People vs. Sañez

An allegation of treachery as an aggravating circumstance in parricide requires proof of the mode of attack; it cannot be appreciated where no eyewitness to the killing exists and no evidence establishes how the assault was committed. A conviction for parricide may be sustained by a dying declaration, corroborated by circumstantial and physical evidence, even absent direct proof of the actual killing.

On the night of 29 October 1995, Raulito Sañez was found severely wounded in a canal across the street from his residence in Imus, Cavite. His brother, Alberto Sañez, rushed him to the hospital, but Raulito died en route. Before expiring, Raulito declared that he had been hacked by his son, Lyndon, the accused. A subsequent investigation uncovered human tissues and blood in the washroom of the Sañez house, and a witness saw Lyndon dragging a body and dumping it into the canal. Lyndon was charged with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code for the killing of his father.

The Incident and Dying Declaration:
On 29 October 1995, close to midnight, Alberto Sañez heard a commotion outside his house in 110 Medicion I, Imus, Cavite. He discovered his younger brother, Raulito Sañez, sprawled in a canal across the street, still alive but bearing three hack wounds — two on the nape, one on the forehead — and scratches on his back. Alberto called for help and, with his son and a companion, lifted Raulito into the family car. While en route to the hospital, Raulito, still conscious and able to speak, told Alberto that he had been hacked by his son Lyndon (the accused-appellant). Raulito expired minutes later. Alberto reported the incident to the police and gave a statement recounting this declaration.

Prosecution Eyewitness Cary Bataclan:
At the time of the incident, Cary Bataclan was standing along Medicion I road waiting for a tricycle. From a distance of about fifty meters, illuminated by an electric lamp post in front of the accused’s house, Bataclan saw accused-appellant emerge from the house dragging a body by its two feet across the road. Accused-appellant dumped the body into a canal, returned to the house, and brought out rags to clean the path where the body had been dragged. As a tricycle passed, Bataclan boarded it and asked the driver to slow down near the canal; he heard a moaning sound but did not stop or report the incident to the police because he was afraid.

Post-Mortem Examination:
Dr. Ruben Anonuevo, Municipal Physician of Imus, Cavite, conducted a post-mortem examination on Raulito Sañez at approximately 2:40 a.m. on 30 October 1995. He found multiple lacerated wounds on the frontal region, right cheek, left temporal region, an abrasion with hematoma on the anterior chest wall, and abrasion-contusions on the back. The cause of death was skull fracture and massive blood loss. Dr. Anonuevo opined that the lacerated head wounds were caused by a “blunt instrument with not too sharp [an] edge” and that, based on the wound appearance, the attack was frontal with the victim in a position likely lower than that of the assailant.

Investigation and Physical Evidence:
Around nine o’clock that same morning, SPO3 Arsenio Gomez, accompanied by Alberto Sañez, investigated the victim’s house. SPO3 Gomez noticed reddish water at the back of the house; tracing it led to the washroom, where he found human tissues with hair and blood. Bloodstains were also observed on the washroom door, along the path to the gate, and in the canal across the road. The suspected human flesh and hair were submitted to the NBI for examination. During the investigation, accused-appellant remained in his room inside the house, seemingly unperturbed.

Defense’s Version:
Accused-appellant claimed he went to bed early, at about eight o’clock in the evening of 29 October 1995. He was awakened at four o’clock the following morning by Barangay Captain Noel del Rosario, who told him his father had been bumped by a vehicle. He went to the scene with the barangay captain, his brother, and a cousin, but his father had already been taken to the hospital. He asserted that relatives refused to bring him to the hospital. On cross-examination, he suggested that his uncle, Alberto Sañez, implicated him out of ill-motive over a parcel of land inherited from a deceased aunt. He further claimed that witness Cary Bataclan was paid to testify falsely.

• Unrealistic Prosecution Theory: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution’s theory was contrary to human experience because a murderer would ordinarily cut up a body to facilitate disposal rather than simply dump it into a nearby canal.
• Dying Declaration: He maintained that the trial court erred in appreciating the victim’s ante mortem statement, asserting that it was impossible for a dying father to implicate his own son, and pointing to minor inconsistencies in Alberto Sañez’s testimony.
• Admissibility of Physical Evidence: Accused-appellant contended that the human tissue and blood traces discovered by the police inside the house were inadmissible because the search was conducted without the presence of the witnesses required under Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
• Credibility of Cary Bataclan: He assailed Bataclan’s credibility for failing to identify the body and for not immediately reporting what he saw, claiming the witness was compensated to testify against him.

