Tan Po Chu vs. Court of Appeals

A court never acquires jurisdiction to order the reissuance of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title if the duplicate has not in fact been lost but is in the possession of another person; any resulting reconstitution order is void for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the registered owner’s remedy against the possessor is an action for replevin. Moreover, an appellate court commits grave abuse of discretion when it dismisses a petition for annulment of judgment based on curable procedural defects and an irrelevant ground, thereby evading its positive duty to determine whether the assailed judgment is void for want of jurisdiction.

Fiber Technology Corporation (FiberTech) was a Philippine corporation and the registered owner of a parcel of land in Marikina covered by TCT No. 157923, entered on November 28, 1988. The SEC allegedly revoked FiberTech’s corporate registration on September 29, 2003. Respondent Felix Chingkoe, one of the incorporators, claimed that he and his wife Rosita had acquired 100% ownership of FiberTech in 2004 pursuant to an NLRC award. On April 4, 2005, Felix executed an affidavit of loss of the owner’s duplicate TCT. Represented by respondent Rodrigo Garcia under a December 2, 2004 Board Resolution, FiberTech filed a petition for reissuance of the owner’s duplicate before the RTC, alleging that former officers denied possession and that an exhaustive search proved futile. Tan Po Chu, mother of incorporators Faustino and Felix Chingkoe, later asserted that she had custody of the original duplicate as the responsible officer of FiberTech and that Felix knew it was not lost.

• Corporate and Proprietary Background: FiberTech was a Philippine corporation and the registered owner of a Marikina property under TCT No. 157923. The SEC allegedly revoked FiberTech’s certificate of registration on September 29, 2003. Respondent Felix Chingkoe claimed that he and his wife Rosita acquired full ownership of FiberTech in 2004 through an NLRC award. Tan Po Chu, the mother of FiberTech’s incorporators Faustino and Felix Chingkoe, asserted she was the responsible officer of FiberTech and had custody of the owner’s duplicate TCT.
• The Affidavit of Loss and Petition for Reissuance: On April 4, 2005, Felix executed an affidavit of loss of TCT No. 157923. On June 2, 2005, FiberTech, represented by respondent Rodrigo Garcia under a December 2, 2004 board resolution, filed a petition with the RTC for reissuance of the owner’s duplicate, averring that former directors and officers denied knowledge or possession and that a diligent search proved futile.
• RTC Decision: On July 23, 2006, the RTC, Marikina Branch 193, granted the petition, declared the owner’s duplicate lost, and ordered issuance of a new duplicate.
• Tan Po Chu’s Claims in the Petition for Annulment: Tan alleged: the owner’s duplicate was in her custody and never lost; Felix knew this, making his affidavit perjurious; Felix and Rosita had not acquired full ownership of FiberTech; Rosita and Rodrigo Garcia were not stockholders of record; and the respondents had no authority to file the petition on behalf of FiberTech. Citing New Durawood Co. v. Court of Appeals and Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, Tan argued that because the duplicate was not lost, the reconstituted title was void and the RTC never acquired jurisdiction.
• CA Dismissal: The CA dismissed the petition outright on January 16, 2008, citing: (1) the verification and certification against forum shopping were signed only by Tan without proof of authority to sign for FiberTech; (2) Tan’s actual address was not indicated in the petition; and (3) the copy of the owner’s duplicate TCT attached was not a certified true copy. On the merits, the CA held that the RTC acquired jurisdiction because it complied with the notice and hearing requirements under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529, a proceeding in rem.

