Pimentel vs. Salanga

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court authorizes a judge to voluntarily disqualify himself in the exercise of sound discretion, but it does not provide a ground upon which a litigant or counsel may compel disqualification; compulsory disqualification is confined exclusively to the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of the rule.

Constante Pimentel, a practicing attorney and president of the Ilocos Sur Lawyers' Association, filed an administrative complaint with the Supreme Court on May 12, 1967, against Judge Angelino C. Salanga of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV), charging him with serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law, and incompetence. Pimentel simultaneously served as counsel of record in four cases pending before Judge Salanga's sala. The administrative case was referred to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation, and remained pending at the time of the present petition.

• Nature of the Action: Original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition to enjoin respondent Judge Salanga from further sitting in, trying, or deciding four cases where petitioner Pimentel appeared as counsel.

• The Parties: Petitioner Constante Pimentel was a practicing attorney and president of the Ilocos Sur Lawyers' Association. Respondent Angelino C. Salanga was the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Branch IV, stationed at Candon, Ilocos Sur.

• The Pending Cases: Petitioner served as counsel of record in the following cases before respondent judge: (1) Civil Case 21-C, a special civil action for mandamus to compel payment of salaries of municipal officials, where petitioner represented the principal respondent, Acting Mayor Brigido Vilog; (2) Criminal Case 4898 and C-5 for frustrated murder, where petitioner appeared as private prosecutor; (3) Criminal Case C-93 for frustrated homicide, where petitioner appeared as defense counsel; and (4) Election Case 2470, an election protest for the office of mayor of Candon, Ilocos Sur, where petitioner represented the protestant.

• The Administrative Complaint: On May 12, 1967, petitioner filed Administrative Case 117 with the Supreme Court against respondent judge, charging serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law, and incompetence. The complaint sought the judge's immediate suspension and eventual removal from office. Respondent judge filed a return traversing the factual averments. On July 13, 1967, the Supreme Court referred the administrative case to Justice Eulogio Serrano of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. The administrative case remained pending.

• The Motion for Disqualification: On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved in the trial court for respondent judge to disqualify himself from Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470, and prayed for the transfer of records to another sala in Narvacan or Vigan. Petitioner's misgivings stemmed from his role as complainant in the pending administrative case against respondent judge.

• Denial of the Motion: On August 1, 1967, respondent judge denied the motion. He ruled that the administrative complaint constituted no cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court; that Civil Case 21-C and Election Case 2470 were in the final stages of termination, and transfer would delay disposition, cause further expense to parties, and violate Administrative Order 371 defining the court's territorial jurisdiction; and that he was sworn to administer justice according to law and the merits of each case. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Civil Case 21-C was rescheduled for hearing on August 22 and 23, 1967.

• Petitioner's Arguments for Relief: Petitioner contended that immediate resolution of the disqualification issue was of profound importance to his career as a legal practitioner, that his cases might fall into respondent judge's sala by raffle, that he could not resign from every accepted case assigned there, and that clients would hesitate to retain counsel unacceptable to the presiding judge.

• Broad Disqualification under the Second Paragraph: Petitioner argued that his case fell within the coverage of the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, which for the first time provided a broad, policy-oriented ground for disqualification, permitting a judge to be barred for reasons other than those enumerated in the first paragraph.

• Failure to Exercise Sound Discretion: Petitioner maintained that respondent judge, in the factual environment presented, did not make use of his sound discretion when he refused to disqualify himself, and that the refusal warranted correction through certiorari or prohibition.

• Prejudicial Impact on Law Practice: Petitioner contended that the disqualification issue was a matter of profound importance to his career and potential as a practitioner, as he could not resign from accepted cases every time they fell into respondent judge's sala, and clients would naturally hesitate to retain counsel unacceptable to the presiding judge.

• No Legal Ground for Disqualification: Respondent judge countered that the administrative complaint against him constituted no cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court, as none of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 was present.

• Prejudice from Transfer: Respondent judge argued that Civil Case 21-C and Election Case 2470 were in the final stages of termination, and transferring them to another sala would delay final disposition, cause further efforts and expenses to the parties, and violate Administrative Order 371 of the Department of Justice defining territorial jurisdiction.

• Duty to Administer Justice: Respondent judge maintained that he was sworn to administer justice in accordance with law and the merits of each case, and that he remained capable of discharging this duty impartially.

• Compulsory Disqualification: Whether the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides a ground upon which a litigant or counsel may compel a judge to disqualify himself from sitting in a case.

• Effect of Pending Administrative Complaint: Whether the pendency of an administrative complaint filed by counsel against a judge constitutes a legal ground for the judge's compulsory disqualification from cases where that counsel appears.

• Compulsory Disqualification: The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 does not provide a ground for compelled disqualification. The provision grants a judge permissive authority to voluntarily inhibit himself in the exercise of sound discretion; it has reference exclusively to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case. When a judge does not inhibit himself and is not legally disqualified under the first paragraph, he has a duty to continue with the case. The amendment introduced by the 1964 Rules did not alter the pre-existing rule that a judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those specified in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.