• Dying Declaration: The prosecution maintained that the victim’s declaration to Alberto Sañez qualified as a dying declaration — made under consciousness of impending death, relating to the cause and circumstances of the fatal injury, and uttered by a competent witness — and was therefore admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Physical Evidence: The prosecution argued that accused-appellant did not object to the admissibility of the physical evidence during trial, thereby waiving the issue, and that Alberto Sañez was in fact present during the investigation.
• Witness Credibility: The People urged that the trial court’s assessment of Bataclan’s credibility deserved respect and that any perceived deficiencies were satisfactorily explained by the witness’s fear.
• Circumstantial Evidence: The prosecution emphasized that guilt could be established through circumstantial evidence, as all requisites were present: there was more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences were drawn were proved, and the combination of circumstances produced a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the prosecution’s evidence, consisting of a dying declaration, circumstantial evidence, and physical evidence, proved accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for parricide despite the absence of an eyewitness to the actual killing.
• Dying Declaration: Whether the trial court correctly admitted and relied upon the ante mortem statement of the victim identifying his son as the assailant.
• Admissibility of Physical Evidence: Whether the human tissue and blood evidence obtained from the Sañez residence should have been excluded for lack of the witnesses required under Rule 126, Section 7 of the Rules of Court during the search.
• Credibility of Witness Bataclan: Whether the trial court erred in according full faith and credence to the testimony of Cary Bataclan.
• Treachery and Penalty: Whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated, and whether the penalty of death was correctly imposed.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Conviction was sustained on the combined strength of the victim’s dying declaration, the circumstantial evidence, and the physical evidence. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable when the totality of the evidence establishes guilt. The requisites for circumstantial evidence were satisfied: there was more than one circumstance; the underlying facts — the victim’s declaration, Bataclan’s eyewitness account of the body being dragged and dumped, the blood and human tissue in the washroom — were proven; and all circumstances taken together produced a moral certainty of guilt.
• Dying Declaration: The victim’s statement to Alberto Sañez was properly admitted as a dying declaration. The declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death, referred to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s fatal injury, and the declarant was a competent witness. The intimation that a father would not implicate his son was rejected; it was, on the contrary, most difficult to believe that a dying man would falsely accuse his own son of so grave a crime. Minor inconsistencies in Alberto Sañez’s testimony did not impair the essential integrity of his account, and the claim of ill-motive was unsubstantiated and too shallow to discredit a witness in a crime of this gravity involving close blood relatives.
• Admissibility of Physical Evidence: The objection to the physical evidence was raised for the first time on appeal; accused-appellant never objected during trial. The issue was therefore deemed waived. In any event, the record showed that Alberto Sañez was present during the investigation.
• Credibility of Witness Bataclan: The trial court’s assessment of Bataclan as a credible witness was accorded the high degree of respect traditionally given to trial court findings on credibility. Bataclan explained that fear prevented him from stopping to examine the body. Moreover, physical evidence independently confirmed that the body dragged and dumped into the canal was that of Raulito Sañez.
• Treachery and Penalty: Treachery was not appreciated because it was merely alleged in the information without any proof of the mode of attack. No eyewitness to the killing or evidence on how the assault was carried out was presented. Since treachery is a circumstance that refers to the manner of execution of the crime, its existence cannot be presumed. With no other aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, and the penalty for parricide consisting of two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death), the lesser penalty — reclusion perpetua — was imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. An award of P50,000.00 in civil indemnity ex delicto was mandated.

• Dying Declaration — A statement qualifies as a dying declaration when: (1) it is made by the declarant under consciousness of an impending death; (2) it refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s injury and impending death; and (3) the declarant is a competent witness. In this case, all three requisites were present, and the victim’s identification of his son as the assailant was admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Circumstantial Evidence — Conviction based on circumstantial evidence is proper when: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found these requisites satisfied by the victim’s dying declaration, the eyewitness account of the body being dragged and dumped, and the physical evidence of human tissue and blood.
• Treachery Must Be Proved by Evidence of Mode of Attack — Treachery is an aggravating circumstance that refers to the mode of attack and cannot be appreciated absent any proof of how the assault was committed. Where there is no eyewitness to the killing and no evidence on the manner of its execution, treachery cannot be considered.
• Application of Article 63, Revised Penal Code (Two Indivisible Penalties) — When the penalty prescribed by law consists of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Here, the penalty for parricide under Article 246 is reclusion perpetua to death; in the absence of any proven aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was applied.

• “What greater irony and tragedy could there be than to find a son turn against, indeed take the life of, the man to whom he owes his being?” — The opening lines capture the profound moral gravity that frames the Court’s review of the parricide case.
• “It is impossible, accused-appellant nevertheless suggests, for the deceased Raulito to have implicated his own son. The Court does not at all find it that way; just to the contrary, it would be most difficult to believe that a dying man would point to his own son as being the perpetrator of so serious a crime as that for which the accused-appellant has been charged if it were not indeed true.” — This passage articulates the rationale for giving weight to a dying declaration against a close family member.
• “The only aggravating circumstance alleged in the information is treachery but, referring as it does to the mode of the attack, it cannot be appreciated absent any proof on how the assault has been committed. There being no eyewitness to the killing or evidence on the manner of its execution, treachery cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance.” — This succinctly states the controlling rule that prevented imposition of the death penalty.

• People v. Salazar, 221 SCRA 170 and People v. Molas, 218 SCRA 473 — Cited to support the requisites and admissibility of a dying declaration.
• People v. Java, 227 SCRA 688 — Cited for the rule that an objection to the admissibility of evidence must be made at the time it is offered; failing that, the objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• People v. Cordero, 217 SCRA 1 — Relied upon for the principle that treachery requires proof of the mode of attack and cannot be presumed.
• People v. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754; People v. De Guzman, 231 SCRA 737; People v. Retuta, 234 SCRA 645 — Cited to define the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence.
• People v. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198 — Applied to support the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes parricide with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The provision governed the crime charged and provided the two indivisible penalties from which the appropriate penalty was selected pursuant to Article 63.
• Article 63, second paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes that when the penalty consists of two indivisible penalties, the lesser shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the deed. This rule was applied to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
• Section 5, Republic Act No. 7659 — The death penalty law cited by the trial court in imposing the capital sentence; the Supreme Court found its application inapt because no aggravating circumstance was proved.
• Section 7, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Pertains to the presence of witnesses during the search; invoked by accused-appellant to challenge physical evidence, but the objection was not timely raised and thus deemed waived.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous with no recorded dissenting opinions.