interposed alibi, claiming he had been in Isabela since 11 July 1998 and that his alleged co-accused was deceased. The trial court convicted him of murder qualified by treachery, appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, and imposed the death penalty. The case was elevated for automatic review.

• The Killing: On the night of 21 July 1998, at a waiting shed in Bacayao Norte, Dagupan City, accused-appellant Pedro Perreras and his nephew Boy Fernandez approached Leonardo Salazar and inquired whether Manoling Pastoral was at home and sought directions to the latter’s house. Leonardo soon left the crowded shed and walked to the front of Estanislao Salo’s house, about ten meters away, to get fresh air. Perreras and Fernandez followed, each holding a bottle of beer. Perreras stopped by the window of Estanislao’s house, lighted by a mercury lamp approximately twelve meters away. He rolled up his sleeves, drew a gun from his waist, and fired at Estanislao, who was seated inside watching television, hitting him on the head. Leonardo Salazar, positioned about ten meters from the shooter, witnessed the shooting. Leonora Salo, the victim’s wife, was washing dishes in the kitchen when she heard the gunshot. She rushed to the living room, saw her husband slumped on the floor, and looked out the window. She saw Perreras holding a gun, staring at her husband’s body, before fleeing with Boy Fernandez trailing some twenty meters behind. Leonardo Salazar immediately reported the incident to barangay councilor Saturnino Maramba, and together they sought police assistance.

• Arrest and Admission: On 22 August 1998, Perreras was arrested while hiding in Echague, Isabela. SPO4 Alfredo Flores testified that Perreras admitted killing Estanislao Salo and voluntarily signed the warrant of arrest on its left margin. Boy Fernandez was not apprehended.

• Autopsy Findings: Dr. Benjamin Bautista, Rural Health Physician of Dagupan City, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver. The victim had a gunshot wound at the left parietal area with tattooing, a depressed skull fracture, penetrating and perforating brain tissue damage, and no exit wound. The cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to moderate hemorrhage from the gunshot wound. The doctor opined that the shot was fired at close range, from about four to six feet, with a low-caliber pistol, and that the victim was likely seated when hit.

• Defense of Alibi and Denial: Perreras denied the charges. He claimed he had been in Isabela from 11 July 1998 and returned to Dagupan only upon his arrest. He disowned any admission to the police, asserting that he did not know how to write and that his captors forced him to sign the warrant. He also alleged that he was mauled by two sons and a nephew of the victim while in detention. Additionally, he maintained that Boy Fernandez had died three years earlier, presenting a Death Certificate of one Rodolfo Geminiano Fernandez who died on 23 May 1994.

• Rebuttal: The prosecution presented Orlando and Pepito Capua, residents of Bacayao Norte, who testified that Boy Fernandez was still alive and that the Rodolfo Geminiano Fernandez who died in 1994 was Boy Fernandez’s father.

• Impeachment of Witness Salazar: Accused-appellant attacked the credibility of prosecution eyewitness Leonardo Salazar by pointing to alleged inconsistencies: (a) an ocular inspection showed the victim’s house was east of the waiting shed, contradicting Salazar’s supposed assertion that he was facing west when the incident occurred; (b) the electric post that illuminated the area was not twenty meters in front of the house as Salazar stated, but located in a southern direction one hundred meters away; and (c) it was impossible for Perreras to have asked directions to Manoling Pastoral’s house because he personally knew Pastoral and the location of his residence.

• Alibi: Perreras maintained that he was in Isabela from 11 July 1998 until his arrest on 22 August 1998, making it physically impossible for him to have been at the scene in Dagupan City on the night of 21 July 1998.

• Credibility and Minor Inconsistencies: The prosecution countered that the supposed inconsistencies referred only to minor and collateral matters, which do not impair the overall credibility of a witness whose positive identification of the assailant was consistent and corroborated. The trial court had the unique opportunity to observe witness demeanor and conducted an ocular inspection, warranting deference to its findings.

• Positive Identification Over Alibi: Respondent argued that the categorical and consistent positive identification by Leonardo Salazar, corroborated by Leonora Salo, prevailed over the appellant’s unsubstantiated alibi and denial. Moreover, the distance between Isabela and Dagupan City was not so great as to render Perreras’s presence at the crime scene impossible.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witness Leonardo Salazar impaired his credibility and undermined the positive identification of accused-appellant.

• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi could prevail over the positive identification of accused-appellant by credible prosecution witnesses.

• Treachery: Whether the killing was attended by treachery, thereby qualifying it to murder.

• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance: Whether the circumstance of dwelling could be appreciated to increase the penalty to death, given that it was not alleged in the Information.

