Tadena vs. People

A local chief executive who alters the text of a duly enacted ordinance commits falsification by making an alteration in a genuine public document that changes its meaning under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, because Section 54 of the Local Government Code confines the executive’s participation to approval or veto and confers no power to modify the language of the enactment.

Floro T. Tadena was the Municipal Mayor of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur. He wrote to the Sangguniang Bayan requesting the creation of a Municipal Administrator position. The Sangguniang Bayan enacted a series of ordinances addressing that request, inserting conditions tied to the implementation of mandatory salary increases. Tension arose between the mayor and the council over whether the position should be created unconditionally or only after certain fiscal milestones. Tadena vetoed the first version and later, instead of vetoing the second, altered its text and returned it as though it had been enacted in the altered form.

• Tadena’s request and the First Version: On October 17, 2001, Mayor Floro T. Tadena wrote to the Sangguniang Bayan requesting the creation of the position of Municipal Administrator. On December 10, 2001, the Sangguniang Bayan adopted the First Version of the municipal ordinance appropriating the annual budget for 2002. Its paragraph (a) of the 4th “Whereas Clause” provided that the position of Municipal Administrator “shall not be created unless the proposed needs of all the Offices of the municipality will be satisfied through Supplemental Budgets and provided further that the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 2001 be implemented.”
• Veto of the First Version: Tadena vetoed the First Version. In his veto message, he declared the conditions unrealistic and demanded deletion, stating that the only agreement during a heads of offices conference was that the office would be created “at a later date.”
• Second Version: On January 11, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan deliberated on Tadena’s request and passed the Second Version. Its paragraph (a) now read: “The position ‘MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR’ shall not be created unless 2% of the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 2002 be implemented.”
• Transmittal and alteration: On January 14, 2002, Sangguniang Bayan Secretary Rodel M. Tagorda transmitted a copy of the Second Version to Tadena for his information, approval, and appropriate action. The Office of the Municipal Mayor received it on January 15, 2002. On January 23, 2002, the Office returned the copy bearing Tadena’s signature, but the first page was substituted. The altered clause stated: “The position ‘MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR’ shall be created and the 2% of the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 2002 be implemented.”
• Discovery and Sanggunian response: On January 25, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 007, deleting paragraph (a) of the 4th “Whereas Clause” and placing on record that page one was substituted and the provision changed. The Sanggunian eventually enacted the Final Version, which contained the same matters as the Second Version except the falsified details; the First and Second Versions were never implemented but were kept in the municipal records.
• Complaint and criminal charge: Secretary Tagorda filed a complaint for falsification against Tadena with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman initially dismissed it but, on motion for reconsideration, reversed and ordered the filing of an Information. An Information was filed on July 4, 2014 charging Tadena with falsification of public document under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code. Tadena pleaded not guilty.
• Stipulations and trial: The parties stipulated that Tadena was the municipal mayor at the time material to the allegation and that Tagorda was the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary. The issues at trial were whether Tadena changed the clause and whether he thereby falsified the ordinance. The Sandiganbayan convicted Tadena, finding all elements of the offense present.

• Inordinate delay: Petitioner argued that the case should have been dismissed because of inordinate delay in the prosecution, violating his right to speedy disposition of the case.
• Complainant’s desistance: Petitioner maintained that private complainant Tagorda lost interest in prosecuting and executed an affidavit of desistance after the Ombudsman’s initial dismissal, and that the revival of the case was upon a motion filed by a lawyer not authorized by Tagorda; thus, the case should have been dismissed.
• Document not genuine: Petitioner contended that the document he allegedly falsified was not a genuine document, an essential element of the offense.
• Concurrence of sanggunian members: Petitioner claimed that the changes he made were done with the actual participation and concurrence of the majority of the Sangguniang Bayan members, negating falsification.
• Good faith and lack of criminal intent: Petitioner asserted that he acted in good faith and without criminal intent; his changes were meant to save the municipality from expenses that could not be funded.
• Part of local legislation process: Petitioner argued that his changes were authorized as part of the local legislation process, as he made them before the ordinance was finally enacted into law.
• Presumption of innocence: Petitioner submitted that the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of innocence and that any doubt should be resolved in his favor.
• Mitigating circumstance: Petitioner claimed that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated because he surrendered to the First Division Clerk of Court upon learning of the criminal case.

• No violation of right to speedy disposition: Respondent countered that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that Tadena’s right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated; Tadena had raised the issue in a motion to quash/motion to dismiss that was denied and not further pursued for relief, and the Ombudsman and prosecutor acted with dispatch.
• Desistance immaterial: Respondent argued that an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for dismissal of a criminal case; Tagorda’s affidavit did not repudiate the material points of the falsification charge, his reason being merely to keep peace, and the prosecution’s evidence stood independent of his desistance.
• Guilt beyond reasonable doubt: Respondent maintained that all elements of falsification under Article 171(6) were established—Tadena was a public officer, he took advantage of his official position, he altered a genuine public document, and the alteration changed its meaning—and his admission on record that he made the changes sealed his guilt.
• No voluntary surrender: Respondent asserted that a warrant of arrest had been issued before Tadena posted bail, making any surrender a reaction to the inevitability of arrest rather than a spontaneous and voluntary act; thus, no mitigating circumstance applied.

• Speedy disposition and desistance: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in not dismissing the case on grounds of inordinate delay and the complainant’s desistance.
• Falsification — genuineness of the document: Whether the document altered by petitioner was a genuine public document.
• Falsification — authority to alter: Whether petitioner was authorized to make the changes as part of the local legislation process.
• Falsification — concurrence of sanggunian: Whether the changes were made with the concurrence of the majority of the Sangguniang Bayan members.
• Falsification — good faith and criminal intent: Whether petitioner acted in good faith and without criminal intent, thereby negating the offense.
• Falsification — sufficiency of evidence: Whether the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Mitigating circumstance: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated.

