Titong vs. Court of Appeals

A complaint for quieting of title must allege — and the plaintiff must prove — the existence of an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid but in truth invalid, voidable, or unenforceable, and that casts a cloud upon the plaintiff’s title. Physical intrusions, boundary disputes, or bare assertions of ownership are insufficient to sustain the action. Furthermore, a person who has conveyed property by absolute sale cannot subsequently acquire title by prescription unless the possession is founded on good faith and just title; ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for ten years with just title and good faith, while extraordinary prescription demands uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or good faith.

Petitioner Mario Z. Titong claimed ownership of an unregistered 3.28‑hectare parcel of land (Lot No. 3918) in Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate. Private respondents Victorico and Angeles Laurio asserted ownership over an adjoining 5.5‑hectare agricultural land purchased from Pablo Espinosa in 1981. The disputed area consisted of approximately two hectares that respondents and their laborers entered and plowed in September 1983 under claim of ownership. Titong regarded the entry as a forcible intrusion and filed a complaint to quiet title. The property had previously been owned by Titong, who had sold it to Espinosa in 1962 after a brief repurchase from an earlier vendee. The core conflict was whether the disputed land formed part of Titong’s retained property or the 5.5 hectares he had conveyed to Espinosa.

• The Property and Petitioner’s Initial Ownership: Petitioner claimed a 3.2800‑hectare unregistered parcel surveyed as Lot No. 3918, declared for taxation in his name. He had been in possession for more than twenty years and identified Pablo Espinosa as an adjoining owner, with the old Bugsayon River serving as the boundary between their properties. In 1962, petitioner instructed his tenant to divert the river, converting the former riverbed into riceland.

• Chain of Conveyances: Private respondents traced a different chain of title. Petitioner originally owned a 5.5‑hectare property declared under Tax Declaration No. 2916, bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River. On December 21, 1960, petitioner sold it to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug; he repurchased it on August 24, 1962, and declared it under Tax Declaration No. 5720. Four days later, on August 28, 1962, petitioner sold the same 5.5‑hectare land to Pablo Espinosa, who declared it under Tax Declaration No. 12311. Throughout these transactions, the area and boundaries remained unchanged. On August 10, 1981, the heirs of Espinosa’s wife executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale,” conveying the property to private respondent Victorico Laurio for P5,000.00. Tax Declaration No. 12738 was thereafter issued in Laurio’s name.

• Surveys and Discrepancies: Two surveys were conducted. Petitioner’s survey showed his total claim as 5.9789 hectares (Lot Nos. 3918, 3918‑A, and 3606), while Espinosa’s Lot No. 3479 was reduced to 4.1841 hectares. Private respondents protested the survey with the Bureau of Lands and filed a case for alteration of boundaries. A court‑ordered relocation survey also revealed that petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 8717 reflected 3.2800 hectares, but his actual claim according to the commissioner’s geodetic engineer amounted to 4.1385 hectares, a discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. Private respondents’ tax declaration of 5.5 hectares was more proximate to the commissioner’s finding of 5.2433 hectares.

• Petitioner’s Alleged Inheritance: Petitioner was one of four heirs of Leonida Zaragoza. Under an extrajudicial settlement, the heirs partitioned a 3.6‑hectare property declared under Tax Declaration No. 3301, bounded on the South by the Bugsayon River. Petitioner’s rightful share was .9000 hectare, but Tax Declaration No. 8723 subsequently issued in his name reflected 2.4 hectares, with altered boundaries — now bounded on the South by property of Espinosa instead of the river. Private respondents contended that petitioner had encroached on their property and improperly included part of it in his inheritance declaration.

• The Alleged Intrusion and the Complaint: In September 1983, private respondents and their hired laborers entered a portion of the land, approximately two hectares, and began plowing, claiming ownership. Petitioner alleged that this constituted forcible entry. He filed a complaint for quieting of title, praying for a declaration of true ownership, a writ of preliminary injunction, and damages. The complaint did not identify any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that clouded his title; it merely averred physical intrusion.

• Ownership by Prior Possession and Title: Petitioner maintained that he was the owner of Lot No. 3918, having possessed it for more than twenty years without controversy, and that the surveys and tax declarations in his name established his title.

