Santos vs. Santos

A co-owner's right to demand partition of commonly owned property is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches, and prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs absent a clear, conclusive, and effectively communicated repudiation of the co-ownership. To prove repudiation, four conditions must be satisfied: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) the repudiating co-owner has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the period required by law.

Isidra Santos, a spinster, owned a 391-square-meter parcel of land in San Mateo, Rizal. She died intestate on April 1, 1967, without issue, survived by two brothers — Ladislao Santos (respondent) and Eliseo Santos (one of the original defendants, father of petitioner Philip Santos). The brothers also co-owned a separate, larger parcel (Lot 1522, 6,340 square meters) inherited from their father Bonifacio Santos. Following Isidra's death, Tax Declaration No. 1115 covering her property was cancelled in 1969 by Tax Declaration No. 7892 under the names of Virgilio Santos (Eliseo's son) and his wife Virginia Santos. In 1980, Virgilio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the same property to his brother, petitioner Philip Santos. Philip thereafter took possession, demolished the existing house, built a shop, and paid realty taxes. Ladislao, who resided in the United States, discovered these transfers in 1993 and filed an action for judicial partition.

• The Property and Intestacy: Isidra Santos, a spinster, owned a 391-square-meter parcel of unregistered land in San Mateo, Rizal, covered by Tax Declaration No. 655 (later cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 1115). She resided on the property in a house she had constructed. Isidra died intestate on April 1, 1967, without issue, survived solely by her two brothers — Ladislao Santos and Eliseo Santos. Upon her death, Ladislao and Eliseo inherited the property as her intestate heirs, each entitled to an undivided one-half share.

• The Alleged Combined Deed of Partition: Petitioners (Eliseo Santos and his son Philip) alleged that in 1969, Ladislao and Eliseo, together with their respective spouses, executed a "Combined Deed of Partition" covering both the estate of their father Bonifacio Santos (Lot 1522, approximately 6,387 square meters) and the Isidra property. Under this alleged instrument, Ladislao received 3,387 square meters of Lot 1522, while Eliseo received 3,000 square meters of Lot 1522 plus the entire Isidra property of 391 square meters. Petitioners claimed that Eliseo thereafter donated the Isidra property to his son Virgilio Santos, who had been raised by Isidra since infancy.

• Tax Declarations and Transfers: On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 1115 under Isidra's name was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 7892 was issued under the names of Virgilio Santos and Virginia Santos. This was subsequently cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 5043 (effective 1974) and later by Tax Declaration No. 04-0015 (effective 1980). On December 16, 1980, Virgilio Santos executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Residential Land" conveying the property to his brother Philip Santos for P24,460.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 04-0015 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 04-0566 under Philip's name, effective 1981. Virgilio and his wife vacated the property and moved to Kambal Street, formerly owned by Philip, while Philip demolished the house on the Isidra property, installed a shop, and paid realty taxes.

• Procedural Events Relating to Lot 1522: On May 29, 1967, Ladislao executed a "Deed of Absolute Conveyance with Right of Way" over the southwestern portion of Lot 1522 (3,000 square meters) in favor of Eliseo for P500.00. In 1984, Ladislao's children and Eliseo filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1522 and 2433, alleging Ladislao's children occupied 3,430 square meters and Eliseo occupied 3,000 square meters. In 1986, the RTC granted registration, issuing OCT No. ON-1146. A subsequent Partition Agreement in 1987 adjudicated Lot 1522-A (3,000 sq m) to Eliseo and Lot 1522-B (3,387 sq m) to Ladislao's children.

• Discovery and Demand: Ladislao, a resident of the United States, discovered in February 1993 that the Isidra property had been transferred to Virgilio Santos and later to Philip Santos. On March 17, 1993, through counsel, Ladislao wrote to Philip alleging discovery of the transfer and suggesting a conference. Philip replied that the Isidra property, together with Lot 1522-A, formed part of Eliseo's share in Bonifacio's estate and that Eliseo had transferred it to Virgilio, who then sold it to Philip.

• Validity of Transfers: Petitioners maintained that the transfer of the Isidra property to Virgilio Santos and later to Philip Santos was lawful and regular, based on a valid document — the Combined Deed of Partition executed by Ladislao and Eliseo and their spouses. They argued that the existence and nature of this document were sufficiently proven through: (a) the annotation at the back of Tax Declaration No. 1115 cancelling it in favor of Tax Declaration No. 7892 under Virgilio's name; (b) the testimony of Municipal Assessor Rodolfo Bautista regarding the existence of a document authorizing the cancellation; and (c) the testimonies of Virginia Santos, Philip Santos, and a certain Dr. Linco.

