Sumulong vs. Guerrero

In expropriation proceedings, a writ of possession may be issued only upon compliance with three requisites: (1) a complaint sufficient in form and substance, (2) a provisional determination of just compensation by the trial court based on judicial—not legislative or executive—discretion, and (3) compliance with the deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67. Provisions that substitute the assessor’s valuation for judicial ascertainment of just compensation are unconstitutional. “Socialized housing,” as defined in Presidential Decree No. 1224 and its amendatory decrees, constitutes “public use” under the expanded concept of the term.

The National Housing Authority sought to expropriate approximately twenty‑five hectares in Antipolo, Rizal, for the expansion of the Bagong Nayon Housing Project, a housing and community development undertaking intended for low‑salaried government employees. The property included two parcels owned by petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 square meters) and Emilia Vidanes‑Balaoing (3,333 square meters). The NHA valued the land at one peso per square meter—the market value fixed by the provincial assessor under presidential decrees—and deposited ₱158,980.00 as the total market value, contemporaneously moving for immediate possession.

• Nature: The National Housing Authority filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land totalling approximately twenty‑five hectares in Antipolo, Rizal, for the expansion of the Bagong Nayon Housing Project. The land included two lots belonging to petitioners with an aggregate area of ten thousand square meters.
• Valuation and Deposit: The NHA valued the land at ₱1.00 per square meter, adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313. The NHA deposited ₱158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the total market value of the entire twenty‑five hectares, and simultaneously moved for immediate possession.
• Issuance of Writ of Possession: On January 17, 1978, without prior notice to petitioners and without hearing, respondent Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued an Order granting a writ of possession. The Order was predicated solely on the NHA’s deposit of the assessed market value.
• Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioners sought reconsideration, arguing that they had been deprived of possession without due process of law. Respondent Judge denied the motion on June 28, 1978.
• Direct Resort to the Supreme Court: Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari, challenging the trial court’s orders and assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1224, as amended, on the grounds that it permitted taking for a non‑public purpose, sanctioned unjust compensation, and authorized immediate taking without judicial hearing.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the writ of possession without notice and hearing, and by denying their motion for reconsideration.
• Public Use – Socialized Housing: Petitioners maintained that “socialized housing,” as defined in Presidential Decree No. 1224, as amended, is not a public use because it benefits only a handful of people and lacks public character.
• Public Use – Size of Property: Petitioners contended that the decree would allow the taking of any private land regardless of size, including their small two‑man lots, despite the availability of vast areas owned by a few landowners in the same vicinity.
• Just Compensation: Petitioners asserted that the decree would permit the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors, thereby depriving the courts of their judicial discretion to determine “just compensation” in each case.
• Due Process: Petitioners claimed that the decree violated procedural due process because it authorized immediate taking of possession, control, and disposition of property without giving the owner a day in court.

• Public Purpose: Respondent National Housing Authority maintained that the expropriation was for a valid public purpose—the expansion of the Bagong Nayon Housing Project, a housing and community development undertaking intended for low‑salaried government employees—and that socialized housing fell within the concept of “public use.”
• Compliance with Statutory Procedure: The NHA argued that it had deposited the total market value as fixed under Presidential Decree No. 1224 and had complied with the statutory requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession.

• Public Use (Socialized Housing): Whether “socialized housing” as defined in Presidential Decree No. 1224, as amended, constitutes “public use” for purposes of expropriation.
• Public Use (Size of Property): Whether the decree’s allowance of expropriation of any private land regardless of size violates the public use requirement.
• Just Compensation: Whether the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1224 and its amendatory decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional for encroaching upon the judicial prerogative to determine just compensation.
• Due Process (Writ of Possession): Whether the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession without prior notice and hearing and without a judicial determination of provisional just compensation violates procedural due process.

• Public Use (Socialized Housing): Socialized housing was held to constitute “public use.” The concept of public use is flexible and evolving; it now encompasses indirect public benefit or advantage. Housing is a basic human need that directly affects public health, safety, and the general welfare. The 1973 Constitution mandated the State to ensure adequate social services including housing, and the 1987 Constitution reinforces the State’s duty to undertake urban land reform and housing programs. The legislative definition of socialized housing—including slum clearance, relocation, resettlement, and the provision of economic opportunities—satisfied the public use requirement. The specific project, Bagong Nayon, aimed to benefit low‑salaried government employees and was thus within the expanded understanding of public use.
• Public Use (Size of Property): The decree’s coverage of any private land regardless of size did not violate the public use requirement. The State, through the NHA, is vested with broad discretion to select the property to be taken, and the test is the number of people benefited, not the area of the land. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion—which petitioners failed to demonstrate—the property owner may not object merely because another property might have been more suitable. The constitutional stewardship concept tempers the right to property with the demands of the common good.
• Just Compensation: The provisions of Presidential Decree Nos. 1224, 1259, and 1313 on just compensation were declared unconstitutional. Applying Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, which had already struck down analogous provisions in Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464, 794, and 1533, the Court held that the decrees impermissibly substituted the assessor’s valuation for judicial determination of just compensation. Just compensation requires a fair and full equivalent based on all relevant facts, a determination that is inherently judicial and cannot be supplanted by legislative or executive fiat. The earlier ruling in National Housing Authority v. Reyes upholding such decrees was abandoned.
• Due Process (Writ of Possession): The issuance of the writ of possession without prior notice and hearing and without a provisional judicial determination of just compensation violated procedural due process. Following Ignacio v. Guerrero—which arose from the same expropriation complaint—a writ of possession in expropriation proceedings may issue only upon satisfaction of three requisites: (1) a complaint sufficient in form and substance; (2) a provisional determination of just compensation by the trial court based on judicial, not legislative or executive, discretion; and (3) compliance with the deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67. The trial court’s orders, grounded solely on the amount deposited pursuant to the unconstitutional decree, were thus issued in excess of jurisdiction.