• Lack of Jurisdiction over the Res: Tan Po Chu maintained that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction because the owner’s duplicate was not lost but in her possession, rendering the reconstitution order void under New Durawood, Serra Serra, Strait Times v. CA, and Demetriou v. CA. She argued that the respondents misled the RTC by falsely claiming loss and by concealing the fact of her custody.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the CA: Tan contended that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that her jurisdictional challenge lacked merit and in dismissing the petition based on technicalities, despite the serious implications of a void judgment for the Torrens system.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondents countered that the CA’s outright dismissal was within its jurisdiction under Rule 47, Section 5, and, at most, constituted an error of judgment — not an error of jurisdiction — and therefore could not be corrected via a special civil action for certiorari.
• Improper Remedy: They argued that Tan’s resort to a Rule 65 petition was unwarranted because the proper remedy was an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether Tan Po Chu availed of the correct remedy by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, given that the CA’s outright dismissal of a petition for annulment of judgment is an error of judgment reviewable by appeal under Rule 45.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissal: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment based on procedural defects and on the ground that the RTC had complied with the notice and hearing requirements.
• Jurisdiction over the Res: Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction to order reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate TCT despite the allegation that the duplicate was not lost but in the possession of Tan Po Chu.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Although a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was technically an improper remedy — because the CA’s outright dismissal under Rule 47, Section 5 was within its jurisdiction and its correctness should have been challenged via appeal under Rule 45 — the Supreme Court entertained the petition under the exception that public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate. The allegation that two owner’s duplicate TCTs now exist over the same property, held by contending factions in an intra-corporate dispute of a defunct corporation, posed an anomalous situation that threatened the integrity of the Torrens system and could harm the general public.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissal: The CA committed grave abuse of discretion. It brushed aside Tan’s jurisdictional argument by ruling that the RTC acquired jurisdiction through compliance with notice and hearing requirements under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529. This was an irrelevant consideration because Tan did not assail the RTC’s jurisdiction based on lack of notice; she challenged jurisdiction over the res on the ground that the duplicate was not lost but in her custody. The procedural defects cited were likewise insufficient to warrant outright dismissal: (a) Tan lacked proof of authority to sign for FiberTech, but she remained a real party-in-interest as the lawful possessor of the duplicate, and FiberTech’s corporate existence had allegedly ceased; (b) Tan cured the address defect by submitting it in her motion for reconsideration; and (c) a petition for annulment of judgment does not require certified true copies of evidentiary documents, only a certified true copy of the assailed judgment. By dismissing the petition based on an irrelevant ground and on rigid technicalities at the expense of substantial justice, the CA evaded its positive duty to determine whether the RTC’s decision was void for want of jurisdiction.
• Jurisdiction over the Res: Reconstitution of a lost owner’s duplicate certificate of title fails to confer jurisdiction on the court when the duplicate has not in fact been lost but is in the possession of another person. The reconstituted certificate is void because the court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter. The proper remedy is an action for replevin to compel surrender of the duplicate. If Tan’s allegations were true, the RTC’s judgment was a lawless thing that could be attacked at any time, and the CA was duty-bound to strike it down.

• Void Judgment for Want of Jurisdiction over the Res in Reconstitution Cases — A court never acquires jurisdiction to order the reissuance of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title if the duplicate has not been lost but is in the possession of another person. The resulting reconstituted certificate is void, and the proper remedy against the possessor is an action for replevin. This doctrine is an application of the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter in reconstitution proceedings depends on the actual fact of loss of the duplicate, not merely on compliance with notice requirements.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion through Irrelevant Considerations and Rigid Technicalities — A court commits grave abuse of discretion when it dismisses a petition based on an extraneous or irrelevant consideration, or when it enforces procedural rules in a rigidly technical manner that overrides substantial justice and public welfare. An outright dismissal that ignores a colorable claim of a void judgment evades the court’s positive duty to uphold the integrity of judicial proceedings and the Torrens system.
• Void Judgments — A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It is a “lawless thing” that may be “slain at sight” or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits itself, and it may be attacked at any time.
• Certiorari as Last Resort; Public Welfare Exception — While certiorari under Rule 65 is an extraordinary remedy limited to errors of jurisdiction and cannot substitute for a lost appeal, it may be entertained when public welfare and the advancement of public policy so require, particularly where a multiplicity of titles threatens the integrity of the Torrens system.

• “We have consistently held that when the owner’s duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void because the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter — the allegedly lost owner’s duplicate. The correct remedy for the registered owner against an uncooperative possessor is to compel the surrender of the owner’s duplicate title through an action for replevin.”
• “A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It has been held to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its ugly head. It may be attacked at any time.”
• “When the interest of strictly enforcing rules of procedure comes in conflict with the interests of rendering substantial justice and protecting the general welfare, the scales of justice tilt substantially in favor of the latter. The rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid technical sense so as to override substantial justice.”

• New Durawood Co. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 109 (1996) — Applied; established that reconstitution of a lost owner’s duplicate TCT is void if the duplicate was never lost but in the possession of another.
• Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, 272-A Phil. 467 (1991) — Applied; likewise held that the court never acquires jurisdiction when the duplicate is not lost.
• Demetriou v. CA, G.R. No. 115595, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 158 — Applied; same principle.
• Strait Times v. CA, 356 Phil. 217 (1998) — Cited as additional support for the rule.
• Camitan v. Fidelity Investment Corp., 574 Phil. 672 (2008) — Cited among the consistent string of cases applying the doctrine.
• Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 623 (2000) — Cited for the rule that procedural rules must yield to substantial justice.
• Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918) — Classic authority for the proposition that a void judgment is a “lawless thing” that may be slain at sight.
• Uy v. Chua, 616 Phil. 768 (2009) — Cited to reiterate that a void judgment is no judgment at all.

• Rule 47, Section 5, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Authorizes the CA to dismiss outright a petition for annulment of judgment if no substantial merit is found. Applied as the basis for the CA’s jurisdiction to dismiss, but the exercise of that power was held to be gravely abused.
• Section 109, P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Governs notice and hearing for replacement of a lost duplicate certificate; invoked by the CA as proof of jurisdiction but held irrelevant to Tan’s challenge that the duplicate was never lost.
• Rule 46, Section 3, Rules of Court — Requires a petition to state the petitioner’s actual address; substantially complied with when the address was supplied in a motion for reconsideration.
• Rule 65, Section 1, Rules of Court — Defines the scope of certiorari as limited to errors of jurisdiction; the Court relaxed its application in favor of public welfare.

Justices Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen concurred.