• Validity of Survey and Tax Declaration: Petitioner relied on the survey plan prepared at his instance, the tax declaration in his name, and the commissioner’s relocation survey report, arguing that these documents demonstrated his ownership and that the disputed area lay inside his property.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Petitioner argued that even if formal title were lacking, his continuous possession from 1962 until the 1983 intrusion — a period of twenty‑one years — vested ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.

• Inexistent Cloud on Title: Private respondents countered that petitioner’s complaint did not state a cause of action for quieting of title because it alleged only physical intrusion and a boundary dispute, not any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that cast a cloud on title.

• Prior Sale and Transfer of Ownership: Respondents argued that petitioner had absolutely sold the 5.5‑hectare property to their predecessor‑in‑interest Pablo Espinosa in 1962, thereby losing all rights of ownership and possession. The property passed to them through a valid chain of conveyances.

• Fraud in Declaration and Survey: Respondents contended that petitioner fraudulently expanded his share in the inheritance of Leonida Zaragoza and altered boundaries in his tax declarations, effectively encroaching on respondents’ land. They further asserted that the unverified survey plan could not confer ownership.

• Cause of Action for Quieting of Title: Whether the complaint for quieting of title stated a valid cause of action under Article 476 of the Civil Code, given that the acts alleged were physical intrusion and the underlying controversy was a boundary dispute.

• Proof of Ownership: Whether petitioner established ownership over the disputed land through the survey plan, tax declarations, and commissioner’s report, notwithstanding his prior sale of the 5.5‑hectare property to respondents’ predecessor‑in‑interest.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether petitioner acquired title by ordinary or extraordinary prescription through possession spanning more than twenty years.

• Damages and Attorney’s Fees: Whether the awards of moral damages and attorney’s fees in favor of private respondents were proper.

• Cause of Action for Quieting of Title: The complaint failed to state a cause of action for quieting of title. Article 476 of the Civil Code requires the plaintiff to allege an “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding” that is apparently valid but in truth invalid, voidable, or unenforceable, and that casts a cloud on the plaintiff’s title. The grounds enumerated are exclusive under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Petitioner alleged only that respondents forcibly entered and plowed the land. No instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding was identified. What petitioner perceived as a cloud was the mere physical intrusion — a ground for forcible entry, not quieting of title. Moreover, the case was in reality a boundary dispute, which cannot be resolved in a quieting‑of‑title action; the determination of boundaries must be litigated in adversarial proceedings such as forcible entry or recovery of possession.

• Proof of Ownership: Even if the complaint were treated as a valid suit to quiet title, petitioner failed to prove ownership. Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, a contract of sale transfers dominion and other real rights. Petitioner sold the 5.5‑hectare property to Pablo Espinosa on August 28, 1962, thereby divesting himself of all rights of ownership and possession. Private respondents subsequently acquired the same land through a valid chain of conveyances. Petitioner’s evidence — the unverified survey plan, the tax declarations, and the commissioner’s report — did not carry probative weight. A survey plan is not a conveyance and is not a mode of acquiring ownership; it is merely an indication of possession unless verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands under Section 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, as amended. The plan here was never approved and was nothing more than a private writing with limited evidentiary value. Tax declarations, standing alone, are not conclusive evidence of ownership; they are at best indicia of a claim. Furthermore, the glaring discrepancy between petitioner’s tax declaration (3.2800 hectares) and his actual claim (4.1385 hectares) undermined his case, while respondents’ declared 5.5 hectares closely matched the commissioner’s measurement of 5.2433 hectares.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Petitioner’s claim of prescription was untenable. Ordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1134 in relation to Article 1117 requires possession for ten years with “just title” and “good faith.” Petitioner did not possess in good faith because he had altered the boundary (the Bugsayon River) to enlarge his holding — an act tantamount to bad faith. Nor did he have just title: he came into possession of the disputed portion not through any recognized mode of acquiring ownership from a grantor, but by his own unilateral act. Neither could he invoke extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137, which demands uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or good faith. His alleged possession from 1962 to September 1983 spanned only twenty‑one years, short of the thirty‑year statutory period.

