Salonga vs. Hermoso

A petition for mandamus to compel the issuance of a travel eligibility certificate is rendered moot and academic by the subsequent issuance of that certificate, but the Supreme Court may, in dismissing the petition, admonish the administrative agency to respect the constitutional right to travel and to avoid needless obstruction of its exercise.

During the martial law period, international travel by Philippine citizens was regulated through a Travel Processing Center that issued certificates of eligibility to travel. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga, a former senator and public figure, held a valid Philippine passport and was a member of the Board of Trustees of the United Board for Higher Christian Education in Asia. He had previously secured travel clearances without incident, but in April 1980 he again encountered delays despite having submitted his application well in advance of a scheduled trip involving medical appointments and official duties.

• Parties: Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga was the holder of a Philippine passport valid until March 1982 and the only Filipino member of the Board of Trustees of the United Board for Higher Christian Education in Asia based in New York. Respondents were Captain Rolando Hermoso, the Travel Processing Center, and General Fabian Ver, who exercised supervision over the center.
• Earlier petition: In a prior mandamus case (Salonga v. Madella, G.R. No. L-49130), the petition was dismissed as moot after the Solicitor General stated that the travel eligibility certificate had not been denied and had, in fact, been granted. A brief separate opinion in that case stressed that the Travel Processing Center must conform to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the President’s declaration lifting the ban on international travel, and that the right to travel deserves respect.
• Present application: On April 1, 1980, petitioner applied for a travel permit in view of urgent medical appointments and official engagements abroad. His last overseas trip, from February 21 to March 15, 1980, had been completed without complaint from any government agency.
• Delay: Despite daily follow-up by petitioner’s representative from the scheduled release date of April 11, 1980, the permit was not issued. By April 18, petitioner was constrained to file the present petition because his April 23 flight was in jeopardy, while all other applications had already been acted upon.
• Grant of permit during litigation: After the petition was filed, the certificate of eligibility to travel was issued. The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the petition on mootness grounds, enclosing a copy of the certificate.

• Right to Travel: Petitioner asserted his constitutional right to travel, recognized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the issuance of his passport, and maintained that the unjustified delay in issuing the travel permit violated that right.
• Previous Recognition: Petitioner argued that his right to travel had already been established in the prior case (Salonga v. Madella) and that the circumstances had not changed; thus, no valid basis existed for the delay.
• Due Process Violation: As elaborated in the concurring opinion, petitioner had cause to complain that he was effectively placed on a “watch list” without notice and hearing, depriving him of the opportunity to rebut any adverse information that might have been gathered against him.

• Mootness: The Solicitor General, in moving for dismissal, contended that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic and removing any need for a ruling on the merits.

• Mootness: Whether the petition for mandamus had become moot and academic due to the subsequent issuance of the travel eligibility certificate.
• Advisory Pronouncement: Whether the Supreme Court could still issue admonitory statements and guidelines to prevent recurrence of similar burdens on the right to travel, despite the mootness of the specific controversy.

• Mootness: The petition was dismissed for being moot and academic because the relief sought—issuance of the certificate of eligibility to travel—had already been granted. The issuance rendered any further judicial determination unnecessary, consistent with the disposition in earlier cases of similar character (Santos v. Special Committee on Travel Abroad, Pimentel v. Travel Processing Center, Gonzales v. Special Committee on Travel, and the first Salonga petition).
• Advisory Pronouncement: Notwithstanding the dismissal, the exigency of preventing future unnecessary litigation and safeguarding the constitutional right to travel warranted an admonition. The Travel Processing Center was reminded to exercise the utmost care to avoid any impression that citizens desirous of exercising their right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In case of doubt, the officer-in-charge was directed to promptly seek the guidance of General Fabian Ver, and persons desiring to travel were advised to file applications at the earliest possible time to facilitate processing and preclude any claim that they caused delay.

• Moot and Academic Principle — A case becomes moot and academic when the relief prayed for has been granted or the controversy has ceased to exist, leaving no practical relief that a court can grant. In such instances, dismissal is appropriate. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may take the opportunity to issue directives or admonitions that serve the public interest and prevent recurrence of the same legal issue, particularly when constitutional rights are implicated.
• Constitutional Right to Travel — The right to travel is a cherished constitutional liberty. Administrative agencies charged with regulating its exercise must act with fidelity to the Constitution and official pronouncements safeguarding the right, and must not impose unnecessary obstacles that amount to a practical denial or delay of its enjoyment. The Travel Processing Center was effectively bound to process applications promptly and to avoid creating an impression of arbitrary restriction.

• “It is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance.” — This passage encapsulates the Court’s core admonition and remains the most frequently cited portion of the resolution, linking the mootness disposition to the substantive constitutional value at stake.
• From the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee: “Petitioner has cause to complain that he should not be placed by respondents on their ‘watch list’ without benefit of previous notice and hearing so as to be afforded the opportunity to rebut whatever adverse information might have been compiled or given in secret against him.” — This highlights the due process dimension of the travel permit system, though it was not a ground of the majority’s ruling.

• Salonga v. Madella, G.R. No. L-49130, Resolution of November 2, 1978 — The earlier petition by the same petitioner, dismissed as moot and academic upon the subsequent grant of the travel certificate. The Court noted the earlier case’s reminder that the Travel Processing Center must conform to the right to travel.
• Santos v. Special Committee on Travel Abroad, G.R. No. L-45748; Pimentel v. Travel Processing Center, G.R. No. L-49637; Gonzales v. Special Committee on Travel, G.R. No. L-46466 — Cited as prior instances where similar petitions for travel permits were dismissed for mootness, illustrating the recurring pattern and the Court’s consistent disposition.

• Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13 — Invoked in the earlier related resolution as a standard governing the right to travel, though not directly applied in this case.
• Article 27, Civil Code of the Philippines — Mentioned in Justice Teehankee’s separate opinion as a potential basis for damages liability of a public servant who refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform an official duty.
• 1973 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 (Right to Travel) — Although not cited by name in the decision, the right to travel is explicitly protected by the Constitution, and the entire resolution proceeds from the premise that the liberty is constitutionally anchored and must not be impaired by administrative delay.

Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera concurred. Justice Antonio was on leave. Justice Teehankee filed a separate concurring opinion emphasizing the absence of any changed circumstances since the prior recognition of petitioner’s right, the lack of hearing on any adverse information, and the applicability of Civil Code Article 27.

None.