Salazar vs. Marigomen

A judge commits gross ignorance of the law by admitting uncertified photocopies of public records in the custody of another tribunal without requiring certified true copies or laying the proper predicate for secondary evidence, and the judge’s active participation in presenting evidence for one party together with a false statement in administrative proceedings constitutes manifest bias and dishonesty, warranting disciplinary fines even if the substantive case was ultimately corrected on appeal.

Zenaida F. Salazar, wife of complainant Doroteo M. Salazar, vied for the mayoralty of Madridejos, Cebu in the May 2001 elections. After Lety Mancio was proclaimed winner, Zenaida Salazar filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu. The case was inherited by respondent Judge Antonio D. Marigomen, who assumed presiding duties on June 3, 2002. Respondent dismissed the protest on August 8, 2003 and declared Mancio the duly elected mayor. The Commission on Elections First Division reversed the decision on March 25, 2004 and proclaimed Zenaida Salazar the winner. Complainant then filed the verified administrative complaint on November 10, 2004.

• The Election Protest: Zenaida F. Salazar, wife of complainant and a mayoralty candidate in Madridejos, Cebu in the May 2001 elections, filed an election protest on July 4, 2001 against proclaimed winner Lety Mancio before the Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu, docketed as Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789. The case was first heard by then Acting Presiding Judge Jesus S. dela Peña, who ordered revision of contested ballots at the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) premises. Respondent took over on June 3, 2002 and eventually dismissed the protest, declaring Mancio the winner with 5,214 votes. On appeal, the COMELEC First Division reversed and declared Zenaida Salazar the duly elected mayor.

• Admission of Uncertified Photocopies: During the proceedings, respondent admitted in evidence uncertified photocopies of the contested ballots that were in the custody of the HRET, over the protestant’s objection invoking Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which requires a certified copy of a public record. Respondent relied on Section 5, Rule 130 (secondary evidence when original is unavailable) as justification.

• Alleged Bias and Active Participation: Complainant pointed to several instances: respondent ordered his Clerk of Court to coordinate with the protestee’s counsel and to testify for the protestee regarding the veracity of the photocopies; allowed Atty. Reinerio Roeles, the protestee’s co-counsel, to testify on matters such as his presence during elections and absence of goons and terrorism, despite objection that it violated professional ethics under Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and repeatedly propounded questions himself to the witness Atty. Caayon after every objection, instead of ruling on the objections. The records showed respondent stating, “We will present the Clerk of Court (Atty. Caayon) to affirm the veracity of those ballots in his possession,” indicating personal interest in presenting the witness.

• Falsehood in Administrative Comment: In his comment to the administrative complaint, respondent claimed that he allowed Atty. Roeles to testify because the protestant’s counsel failed to submit a memorandum of authorities in support of his objection. However, the records contained a “Manifestation” dated February 24, 2003 filed by the protestant’s counsel, received by the court on the same day, which called attention to the ethical violation and submitted a memorandum of authorities.

• Deficiencies in the Decision: Respondent’s 22-page decision dismissed the protest after stating: “After reviewing or re-appreciating the ballots of the contested precincts, the Court invalidated ninety (90) votes of the protestant …” The decision did not specify the factual and legal bases for invalidating these votes nor identify the specific ballots set aside, leading the COMELEC First Division to reverse it.

• Procedural Defects and Mootness: Respondent countered that complainant was not the real party in interest and that the complaint was moot because the election protest had already been decided on appeal by the COMELEC.

• Errors of Judgment Not Administrative: Respondent argued that any errors committed, including the admission of evidence, pertained to the exercise of adjudicative functions and were correctible only by judicial remedies, not through administrative proceedings.

• Justification for Admission of Photocopies: Respondent invoked Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (secondary evidence when original is unavailable) as legal basis for admitting the uncertified photocopies.

• Denial of Bias: Respondent claimed that he allowed Atty. Roeles to testify because the protestant’s counsel failed to submit a memorandum supporting the objection; he asserted that he propounded questions in good faith to ascertain the truth or falsity of the matters in issue.

• Denial of Delay and Non‑Compulsory Guidelines: Respondent disclaimed any intentional delay and argued that the Memorandum on Policy Guidelines was merely recommendatory and could not be imposed on the protestee unilaterally.

• Sufficiency of Decision: Respondent maintained that his decision stated the facts and the law, and that any errors were addressable through judicial appeal.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether respondent’s admission of uncertified photocopies of contested ballots, and his reliance on Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, constituted gross ignorance of the law.

• Manifest Bias: Whether respondent exhibited manifest bias by facilitating the testimony of his Clerk of Court and the protestee’s counsel, and by propounding questions to the witness in lieu of ruling on objections.