• Proper Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty of death and the amounts awarded as civil indemnity, actual damages, lost earnings, and moral damages were proper.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The alleged inconsistencies did not impair the credibility of the witness. The record showed that Leonardo Salazar never stated he was facing west when the shooting occurred; that statement referred to the waiting shed, whereas he witnessed the shooting from the front of the victim’s house. The discrepancy regarding the distance of the electric post was a minor inconsistency that does not affect the veracity of the testimony when the principal occurrence and positive identification remain consistent. Likewise, the claim that Perreras knew Pastoral’s house was untenable, as he had been away from the barangay from 1975 to 1997 and could have lost familiarity. The trial court’s findings of fact, bolstered by the ocular inspection it conducted, were entitled to great weight.

• Alibi: The defense of alibi failed. Categorical and consistent positive identification, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over alibi and denial. Moreover, for alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate not merely that he was elsewhere, but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene or its immediate vicinity. The trial court took judicial notice that travel between Isabela and Dagupan City takes only eight to nine hours, rendering Perreras’s presence at the crime scene not impossible.

• Treachery: Treachery was properly appreciated. Both elements concurred: (a) the means of execution—shooting the victim from behind, through a window, while he was seated watching television in his own home and completely unaware—afforded him no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) those means were deliberately adopted, as demonstrated by the assailant’s having rolled up his sleeves and taken careful aim before firing.

• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance: Dwelling was present as the victim was attacked inside his own house, even though the assailant fired from outside. However, dwelling was not alleged in the Information. Pursuant to the retroactive application of Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure—which require the Information to specify both qualifying and aggravating circumstances—the aggravating circumstance of dwelling could not be appreciated to raise the penalty to death. With no other modifying circumstances, the imposable penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, was reclusion perpetua.

• Proper Penalty and Damages: The death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua. On damages: actual damages were reduced to P61,813.15, the amount supported by receipts; civil indemnity was reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, conformably with the rule that the higher amount applies only when the death penalty is imposable; lost earnings were recomputed using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, yielding P1,080,000.00; and moral damages were reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence, the victim’s widow having testified to mental anguish.

• Aggravating circumstances must be pleaded in the Information — Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate that the complaint or information state the designation of the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Where the rule is given retroactive effect as favorable to the accused, an aggravating circumstance proven at trial but not alleged in the Information cannot be appreciated to increase the penalty. In this case, dwelling, though present, was not pleaded and therefore could not elevate the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.

• Treachery (alevosia) — Treachery exists when (a) the means of execution give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) such means were deliberately or consciously adopted. It was present where the victim was shot from behind through a window while seated and unaware inside his home, after the assailant rolled up his sleeves and aimed.

• Dwelling as an aggravating circumstance — Dwelling is aggravating where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party without provocation. It is sufficient that the victim was attacked inside his own house, even if the assailant perpetrated the assault from outside, without having actually entered the dwelling. The sanctity of privacy that the law accords the human abode supplies the underlying policy.

• Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification — For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Positive identification by a credible witness, absent ill motive, defeats alibi and denial.

• Computation of loss of earning capacity — Under the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in jurisprudence, loss of earning capacity is computed as:

Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy × (Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses) Life Expectancy = 2/3 × (80 - age of deceased) Living Expenses = 50% of Gross Annual Income Documentary evidence is not indispensable; credible testimonial evidence of earnings can provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable estimate.

• "The Rules now require that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be properly appreciated. Since dwelling was not alleged in the Information, it cannot be considered to raise the penalty to death." — This encapsulates the retroactive application of the new procedural rule and the basis for reducing the penalty.

• "For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside." — Clarifies the reach of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — The definition of treachery as applied.

• People v. Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492, 31 January 2001 — Applied as controlling precedent for the retroactive application of the requirement that aggravating circumstances be pleaded in the information.

• People v. Gano, G.R. No. 134373, 28 February 2001 — Followed, reaffirming the retroactive application of the new rules on alleging aggravating circumstances.

• People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, 29 November 2000 — Cited for the doctrine that minor inconsistencies in testimony do not affect credibility.

• People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, 26 December 2000 — Cited for the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial.

• People v. Dacibar, G.R. No. 111286, 17 February 2000, 325 SCRA 725 — Cited for the principle that dwelling is aggravating even if the accused fired from outside the victim’s house.

• People v. Bangcado, G.R. No. 132330, 28 November 2000 — Cited for the allowance of testimonial evidence as basis for loss of earning capacity.

• Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code — Dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Applied to treat the killing as aggravated by the fact that the victim was attacked inside his home, though the qualifying effect was barred by procedural rule.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Murder. The provision defined the offense; the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death was reduced to reclusion perpetua because no aggravating circumstance was properly pleaded.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. Applied to determine that in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty (reclusion perpetua) should be imposed.

• Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requirement that the information state the designation of the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Given retroactive effect as favorable to the accused, barring the appreciation of unpleaded dwelling to impose death.

Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Davide, Jr., Melo, Panganiban, Buena, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., were abroad on official business.