• Effect of Pending Administrative Complaint: The pendency of an administrative complaint filed by counsel against a judge does not constitute a legal ground for the judge's compulsory disqualification. Prejudice is not to be presumed, especially when weighed against a judge's legal obligation under oath to administer justice without respect to persons. No act or conduct of respondent judge had shown arbitrariness or prejudice; he had not crossed the line dividing partiality from impartiality. To assume what a judge not otherwise legally disqualified would do in a case before him would be speculative and unjustified. However, a charge made before trial that a party will not receive a fair, impartial, and just hearing is premature.

• Doctrine of Voluntary Inhibition — Under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, a judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, voluntarily disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other than those enumerated in the first paragraph. This authority is permissive and relates exclusively to voluntary inhibition; it does not empower a litigant or counsel to compel disqualification. The rule originated from Del Castillo vs. Javelona, L-16742, September 29, 1962, where the Supreme Court upheld a judge's voluntary inhibition based on his first-cousin relationship with counsel, and confirmed that voluntary inhibition upon good, sound, and/or ethical grounds rests within the judge's discretion.

• Doctrine of Compulsory Disqualification — The grounds for compulsory disqualification are exclusively those enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137: pecuniary interest as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; relationship to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree; having been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel in the case; or having presided in an inferior court whose ruling or decision is under review. Absent any of these specific grounds, a judge is duty-bound to proceed with the trial and decision of the case and cannot shirk that responsibility.

• Presumption of Judicial Impartiality — Prejudice on the part of a judge is not to be presumed. A charge made before trial that a party will not receive a fair, impartial, and just hearing is premature. The Court will not assume what a judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him, particularly where no act or conduct showing arbitrariness or prejudice has been demonstrated.

• Remedy for Actual Bias — If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial induced by a judge's bias or prejudice, the appropriate remedy is a new trial in the interest of justice. The principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge is foundational to courts. Where the filing of charges by a party against a judge generates resentment leading to bias reflected in the decision, the judgment may be set aside and a new trial ordered, as held in Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904.

• Guidelines for Self-Examination — When a suggestion is made of record that a judge might act with bias or prejudice arising from a circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, the judge should conduct a careful self-examination. A salutary norm is to reflect on the probability that a losing party might believe the judge tilted the scales of justice against him. The judge should exercise discretion in a way that preserves public faith in the courts. He may in good grace inhibit himself where the case can be heard by another judge without appreciable prejudice to others involved. A judicial officer who voluntarily desists from sitting where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned serves the cause of the law by forestalling a miscarriage of justice.

• "The exercise of sound discretion — mentioned in the rule — has reference exclusively to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case. For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the matter of disqualification, not otherwise. Better stated yet, when a judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been — he has to continue with the case." — This passage encapsulates the ratio decidendi, clarifying that the second paragraph is a shield for voluntary inhibition, not a sword for compelled recusal.

• "A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired." — This articulation of the judge's duty of self-examination and the importance of public confidence in the judiciary is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on judicial ethics and disqualification.

• "To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience." — A concise summation of the discretionary nature of voluntary inhibition, emphasizing the personal ethical dimension of the judge's decision.

• "If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice." — The Court's closing guidance, endorsing voluntary inhibition as a judicially virtuous act even when not legally compelled.

• Del Castillo vs. Javelona, L-16742, September 29, 1962 — The jurisprudential source of the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. The Supreme Court upheld a judge's voluntary inhibition due to his first-cousin relationship with counsel, holding that voluntary inhibition based on good, sound, and/or ethical grounds is a matter of discretion. The opinion made clear that Rule 126 (old Rules) did not include or preclude cases of voluntary inhibition.

• Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904 — Cited for the proposition that where charges filed by a party against a judge generated resentment reflecting bias in the decision, the judgment must be set aside and a new trial ordered. This case provided the doctrinal foundation for the remedy of a new trial upon proof of actual prejudice, distinguishing it from the premature assumption of bias.

• People vs. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286, 294 (1949) — Articulated the pre-amendment rule that a judge not legally disqualified has a duty to proceed, stating: "It is his duty not to sit in its trial and decision if legally disqualified; but if the judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case."

• Benusa vs. Torres, 55 Phil. 737, 740 (1931) — An early acknowledgment that voluntary inhibition upon sound grounds could be recognized, observing that if the judge had abstained "there would have been less susceptibility to suspicion," although no legal ground for disqualification existed.

• Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court (1964) — The central provision interpreted in this case. The first paragraph enumerates the exclusive grounds for compulsory disqualification (pecuniary interest, relationship to parties or counsel within specified degrees, prior involvement as executor/administrator/guardian/trustee/counsel, or prior judicial action under review). The second paragraph, introduced in the 1964 Rules, provides: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above." The Court construed this second paragraph as permissive authority for voluntary inhibition only, not a basis for compelled disqualification.

• Section 3, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended — Referenced for the judicial oath "to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich," underscoring the presumption of impartiality and the duty to proceed absent legal disqualification.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concurred.

None. The decision was unanimous.