• Damages and Attorney’s Fees: The award of moral damages was warranted because fraud and bad faith were established. Article 2219(10) in connection with Article 21 of the Civil Code allows recovery of moral damages where a person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. The Court increased the moral damages from P10,000.00 to P30,000.00. Attorney’s fees were properly granted under Article 2208(4) because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil action.

• Requirement for Quieting of Title — Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, a complaint for quieting of title must specifically allege and prove the existence of an “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding” that is apparently valid but in truth invalid, voidable, or unenforceable, and that casts a cloud upon the plaintiff’s title. The grounds are exclusive; mere physical intrusion or a boundary dispute does not satisfy the statutory requirement. An action for quieting of title cannot be used to determine boundaries or resolve possession de facto.

• Survey as Evidence of Ownership — A survey plan, particularly one not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands, is not a conveyance and is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is an instrument sui generis that may indicate possession but is not conclusive as to title. To possess evidentiary weight, it must be verified and approved in accordance with the Cadastral Act.

• Tax Declarations as Evidence — A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership; it is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership and carries little value in proving title.

• Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription — Ownership over immovable property may be acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years, provided the possession is in good faith and with just title (Article 1117 in relation to Article 1134, Civil Code). Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the transferor was the owner and could transmit ownership (Article 1127). Just title exists when the adverse claimant came into possession through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right (Article 1129).

• Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription — Under Article 1137, ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Possession for a shorter period, even if adverse, does not vest ownership.

• Effect of Sale on Ownership — A contract of sale transfers dominion and other real rights in the thing sold (Article 1458). Upon the perfection and consummation of the sale, the vendor ceases to be the owner and can no longer assert any claim of ownership based on subsequent possession or prescription against the vendee or the latter’s successors‑in‑interest.

• “Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be ‘an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.’ Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.”

• ”. . . (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’ interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the ‘instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding’ itself, may be introduced.”

• “A survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession.”

• “A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one’s ownership.”

• Vda. de Aviles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95748, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 473 — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the rule that a complaint for quieting of title must allege a specific cloud as enumerated in Article 476, and that a boundary dispute cannot be resolved in such an action.

• Heirs of George Bofill v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107930, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 451 — Followed. Cited for the principle that a survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land is not conclusive as to ownership and may merely indicate a delineation of possession.

• Fige v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107951, June 30, 1994, 233 SCRA 586 — Followed. Applied the requirement that private surveys must be verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands under Act No. 2259 to have probative value.

• Santiago v. Cruz, 19 Phil. 145 (1911) — Followed. The Court invoked this early authority for the rule that prescriptive title to real estate requires possession with color of title and good faith.

• Article 476, Civil Code — Defined the cause of action for quieting of title, requiring an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that clouds the plaintiff’s title. The complaint’s failure to allege any such cloud was fatal.

• Article 1458, Civil Code — Established that a contract of sale obligates the vendor to transfer ownership and deliver a determinate thing. Petitioner’s prior sale to Espinosa extinguished his ownership.

• Article 1117, Civil Code — Prescribed that ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title. Petitioner lacked both.

• Articles 1127 and 1129, Civil Code — Defined good faith and just title for prescription purposes. Petitioner’s conversion of the river boundary and unilateral claim did not satisfy these requirements.

• Article 1134, Civil Code — Fixed the ten‑year period for ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables. This was unavailable to petitioner due to absence of good faith and just title.

• Article 1137, Civil Code — Fixed the thirty‑year period for extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Petitioner’s twenty‑one years of possession fell short.

• Article 2219(10) in relation to Article 21, Civil Code — Allowed recovery of moral damages for willful acts contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Moral damages were increased to P30,000.00.

• Article 2208(4), Civil Code — Permitted the recovery of attorney’s fees where an unfounded civil action is filed. The award of attorney’s fees was sustained.

• Section 28, paragraph 5, Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act), as amended by Section 1862, Act No. 2711 — Required private surveyors to submit field notes, computations, and survey plans to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. Petitioner’s unapproved plan was a mere private writing.

Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan, J., and Purisima, J., concurred.