• Speedy disposition and desistance: The issue of inordinate delay raised a question of fact not proper for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and petitioner failed to invoke any recognized exception. As to desistance, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for automatic dismissal; the State retains sovereign control over criminal prosecutions. Tagorda’s desistance did not repudiate the material allegations of falsification, and independent record evidence supported guilt.
• Falsification — genuineness of the document: The Second Version of the municipal ordinance was a genuine public document under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence because it was a written official act of the Sangguniang Bayan. The prosecution’s presentation of the original, the altered version, and Resolution No. 007—coupled with Tagorda’s testimony—proved that an alteration was made on a genuine document.
• Falsification — authority to alter: Section 54 of the Local Government Code limits a local chief executive’s participation in legislation to approval or veto. It does not grant the power to change the text of an enacted ordinance. Tadena’s act of altering the wording rather than vetoing and submitting objections was an unauthorized intervention.
• Falsification — concurrence of sanggunian: Petitioner offered no proof that the majority of the Sangguniang Bayan members agreed to the changes. His bare and self-serving claim was insufficient to overturn the conviction.
• Falsification — good faith and criminal intent: Good faith is a state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of facts that should prompt inquiry. Tadena’s outward conduct—initiating the creation, vetoing the first version, then ignoring the veto procedure and unilaterally altering the text—negated any claim of good faith. His inconsistent defenses during trial further undermined the assertion.
• Falsification — sufficiency of evidence: All elements of falsification under Article 171(6) were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Tadena was a public officer; he took advantage of his position by having both the duty to intervene in the enactment and official custody of the document; he altered a genuine public document by substituting its first page and changing the conditional clause into a mandatory one; and the alteration changed the meaning by making it appear that the Sanggunian intended an unconditional creation when it did not.
• Mitigating circumstance: For voluntary surrender to be mitigating, the surrender must be spontaneous, and not prompted by the inevitability of arrest. A warrant of arrest had already been issued on August 1, 2014 before Tadena posted bail on August 20, 2014. His surrender was therefore a response to the warrant, not a spontaneous act acknowledging guilt.

• Elements of falsification under Article 171(6), Revised Penal Code — As clarified in Typoco, Jr. v. People, a conviction requires: (1) an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) the document was genuine; (3) the alteration or intercalation changed its meaning; and (4) the change made the document speak something false. All four were satisfied where the mayor substituted a page of the ordinance and converted a conditional prohibition into an unconditional command.
• Power of local chief executive over ordinances — Under Section 54 of the Local Government Code, the only acts a local chief executive may perform upon presentment of an enacted ordinance are approval or veto, with a duty to return objections to the sanggunian for reconsideration. There is no power to revise, amend, or alter the text.
• Taking advantage of official position in falsification — This element exists when the offender (1) has the duty to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation of the document, or (2) has official custody of the document that is falsified. Here, both aspects were present: the mayor intervenes in enactment by approving or vetoing, and he had custody upon transmittal.
• Good faith as a defense in falsification — Good faith denotes an honest intention, and is contradicted by conduct that departs from legal processes and by inconsistent defenses. The Court ascertains intention from outward acts, not self-serving protestations.
• Voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstance — The requisites are: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. Spontaneity is the essence; a surrender prompted by the inevitability of arrest is not voluntary.
• Effect of affidavit of desistance in criminal cases — A complainant’s desistance does not automatically dismiss a criminal case; it is merely an additional ground to buttress defenses, and there must be other circumstances that create doubt about the testimony accepted at trial.

• “Section 54 of the LGC limits the participation of a local chief executive in the enactment of ordinance to two acts, either approval or veto. The provision does not include the power to make changes on an ordinance. At most, the local chief executive may veto the ordinance and submit his objections to the sanggunian.”
• “Good faith is a state of mind denoting honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. … we can ascertain a person’s intention by relying not on his own protestations of good faith, which is self-serving, but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.”
• “The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused is give oneself up and submit to the authorities either because he/she acknowledges his/her guilt or he/she wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his/her search and capture. … where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous.”

• Typoco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 221857; Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 222020, August 16, 2017 — Followed; the Court adopted its dissection of the third element of falsification under Article 171(6), requiring proof that the alteration changed the meaning of the document and made it speak something false.
• Civil Service Commission v. Maala, 504 Phil. 646 (2005) — Applied; the Court relied on its definition of good faith as honesty of intention, and its teaching that intention is inferred from conduct, not self-serving claims.
• People v. Ballabare, 332 Phil. 384 (1996) — Cited; the principle that an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for dismissal and is viewed with disfavor was controlling.
• Belbis, Jr. v. People, 698 Phil. 706 (2012) — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender and the rule that a surrender compelled by inevitability of arrest is not mitigating.

• Article 171(6), Revised Penal Code — Falsification by a public officer by “making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.” Applied to the mayor’s substitution of the conditional clause with an unconditional mandate in the municipal ordinance.
• Section 54, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Prescribes the procedure for approval of ordinances, limiting the local chief executive to approval or veto. The Court held that this provision excludes the power to alter the text, foreclosing Tadena’s defense of authorized participation.
• Section 19, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence — Defines public documents to include written official acts of sovereign authority, official bodies, and public officers. Applied to classify the Second Version as a genuine public document.
• Section 31, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence — Governs how a party producing an altered document must account for the alteration. The prosecution’s evidence satisfied this rule by demonstrating the alteration was unauthorized and changed the document’s meaning.

Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.