Santos vs. Bernabe

When fungible goods belonging to different owners are commingled by consent or by accident and cannot be separated without injury, each owner acquires a right in the mixture strictly proportionate to the part he owned, measured by value. Consequently, in a suit to recover for the wrongful seizure of a portion of such a mixture, the injured co-owner’s recovery is limited to the value of his proportionate share of the quantity actually taken, not the entire quantity he originally deposited.

On March 20, 1928, Urbano Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the warehouse of Jose C. Bernabe. On the same day, Pablo Tiongson deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay in the same warehouse. The sacks were not marked, labelled, or physically segregated. Shortly thereafter, Tiongson filed a complaint against Bernabe to recover his deposit and secured a writ of attachment over Bernabe’s property. Pursuant to the writ, the provincial sheriff attached 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay found in the warehouse, sold it at public auction, and delivered the proceeds to Tiongson. Urbano Santos intervened in the attachment proceedings, but Tiongson posted a bond, the attachment proceeded, and Santos commenced the present action to recover the value of his palay.

• Deposits: On March 20, 1928, Urbano Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the warehouse of Jose C. Bernabe. On the same date, Pablo Tiongson deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay in the same warehouse. Neither lot bore marks or signs of identification, and no physical separation was maintained between them.
• The Attachment: On the same day, Pablo Tiongson filed civil case No. 3665 in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against Jose C. Bernabe, alleging that Bernabe had failed to return the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos deposited by Tiongson. Tiongson applied for and obtained a preliminary writ of attachment. The sheriff attached various properties of Bernabe, including 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay found in the warehouse, sold the attached palay at public auction, and turned over the proceeds to Tiongson, who later obtained judgment in that suit.
• Intervention of Santos: Urbano Santos intervened in the attachment, asserting his ownership over a portion of the palay. Despite the intervention, the sheriff proceeded with the attachment and sale after Tiongson filed a bond. Santos then filed the present complaint to recover the value of his palay.
• State of the Mixture: It was conclusively established that the sacks of palay belonging to Santos and Tiongson had been deposited in the same warehouse, were indistinguishable, and had been commingled. At the time of attachment, the sheriff found only 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay in the warehouse, a quantity less than the total deposited by both parties.

• Insufficiency of Proof: Appellants, Pablo Tiongson and the provincial sheriff, contended that appellee failed to prove that the palay attached from Jose C. Bernabe’s warehouse included the palay claimed by Urbano Santos.
• Excessive Award: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in ordering Tiongson to pay the full value of 778 cavans and 38 kilos because the palay had been commingled with Tiongson’s own deposit and only a portion was actually attached and sold.
• Denial of New Trial: Appellants maintained that the trial court should have granted their motion for a new trial.

• Implied Admission of Ownership: Appellee Urbano Santos argued that Pablo Tiongson, by asking for the attachment of the palay as property of Jose C. Bernabe, impliedly acknowledged that the palay belonged to Bernabe and not to Tiongson, and thus Tiongson could not claim any ownership over the attached grain that would defeat Santos’s right to full recovery.

• Identification of Attached Palay: Whether it was proven that the 924 cavans and 31½ kilos of palay attached by the sheriff included the palay deposited by Urbano Santos.
• Measure of Recovery: Whether Urbano Santos was entitled to recover the full value of the 778 cavans and 38 kilos he deposited, or only a proportionate share of the palay that was actually attached and sold under the rule on commingling.

• Identification of Attached Palay: The evidence was held sufficient to prove that the attached palay formed part of the commingled mass in Bernabe’s warehouse. Because the sacks bore no marks and were not segregated, the grain seized necessarily included a portion of the palay deposited by Santos. The factual finding of the trial court on this point was not disturbed.
• Measure of Recovery: The award was modified. Under Article 381 of the Civil Code, when things belonging to different owners are commingled by the will of their owners or by accident and cannot be separated without injury, each owner acquires a right in the mixture proportionate to the part he owned, calculated according to value. Since the sheriff attached only 924 cavans out of the total mixture of 1,804 cavans (778 from Santos and 1,026 from Tiongson), Santos’s right extended solely to 398.49 cavans of that attached quantity, representing his 778/1,804 share. Santos’s right was not to recover his entire deposit from Tiongson, but only the value of his proportionate interest in the actual portion that was wrongfully taken and sold.

• Proportionate Right in Mixture (Article 381, Civil Code) — Where two things of the same or different kinds are mixed by the will of their owners, or if the mixture occurs accidentally and the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner acquires a right in the resulting mixture strictly proportional to the part he contributed, determined by the value of the things mixed. The rule applies whether the mixture is voluntary or involuntary, so long as separation is impossible without damage. In this case, the commingled palay constituted a single fungible mass; the rights of Santos and Tiongson over the 924 cavans attached were thus measured by their respective contributions to the total mass, not by the quantity originally deposited by each.

• “If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or commingled.” — This quotation of Article 381 provided the controlling framework for the Court’s apportionment of the loss.
• “Liberally construing, therefore, the above cited provisions of section 262 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the writ of attachment applied for by Pablo Tiongson against the property of Jose C. Bernabe may be construed as a claim for the delivery of the sacks of palay deposited by the former with the latter.” — This passage illustrates the Court’s pragmatic approach in treating the attachment as a substitute claim for delivery, a step that permitted the application of the commingling rule.

• N/A — The decision relied principally on codal provisions and did not cite any prior judicial precedent.

• Article 381, Civil Code (1889) — Set forth the rule on mixture and commingling, which determined the proportionate rights of the parties in the fungible mass of palay. Because the grain could not be separated without injury and was commingled at least with the consent of the depositors, each owner’s recovery was limited to his aliquot share of the quantity actually taken.
• Section 262, Code of Civil Procedure — Governed actions for the delivery of personal property. The Court invoked it to treat Tiongson’s writ of attachment as the functional equivalent of a claim for delivery of his deposited palay, facilitating a unified resolution of the ownership and conversion claims.
• Section 2, Code of Civil Procedure — Mandated liberal construction of the Code’s provisions and proceedings to promote their objective and assist parties in obtaining speedy justice. This section supported the Court’s flexible characterization of the attachment proceeding.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ., concurred. Justice Johnson reserved his vote.

• Justice Johns — Dissented without a written opinion; the grounds for his dissent are not set out in the decision.