People vs. Pilpa

A dismissal of a criminal case after plea, granted on the prosecution's own motion, constitutes a termination with the accused's express consent—and therefore does not give rise to former jeopardy—when defense counsel orally states in open court that the accused has no objection to the dismissal. Counsel's subsequent unilateral manifestation of opposition cannot revoke that express consent after the court has already acted upon it.

On October 29, 1966, Pablo Pilpa allegedly stabbed Rex Magsambol with a bolo, inflicting a back wound that would have been fatal but for timely medical assistance. The Tacloban City Fiscal charged Pilpa with frustrated murder. Pilpa was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. At the hearing, the prosecution itself moved to dismiss the case on the untenable ground that the information lacked an express allegation of intent to kill. The trial judge granted the motion after defense counsel voiced no objection. Two days later, the fiscal filed a second, nearly identical information for the same offense. Pilpa moved to quash it on double jeopardy grounds, and the trial court, noting the defense's subsequent attempt to retract its earlier consent, agreed, dismissing the second information. The prosecution challenged that dismissal on appeal.

• The Stabbing and First Information: On or about October 29, 1966, in Tacloban City, Pablo Pilpa, armed with a bolo, allegedly stabbed Rex Magsambol on the back. The wound inflicted would ordinarily have caused death but did not due to timely and able medical assistance. On April 19, 1967, the City Fiscal filed an information charging Pilpa with frustrated murder, alleging treachery and evident premeditation. The information alleged that all acts of execution were performed but the crime was not consummated by reason of causes independent of Pilpa's will, specifically the medical assistance rendered to the victim.
• Arraignment and Plea: Pilpa was arraigned on June 15, 1967, with the assistance of counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty.
• Dismissal of the First Case: On the morning of November 20, 1967, during the hearing, the prosecution orally moved for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11935. The stated ground was an alleged lack of jurisdiction because the information did not expressly aver "intent to kill." The private prosecutor joined the motion. Defense counsel, Atty. Pelaez, asked for categorical confirmation that the Fiscal's office was formally seeking dismissal and, upon receiving it, declared in open court: "We have no objection." Judge Elias B. Asuncion forthwith dictated an order dismissing the case "with costs de officio."
• The Accused's Reversal: Later that same afternoon, Pilpa, joined by his two lawyers, filed a manifestation expressly opposing the dismissal. The trial judge wrote "Noted" on the manifestation. The following day, November 21, Pilpa moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order, arguing that the court had jurisdiction over the offense. That motion was denied on November 25, 1967. No appeal was taken from the denial.
• The Second Information and Motion to Quash: On November 22, 1967, two days after the dismissal, the City Fiscal filed a second information for frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 12183), reproducing the first information verbatim and adding the phrases "intent to kill" and "vital portion." Pilpa moved to quash the second information on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution opposed. Judge Quimbo granted the motion to quash, reasoning that the dismissal was without Pilpa's consent because of his manifestation of opposition, that the court had jurisdiction over the first information, and that the erroneous dismissal on a jurisdictional ground did not prevent former jeopardy from attaching. The prosecution appealed that order.

• Validity of the First Information: The absence of a specific averment of "intent to kill" was not a fatal defect because intent to kill could be inferred from the allegation that the stab wound would have caused the victim's death. Thus, the first information was valid and could have supported a conviction.
• Express Consent Given: Pilpa's counsel expressly declared in open court, "We have no objection," when the prosecution moved for dismissal. That declaration constituted express consent to the termination of the case within the meaning of Section 9 of Rule 117, thereby preventing former jeopardy from attaching.

• Dismissal Without Express Consent: Despite counsel's initial statement, the accused's subsequent manifestation of opposition and motion for reconsideration demonstrated that the dismissal was ultimately without his consent. The court itself acknowledged the opposition by noting the manifestation, and the dismissal should thus be considered a termination without express consent that barred a second prosecution.
• Former Jeopardy Attached: All requisites of former jeopardy were present: a valid information, before a court of competent jurisdiction, plea entered, and dismissal without the accused's express consent. Consequently, the second information placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense of frustrated murder.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the second information for frustrated murder placed the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, given that the first information was dismissed upon the prosecution's motion after plea, the accused's counsel orally stated "We have no objection," and the accused later filed a manifestation and motion opposing the dismissal.

• Double Jeopardy: No double jeopardy attached. Under Section 9 of Rule 117, a dismissal bars a subsequent prosecution only if it was without the express consent of the accused. The oral manifestation of Pilpa's counsel in open court—"We have no objection"—was equivalent to a declaration of full conformity to the dismissal and constituted express consent to the termination of the case. Because the trial court relied on that consent and immediately ordered the dismissal, the accused could not thereafter unilaterally revoke it through a later manifestation of opposition. The dismissal was therefore with the accused's express consent, the fourth requisite of former jeopardy was absent, and the second information was not barred.

• Requisites of Former Jeopardy (Section 9, Rule 117): For double jeopardy to bar a second prosecution, the following must concur: (a) a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (b) filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the accused's express consent. Where any element is missing, former jeopardy does not lie.
• Express Consent Through Counsel's "No Objection": A statement by defense counsel in open court that the defense has "no objection" to the prosecution's motion to dismiss is an express consent to the termination of the case within the meaning of Section 9. The words convey the idea of full concurrence and are equivalent to saying "I agree." Such consent, once given and acted upon by the court, cannot be revoked by a subsequent unilateral manifestation of opposition.
• Accused Bound by Counsel's Assent to Dismissal: The accused is bound by defense counsel's express assent to the dismissal of a criminal case. A belated effort to nullify that assent does not restore the protection of former jeopardy when the court has already dismissed the case in reliance upon it.
• Intent to Kill in Frustrated Homicide/Murder: An information for frustrated murder is not fatally defective for failing to expressly allege "intent to kill" where the intent to kill may be inferred from the allegation that the wound inflicted would have caused the victim's death but for timely medical intervention.

• "We hold that the oral manifestation at the hearing made by the counsel of the accused that he had no objection to the dismissal of the case was equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to an express consent to its termination within the meaning of section 9 of Rule 117. He could not thereafter revoke that conformity since the court had already acted upon it by dismissing the case. He was bound by his counsel's assent to the dismissal."
• "In Pendatum vs. Aragon, 93 Phil. 798, 800 the prosecution filed a motion for the provisional dismissal of the complaints ... At the bottom of that motion, her lawyer wrote the words: 'No objection'. ... There was no jeopardy in such dismissal because the words 'No objection' conveyed the idea of full concurrence with the dismissal and was equivalent to saying 'I agree.'"

• Pendatum vs. Aragon, 93 Phil. 798 — Followed. The phrase "No objection" written on a prosecution's motion for provisional dismissal was deemed express consent, preventing former jeopardy from attaching.
• People vs. Duran, Jr., 107 Phil. 979 — Distinguished. In Duran, the dismissal was without the accused's consent; here, express consent was given.
• People vs. Consults, L-41251, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 277; People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 — Cited for the general enumeration of the requisites of former jeopardy under Rule 117.
• People vs. Romero, 89 Phil. 672; People vs. Obsania, L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249 — Cited for the principle that the accused is bound by counsel's assent to a dismissal.

• Section 22, Article IV, 1935 Constitution — "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The provision embodies the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, which the Court found inapplicable because the first termination was with the accused's consent.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Enumerates the conditions under which a former conviction, acquittal, or dismissal bars a subsequent prosecution. The dismissal must be "without the express consent of the defendant." The Court determined that this element was not satisfied; the accused had expressly consented through counsel.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concurred.

None.