Rodriguez vs. Tan

A de facto public officer who has been duly proclaimed, has taken the oath of office, and has discharged its duties under color of title is entitled to retain the salaries and emoluments received during incumbency, absent an express statutory provision compelling reimbursement to the subsequently declared de jure officer. The silent treatment of a claim for reimbursement by an electoral tribunal, when that claim was squarely raised in the protest proceedings, operates as a denial and is res judicata in a subsequent civil action.

At the 11 November 1947 general elections, both Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. and Carlos Tan were candidates for Senator. Tan was proclaimed elected by the Commission on Elections, took his oath, and served from 30 December 1947. Rodriguez challenged the result before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. On 16 December 1949, the Tribunal adjudged Rodriguez the duly elected Senator. Rodriguez then sought to recover from Tan the salaries Tan had received and the expenses Rodriguez had incurred in the protest.

• The Elections and Proclamation: Carlos Tan was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party for Senator in the 11 November 1947 general elections. He was proclaimed elected by the Commission on Elections, took his oath of office, and continuously discharged the duties of Senator from 30 December 1947 until December 1949, collecting the corresponding salaries, emoluments, and allowances totaling P18,400.
• The Election Protest: Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. filed an election protest against Tan before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. On 16 December 1949, the Tribunal rendered judgment declaring Rodriguez the duly elected Senator. In that protest, Rodriguez had specifically claimed reimbursement of the salaries and emoluments Tan had received and sought recovery of the expenses incurred in prosecuting the protest.
• The Complaint Below: Rodriguez thereafter commenced an action in the Court of First Instance to collect the P18,400 in salaries and allowances from Tan as well as P35,524.55 in damages, characterizing Tan’s occupancy of the office as “usurpation.”
• Motion to Dismiss: Tan moved to dismiss, asserting that the Electoral Tribunal’s judgment was res judicata and that the Tribunal had denied Rodriguez’s claim for expenses without reservation. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

• Right to Salaries Follows Title: Rodriguez argued that the salaries and emoluments of a public office are inseparable from legal title and belong to the de jure officer regardless of who actually performed the duties. He invoked the rule, supported by numerous American authorities, that the de facto officer must reimburse the de jure officer for all compensation received.
• Deterrence of Election Fraud: Rodriguez maintained that the rule requiring reimbursement curbs election frauds, lessens the danger of usurpation, and deters violence and terrorism, thereby protecting the integrity of the electoral process.

• Entitlement to Compensation for Service Rendered: Tan contended that the rule advocated by Rodriguez ran counter to the long-settled principle in the Philippines that a candidate proclaimed elected and sworn into office has the right to assume the position and retain the salaries and emoluments as compensation for the service actually rendered, notwithstanding a pending protest.
• Res Judicata: Tan argued that Rodriguez had already sought the same reimbursement before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s sub silentio treatment of that claim constituted a denial that barred relitigation under the doctrine of res judicata.

• Recovery of Salaries: Whether the de jure Senator may recover from the de facto Senator the salaries and emoluments the latter received while actually serving in the office under a valid proclamation, absent any statute authorizing such recovery.
• Res Judicata: Whether the Senate Electoral Tribunal’s silence on Rodriguez’s claim for reimbursement and damages, raised in the election protest, operates as res judicata.

• Recovery of Salaries: The claim for reimbursement was rejected. Tan was a de facto officer who had been proclaimed by the Commission on Elections, had taken his oath, and had performed the duties of the office. The consistent policy and practice in the jurisdiction recognized the right of a person so situated to retain the compensation for the service rendered. The emolument belongs to the person who rendered the service unless a contrary provision exists. No Philippine statute authorized recovery; the common law rule to the contrary, adopted in some American jurisdictions, was not in force in the Philippines, and adopting it would amount to judicial legislation.
• Res Judicata: The claim for damages and, implicitly, the claim for salaries were barred. Rodriguez had set up the same claim before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The Tribunal’s decision on the merits passed over the matter sub silentio. That silence was interpreted as a denial of the relief, which was within the Tribunal’s ample and unlimited jurisdiction over election contests. Accordingly, the matter could not be relitigated, consistent with Kare vs. Locsin.

• De Facto Officer’s Right to Compensation: A person who has been proclaimed elected, has taken the oath, and has discharged the duties of a public office under color of title is a de facto officer and, absent a statute directing otherwise, is entitled to retain the salaries and emoluments received as compensation for the services actually rendered. The legal title subsequently adjudicated in favor of another does not retroactively divest the de facto officer of that right.
• Res Judicata by Implied Denial: Where a competent tribunal with ample jurisdiction over an election contest passes sub silentio on a claim for monetary reimbursement raised in the protest, the silence is deemed a denial of the claim and operates as res judicata in a subsequent civil action based on the same cause.

• “The emolument must go to the person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided.”
• “This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with the provisions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been recognized.”
• “For us to follow the suggestion of the plaintiff would be to legislate by judicial ruling which is beyond the province of the Court. Nor are we justified to follow a common law principle which runs counter to a precedent long observed in this jurisdiction.”
• “[W]hen the Tribunal chose to pass sub silentio , or ignore altogether, this important claim, the clear implication is that it deemed it unjustified.”

• Page vs. U.S. , 127 U.S. 67 (1888) — Cited as persuasive authority that a person who serves as a member of Congress under a certificate of election and is later unseated is the predecessor of the person who subsequently fills the vacancy, and is entitled to the salary received during his incumbency.
• Kare vs. Locsin , 61 Phil. 541 (1935) — Followed as controlling on the res judicata effect of an implied denial; where the Legislature voted compensation to the de facto officer despite a pending contest, that determination was res judicata and barred the de jure officer’s claim for the same compensation.
• Fressel vs. Mariano Uy Chanco & Sons & Co. , 34 Phil. 122 (1916) — Applied for the rule that a conclusion of law (usurpation) is not deemed admitted by a motion to dismiss when the specific facts supporting it are not pleaded.
• U.S. vs. Cuna , 12 Phil. 241 (1908); Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson , 18 Phil. 257 (1911) — Cited for the principle that neither English nor American common law is in force in the Philippines as a general rule.
• Sanidad et al. vs. Vera et al. , Senate Electoral Tribunal Case No. 1 — Invoked to underscore the ample and unlimited jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal over election contests.

• Article VI, Section 14, 1935 Constitution of the Philippines — The provision fixing the compensation of Senators was the basis for the salary and emoluments Tan received; the Court implicitly recognized that constitutional compensation attached to the office and was properly paid to the person who discharged its duties.

Bengzon, Montemayor, and Labrador, JJ., concurred.
Paras, C.J., and Tuason, J., concurred in the result.
Padilla, J., wrote a separate concurrence, emphasizing that usurpation is a conclusion of law; a proclaimed candidate cannot be a usurper. He added that Tan could be liable for damages only if Rodriguez had pleaded that Tan committed unlawful or tortious acts leading to the proclamation—a pleading absent in this case.

• Pablo, M. — Dissented on the ground that a de facto officer is obliged to restitute all emoluments to the de jure officer. He argued that natural justice demands restitution, as the emoluments belong to the person legally elected. He contended that the majority’s reliance on the absence of a Philippine statute and the inapplicability of common law was misplaced: the Supreme Court should establish the rule as a matter of justice, forming part of a developing Philippine common law. He distinguished Page vs. U.S. on the facts, noting that in Page the seat was declared vacant and a special election was called, whereas in this case the Tribunal declared Rodriguez the duly elected Senator from the start. He also rejected the res judicata holding, arguing that the Electoral Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the monetary claim and that its silence could not be treated as a decision.