• Lack of Proof of Fraud: Petitioners contended that respondent failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation in the cancellation of the tax declaration in Isidra's name and the subsequent issuance of tax declarations in Virgilio's and Philip's names. All assessment records had been destroyed by fire at the Provincial Assessor's Office.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Petitioners argued that acquisitive prescription had set in, barring the action for partition. Virgilio Santos possessed the property from Isidra's death in 1967 until its sale in 1980 (over 13 years), and Philip Santos possessed it from December 16, 1980, until the filing of the complaint in 1993 (over 12 years). The possession of Virgilio and Philip could be tacked, totaling 26 years — far exceeding the 10-year period for ordinary acquisitive prescription.

• Prescription of Action and Laches: Petitioners maintained that Ladislao's right to file the action had prescribed and that laches barred him from asserting his claim after 26 years of inaction.

• Buyer in Good Faith: Petitioner Philip Santos asserted his right as a buyer in good faith and for value.

• Co-ownership by Inheritance: Ladislao Santos argued that upon Isidra's death, he and Eliseo inherited the property as her sole surviving intestate heirs, each owning an undivided one-half share. This co-ownership was admitted by petitioners in their answer.

• Invalidity of Transfers: Respondent contended that the alleged Combined Deed of Partition was never proven by the original document, and the secondary evidence offered by petitioners (testimonial accounts and tax declarations) was inadmissible and insufficient. Tax declarations alone do not vest ownership.

• No Repudiation of Co-ownership: Respondent argued that prescription could not run because co-ownership had never been effectively repudiated. His long silence and inaction were explained by close Filipino family ties and the fact that Virgilio — Isidra's ward since infancy — was merely tolerated in his occupation of the property. Ladislao assumed Eliseo had allowed Virgilio to occupy the property temporarily.

• Proof of the Alleged Combined Deed of Partition: Whether the transfer of the Isidra property from Ladislao and Eliseo to Virgilio Santos, and later to Philip Santos, was validly proven in the absence of the original Combined Deed of Partition.

• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence: Whether the testimonies of witnesses and the tax declaration entries constituted admissible secondary evidence of the contents of the alleged Combined Deed of Partition under the Best Evidence Rule.

• Effect of Tax Declarations on Ownership: Whether tax declarations in the names of Virgilio Santos and Philip Santos conclusively proved ownership of the Isidra property.

• Acquisitive Prescription Against a Co-owner: Whether ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten years had set in to bar the action for partition, considering the alleged possession by Virgilio Santos and Philip Santos for a combined period exceeding 26 years.

• Laches: Whether the action for partition was barred by laches due to Ladislao Santos's prolonged inaction.

• Proof of the Alleged Combined Deed of Partition: The transfer of the Isidra property by virtue of an alleged Combined Deed of Partition was not validly proven. Under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the original document is the best evidence of its contents. Petitioners failed to produce the original or to prove any of the exceptions allowing secondary evidence. The testimonies of Virginia Santos and Philip Santos regarding the existence and contents of the deed constituted inadmissible secondary evidence because petitioners did not establish the loss, destruction, or unavailability of all original copies without bad faith. Virginia Santos admitted three copies existed — one given to Virgilio, one retained by Eliseo, and one retained by the notary public, Atty. Sixto Natividad. Petitioners proved only that the copy filed with the Provincial Assessor's Office was destroyed by fire in 1977. They failed to account for the copy in Atty. Natividad's notarial records or Eliseo's copy. Atty. Natividad could have been subpoenaed but was not.

• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence: The secondary evidence was inadmissible. Before testimonial evidence on the contents of a document may be received, the offeror must prove: (a) the execution and existence of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (c) that the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith. Petitioners failed to establish these conditions. Moreover, a xerox copy given to Philip Santos was not accounted for. Testimonial evidence under Section 5, Rule 130 requires prior proof that no copy of the original or authentic document reciting its contents exists — a requirement petitioners did not meet.

• Effect of Tax Declarations on Ownership: Tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute conclusive evidence of ownership or the right to possess real property. The entry on Tax Declaration No. 1115 stating "Cancelled by: Tax Declaration No. 7892" contained no clue as to the nature of the document used for cancellation, the parties who executed it, or its beneficiary. The municipal assessor, Rodolfo Bautista, admitted he had no knowledge of the particular document presented to effect the transfer. Virgilio could have executed a unilateral "Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement" that would not have prejudiced Ladislao's co-ownership share, as one cannot legally adjudicate to himself property he does not own.

