Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. vs. Supergreen, Incorporated

For a transitory or continuing offense, an application for a search warrant may be filed in any court within the judicial region where any element of the offense was committed, as the place of commission of the crime extends to all such locations. Where the offense of unfair competition involves the manufacture of counterfeit goods in one judicial region and their sale in another, the crime is deemed committed in both regions, vesting jurisdiction in the courts of either region to issue search warrants under Section 2(b), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation alleging that Supergreen, Incorporated was reproducing and distributing counterfeit “PlayStation” game software, consoles, and accessories in violation of Sony’s intellectual property rights. The NBI’s investigation confirmed the allegations and sought search warrants for Supergreen’s premises in Parañaque City and Trece Martires City, Cavite.

• The Complaint: Petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. filed a complaint with the NBI alleging that respondent Supergreen, Incorporated was engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit “PlayStation” game software, consoles, and accessories, in violation of petitioner’s intellectual property rights.

• Application for Search Warrants: The NBI applied with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, for search warrants covering respondent’s premises at Trece Martires City, Cavite (Fourth Judicial Region) and at Parañaque City (National Capital Region). On April 24, 2001, the RTC issued Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 for the Cavite premises and Search Warrants Nos. 01-1989 to 01-1991 for the Parañaque premises.

• Seizure: The search warrants were simultaneously served. The NBI seized a replicating machine, counterfeit PlayStation consoles, joy pads, housings, labels, and game software from the Cavite and Parañaque locations.

• First Motion to Quash: On June 11, 2001, respondent moved to quash Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 (Cavite warrants) on the ground that the warrants failed to particularly describe the properties to be seized. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.

• Second Motion to Quash: On August 4, 2001, respondent filed a second motion to quash, this time challenging the venue of the application. Respondent argued that the RTC of Manila had no authority to issue search warrants for offenses committed in Cavite because Cavite belongs to a different judicial region. Petitioner opposed, invoking the omnibus motion rule that all objections not included in the first motion are deemed waived.

• Trial Court’s Quashal Order: The trial court upheld the validity of the Parañaque warrants but quashed the Cavite warrants, holding that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the omnibus motion rule and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

• Respondent’s Alleged Acts: Respondent’s imitation of the general appearance of petitioner’s goods allegedly took place in Cavite. The counterfeit goods were sold allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila.

• Venue Not Jurisdictional: Petitioner argued, citing Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, that a search warrant application is a special criminal process, not a criminal action, and therefore the rule on venue is not jurisdictional. Hence, an objection to venue is waivable if not timely raised.

• Practical Necessity: Petitioner maintained that requiring search warrant applications to be filed in multiple courts increases the risk of leakage of information and inconsistent rulings, defeating the purpose of the warrants.

• Continuing Offense: Even assuming the venue rule is jurisdictional, petitioner contended that the offense of unfair competition is a continuing crime committed partly in Parañaque City and partly in Cavite. Thus, the application could properly be filed in the RTC of Manila, which is within the National Capital Region where an element of the offense (sale) occurred.

• Explicit Territorial Limitation: Respondent countered that Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court explicitly delimits where search warrant applications shall be filed and that a different judicial region is beyond the court’s authority.

• Malaloan Inapplicable: Respondent argued that Malaloan is no longer controlling with the effectivity of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which revised the rules on search and seizure.

• Continuing Crime Doctrine Inapplicable: Respondent contended that the doctrine of continuing crime applies only to the institution of a criminal action, not to the special proceeding of a search warrant application governed solely by Rule 126.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Whether the rule on venue for search warrant applications under Section 2, Rule 126 involves territorial jurisdiction such that an objection based on improper venue is non-waivable.

• Continuing Offense: Whether the offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293 is a transitory or continuing offense, such that the RTC of Manila could validly issue search warrants for premises located in Cavite.