• Dishonesty: Whether respondent committed falsehood or dishonesty by claiming that the protestant’s counsel failed to submit a memorandum of authorities, when such memorandum had in fact been filed.

• Constitutional and Procedural Violation: Whether respondent violated the constitutional mandate by failing to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law upon which his decision invalidating 90 ballots was based.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Gross ignorance of the law was established because respondent admitted plain photocopies of public records—contested ballots in HRET custody—without requiring certified true copies as mandated by Section 7, Rule 130. The invocation of Section 5, Rule 130 was misplaced, as the originals were neither lost nor destroyed and were readily accessible; the predicates of loss, diligent search, and absence of bad faith were never proved. The Best Evidence Rule is elementary, and a judge’s failure to know and apply it constituted gross ignorance.

• Manifest Bias: The record disclosed manifest bias. Respondent took a special interest in presenting Atty. Caayon as a witness, declared “We will present the Clerk of Court … to affirm the veracity of those ballots,” ignored the protestant’s objections, later allowed protestee’s counsel Atty. Roeles to testify on substantive matters not falling within the formal‑matter or essential‑justice exceptions of Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and repeatedly propounded questions himself after every objection instead of ruling. These acts violated Canon 3 (Impartiality) and Canon 5 (Equality) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which require impartiality in both the decision and the process.

• Dishonesty: Respondent’s claim in his comment that the protestant’s counsel failed to submit a memorandum was contradicted by the record containing a Manifestation with memorandum of authorities, filed and received on February 24, 2003. This false statement constituted dishonesty, which is anathema to the judicial office and incompatible with the candor and fairness required of magistrates.

• Constitutional Violation: Respondent’s decision invalidated 90 votes of the protestant without indicating the factual and legal grounds therefor and without specifying which ballots were set aside. This directly contravened Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that every decision express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — A judge’s failure to apply an elementary rule of evidence, such as the Best Evidence Rule requiring a certified copy of a public record in official custody, constitutes gross ignorance. The invocation of secondary evidence under Section 5, Rule 130 when the originals are extant and accessible is patently erroneous and indicates a lack of basic legal competence.

• Impartiality Encompasses the Entire Judicial Process — Under Canons 3 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, impartiality is essential not only in the decision itself but also in the process by which the decision is reached. A judge who actively facilitates the presentation of a witness for one party, repeatedly propounds questions instead of ruling on objections, and allows counsel to testify on substantive non‑excepted matters demonstrates manifest bias warranting administrative sanction.

• Dishonesty in Judicial Office — A judge must exhibit candor, fairness, and good faith before the courts. Making a false statement in an administrative comment constitutes dishonesty, a serious charge that strikes at the very nature of judicial functions and undermines public confidence.

• Constitutional Duty to State Facts and Law in Decisions — Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution imposes an imperative on all courts to spell out clearly and distinctly the factual and legal bases of their decisions. A decision that merely declares an invalidation of votes, without specifying the grounds and without identifying the ballots affected, fails this constitutional standard and subjects the judge to administrative liability.

• “When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.” — The Court’s concise formulation of the standard, applied to the erroneous admission of uncertified photocopies under the Best Evidence Rule.

• “Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.” — Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, invoked to emphasize that procedural bias is as sanctionable as decisional bias.

• “Dishonesty is anathema to the very nature of functions which a magistrate performs.” — Quoting Re: Compliance of Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, underscoring that judicial dishonesty is fundamentally incompatible with the role of a judge.

• Re: Compliance of Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, MTCC, Santiago City, Isabela, A.M. No. 04-5-118-MTCC, July 29, 2004, 435 SCRA 363 — Cited for the principle that lack of candor and dishonesty by a judge are incongruent with the judicial office and warrant disciplinary action.

• Section 7, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Best Evidence Rule for public records: contents of an original in the custody of a public officer may be proved by a certified copy issued by the custodian. Applied to show that admission of uncertified photocopies was a blatant violation.

• Section 5, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Secondary evidence when original is lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced; requires proof of unavailability without bad faith. Invoked by respondent but found inapplicable because the original ballots were in HRET custody and accessible.

• Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that no decision shall be rendered without clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the law upon which it is based. Violated by the decision’s failure to specify grounds for invalidating 90 ballots.

• Rule 12.08, Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits a lawyer from testifying on behalf of a client except on formal matters or when testimony is essential to the ends of justice. Applied to demonstrate that allowing Atty. Roeles to testify on substantive, self‑serving matters revealed bias.

• Canons 3 and 5, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary — Impartiality and equality; judges must not, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice toward any person. Applied to respondent’s courtroom behavior and decision-making process.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur. Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., on official leave. Corona and Velasco, Jr., JJ., no part.