• Acquisitive Prescription Against a Co-owner: Acquisitive prescription did not bar the action for partition. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized. For prescription to terminate co-ownership, there must have been a repudiation meeting four requisites: (1) repudiation by a co-owner; (2) clear communication of the repudiation to the other co-owners; (3) clear and conclusive evidence of repudiation; and (4) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the period required by law. None of these requisites was satisfied. The possession by Virgilio and Philip was consistent with mere tolerance — Virgilio had been Isidra's ward since infancy, and under Filipino family customs, Ladislao could reasonably assume his brother Eliseo allowed Virgilio to occupy the property temporarily. Under Article 1119, acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance are not available for purposes of prescription.

• Laches: An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand partition of the common property at any time. Ladislao's prolonged silence did not constitute laches because his right as a co-owner to seek partition endures as long as co-ownership subsists.

• Repudiation of Co-ownership (Four Requisites): For prescription to terminate a relation of co-ownership, the following must concur: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) the repudiating co-owner has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the period required by law. The Court applied these requisites and found none of them satisfied, as there was no showing that Eliseo Santos clearly communicated any repudiation to Ladislao, nor was the evidence of repudiation clear and conclusive.

• Best Evidence Rule (Rule 130, Section 3, Rules of Court): When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in four enumerated cases: (a) loss or destruction without bad faith; (b) the original is in the adverse party's custody and not produced after reasonable notice; (c) the original consists of voluminous accounts; (d) the original is a public record. The Court applied this rule to exclude testimonial evidence about the alleged Combined Deed of Partition because petitioners failed to account for all original copies.

• Imprescriptibility of Action for Partition: An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may at any time demand partition of the common property. The Court relied on this principle to reject the defenses of prescription and laches.

• Tax Declarations as Evidence of Ownership: A mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of property upon the declarant. Neither tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation purposes constitute adequate evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. The Court applied this principle to hold that the tax declarations in Virgilio's and Philip's names did not prove exclusive ownership.

• Acts of Tolerance and Possession (Article 1119, Civil Code): Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or tolerance of the owners are not available for purposes of prescription. The Court applied this to characterize Virgilio's occupation as tolerated by Ladislao, given family relationships and the absence of overt repudiation.

• "Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law." — This articulation of the four requisites for repudiation, drawn from Adile vs. Court of Appeals, is the cornerstone of the ruling on prescription.

• "Filipino family ties being close and well-knit as they are, and considering that Virgilio Santos was the ward of Isidra Santos ever since when Virgilio Santos was still an infant, it was but natural that the Appellant did not interpose any objection to the continued stay of Virgilio Santos and his family on the property and even acquiesce thereto. Appellant must have assumed too, that his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, allowed his son to occupy the property and use the same for the time being." — This passage contextualizes why Ladislao's inaction did not amount to acquiescence to repudiation, grounding the legal analysis in Filipino familial norms.

• "A mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property upon the declarant. Neither do tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation purposes constitute adequate evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty." — This restates a settled rule repeatedly applied in the decision to deny the probative value of the tax declarations offered by petitioners.

• "NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET." — The Court invoked this Latin maxim (one cannot give what one does not have) to conclude that Virgilio Santos, having never acquired title over the Isidra property, could not lawfully sell it to Philip Santos.

• Adile vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 455 (1988): Controlling precedent on the requisites for repudiation of co-ownership. Cited as the source of the four conditions that must concur before prescription can terminate a co-ownership relation.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 223 (1996): Cited for the rule that the offeror of secondary evidence must prove exceptions under Section 3, Rule 130 and establish the conditions for admissibility.

• Deiparine vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 668 (1998): Cited for the twin holdings that (1) tax declarations are not adequate evidence of ownership, and (2) an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not barred by laches.

• Maria Bicarme, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 186 SCRA 294: Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that absent written proof of an alleged sale or transfer, property remains inherited property, as applied to the Isidra property.

• Roque vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 SCRA 118 (1988): Cited for the procedural rule that once co-ownership is established, the secondary issue of actual partition should be determined by the trial court under Rule 69.

• Article 494, Civil Code: Provides that prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Applied as the controlling substantive provision defeating the defense of acquisitive prescription.

• Article 1119, Civil Code: Provides that acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or tolerance of the owners shall not be available for the purposes of possession. Applied to characterize Virgilio's occupation as tolerated rather than adverse.

• Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court (Best Evidence Rule): Requires the production of the original document when the contents of a document are the subject of inquiry, subject to four exceptions. Applied to exclude testimonial evidence concerning the alleged Combined Deed of Partition.

• Section 5, Rule 130, Rules of Court: Governs when secondary evidence of the contents of a document may be received, requiring proof of execution, loss or unavailability without bad faith, and absence of an authentic copy. Applied to hold testimonial evidence inadmissible for failure to account for all original copies.

• Rule 69, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Governs actions for partition. The trial court was ordered to effect partition in conformity with this rule.

Justices Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima concurred without separate opinions.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.