• Validity of Quashal: Whether the quashal of Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 was proper under the circumstances.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC of Manila, situated in the National Capital Region, had no territorial jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for an offense committed entirely in Cavite, which is within the Fourth Judicial Region. The pronouncement in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals must be read in conjunction with the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which confers on regional trial courts a territorial jurisdiction that is regional in scope. Malaloan involved a court in the same judicial region where the crime was committed, and thus was distinguished. Petitioner’s reliance on Malaloan was therefore misplaced. Any interpretation redefining territorial jurisdiction would amount to judicial legislation.

• Continuing Offense: The Court agreed with petitioner that the offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293, read with Article 189(1) of the Revised Penal Code, was a transitory or continuing offense. Respondent’s imitation of the general appearance of petitioner’s goods occurred allegedly in Cavite, while the counterfeit goods were sold allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. Because the crime was committed in multiple places, petitioner could apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the offense was committed. Under Section 2(b) of Rule 126, the application could thus be filed in any court within the judicial region where the place of commission of the crime was known, including courts in the National Capital Region.

• Validity of Quashal: The quashal of Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 was invalid. Given that the offense was a continuing crime with elements occurring in Metro Manila, the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to issue the warrants. Consequently, Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 were declared valid.

• Territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts is regional in scope. By virtue of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the territorial jurisdiction of a regional trial court and its judges is limited to the judicial region to which it belongs. A court cannot issue a search warrant for an offense committed entirely outside its judicial region.

• Venue rule for search warrant applications is jurisdictional when premised on the place of commission of the crime. The requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 that the application be filed in a court within whose territorial jurisdiction the crime was committed is an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage and is not waived by the omnibus motion rule.

• Continuing or transitory offense doctrine in search warrant applications. When an offense is transitory or continuing—committed in more than one judicial region—the crime is deemed to have been committed in each of those regions. Consequently, an application for a search warrant may be filed in any court within the judicial region where any element of the offense occurred, subject to the conditions of Section 2(b), Rule 126.

• “Both the main decision and the dissent in Malaloan recognized [that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 confers] on the regional trial courts and their judges a territorial jurisdiction, regional in scope.”

• “[R]espondent’s premises in Cavite, within the Fourth Judicial Region, is definitely beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila, in the National Capital Region. Thus, the RTC of Manila does not have the authority to issue a search warrant for offenses committed in Cavite.”

• “Respondent’s imitation of the general appearance of petitioner’s goods was done allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly, under Section 2(b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189(1) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was committed, including any of the courts within the National Capital Region (Metro Manila).”

• Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 249 — Distinguished. Malaloan held that a search warrant application is a special criminal process, not a criminal action, and that the venue rule is not jurisdictional. The Court clarified that this ruling was limited to a court within the same judicial region where the crime was committed, unlike the present case which involved a court in a different judicial region.

• NBI-Microsoft Corporation v. Hwang, G.R. No. 147043, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 428 — Cited for the elements of unfair competition under Article 189(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which were used to demonstrate that the offense continues across multiple locations.

• Section 2, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Governs the court where an application for a search warrant shall be filed. The provision requires filing in any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, or for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed or where the warrant shall be enforced. The Court applied paragraph (b) to permit filing in Metro Manila because the continuing offense’s elements occurred there.

• Section 168, Republic Act No. 8293 (Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines) — Defines unfair competition, including the acts of passing off goods and making false statements in trade. The Court characterized the offense as transitory or continuing when acts of imitation and sale occur in different locations.

• Article 189(1), Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the elements of unfair competition: (a) giving one’s goods the general appearance of another’s goods; (b) the general appearance is shown in the goods, wrappings, devices, or other features; (c) the offender offers or sells those goods; and (d) actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor. These elements supported the finding that the offense continued across Cavite and Metro Manila.

• A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Section 12 — Noted as a supplementary rule granting the Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City authority to act on applications for search warrants involving violations of the Intellectual Property Code, among other special laws, filed by the NBI, PNP, and ACTAF.

Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno certified the decision. No separate concurring opinions were filed.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were recorded.