• Expanded Concept of Public Use — Public use is no longer confined to direct use or employment by the public; it includes indirect public benefit or advantage. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement. The Court applied this concept to uphold socialized housing as a public use, emphasizing that housing affects public health, safety, and the general welfare.
• Stewardship Concept of Property — Private property is held by the individual as a trustee for the people in general. The right to the use, enjoyment, and disposal of private property is tempered by and must yield to the demands of the common good. The Court invoked this principle to support the State’s broad discretion in selecting property for expropriation for socialized housing.
• Number of People to be Benefited Test — In determining the propriety of expropriation, the test is the number of people who stand to be benefited, not the size of the land. The Court relied on this test to reject petitioners’ argument that their small lots should be exempt from expropriation.
• Just Compensation as a Judicial Function — The determination of just compensation is inherently a judicial function. Legislative or executive acts that substitute the assessor’s valuation for judicial ascertainment of just compensation are unconstitutional for encroaching upon judicial prerogative and violating due process. The Court applied this doctrine to invalidate the just‑compensation provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1224 and its amendatory decrees.
• Requisites for Issuance of a Writ of Possession in Expropriation — Under Ignacio v. Guerrero, a writ of possession may be issued only upon: (1) a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) a provisional determination of just compensation by the trial court based on judicial discretion; and (3) compliance with the deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67. The absence of these requisites renders the issuance of the writ a violation of due process.

• “The taking to be valid must be for public use. … As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. … It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.” — Quoting Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, this passage encapsulates the expanded public use doctrine that the Court applied to sustain socialized housing.
• “The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. … Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. … And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court …” — This excerpt from Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay articulates the core rationale for invalidating legislative valuation schemes.
• “[I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with.” — This passage from Ignacio v. Guerrero supplies the controlling standard for the issuance of writs of possession in expropriation cases.

• Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 60549, 60553‑60555, October 26, 1983, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) — Applied as controlling authority for the expanded concept of public use, holding that indirect public benefit or advantage satisfies the public use requirement.
• J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L‑21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 (1970) — Followed for the rule that expropriation is not confined to landed estates and that the propriety of expropriation cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis; it departed from the earlier Guido v. Rural Progress Administration.
• Pulido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57625, May 3, 1983, 122 SCRA 63 (1983) — Cited to reinforce the principle that individual property interests must yield to the benefit of the greater majority.
• Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga, G.R. No. 32049, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 30 (1984) — Relied upon for the “number of people to be benefited” test and the stewardship concept of property.
• Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987 — Treated as the controlling precedent on the unconstitutionality of legislative and executive valuation schemes for just compensation; the Court abandoned National Housing Authority v. Reyes in its wake.
• Ignacio v. Guerrero, G.R. No. L‑49088, May 29, 1987 — Followed as the case arising from the same expropriation complaint, which set forth the three requisites for a valid writ of possession.
• National Housing Authority v. Reyes, G.R. No. 49439, June 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 245 (1983) — Expressly abandoned, as it had upheld Presidential Decree No. 464 and its amendatory decrees.

• Presidential Decree No. 1224, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313 — Defined the policy on expropriation of private property for socialized housing. The Court upheld the definition of socialized housing as a valid public use but struck down the provisions prescribing the assessor’s market value as the basis for just compensation and authorizing immediate taking upon deposit of that amount, for being unconstitutional encroachments on judicial power and violative of due process.
• 1973 Constitution, Article IV, Section 1 and Section 9 — Prohibited deprivation of property without due process and taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The Court anchored its due process and just compensation analysis on these provisions, emphasizing that the challenged decree contravened these fundamental guarantees.
• 1987 Constitution, Article II, Sections 9 and 10; Article XIII, Sections 1 and 9 — Mandated the State to promote a just and dynamic social order, ensure adequate social services including housing, undertake urban land reform and housing programs, and regulate property for the common good. The Court cited these provisions to reinforce the public purpose of socialized housing and the stewardship concept of property.
• Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Court — Governs the deposit requirement for immediate possession in expropriation cases. The Court held that compliance with this provision is a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of possession, and that the deposit must be preceded by a judicial provisional determination of just compensation, not a mere mechanical application of the assessor’s valuation.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio‑Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred.