Usama vs. Tomarong

A judge commits gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct by granting an application for bail without giving notice to the prosecutor and without conducting a hearing, regardless of whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and by using a habeas corpus proceeding to order the release on bail of persons who are not parties to the petition. The mandatory procedural requirements for bail applications are not excused by the absence of a pending Information, and habeas corpus is not the proper vehicle for asserting or granting bail.

Alson Chan and Angeles Carloto contested the mayoralty of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte during the May 9, 2016 elections. On May 4, 2016, police officers on roving patrol encountered Chan and his campaign volunteers; a gunfight erupted, resulting in the death of PO1 Mirdan Usama. Chan and his volunteers were arrested the following morning and detained at the Tampilisan Police Station. That same afternoon, Chan, through counsel, urgently sought bail before the Regional Trial Court presided by respondent Judge Oscar D. Tomarong, although no Information had yet been filed. The judge granted bail immediately, and later, in a habeas corpus proceeding filed by Chan’s wife, ordered the release of three other detainees on bail. The widow of the slain officer subsequently filed the present administrative complaint, alleging gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

• The Incident and Arrest: During the 2016 election period, on May 4, 2016, police officers of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, responding to a tip about a suspicious gray Hilux van, encountered mayoral candidate Alson Chan and his campaign volunteers. A gunfight ensued, killing PO1 Mirdan Usama, the complainant’s husband. Chan and his volunteers—Alfred F. Geronimo, Lito H. Jumawan, and Nilo C. Malanog—were arrested in the morning of May 5, 2016, and detained at the Tampilisan Police Station.

• Ex Parte Bail Application: On May 5, 2016, at 2:00 p.m., Chan, through counsel, filed with RTC Branch 28, presided by respondent Judge Tomarong, an “Application to Post Bail and to Release the Detained Person Pending Filing of Proper Information,” docketed as Misc. Sp. Proc. No. MSP-328. On the same day, respondent issued an Order granting the application and fixing bail at ₱200,000.00. No notice was given to the provincial prosecutor, and no hearing was conducted. The Tampilisan police OIC refused to release Chan despite receiving the Order.

• Filing of Informations: On May 6, 2016, Chan and his volunteers were subjected to inquest proceedings. Provincial Prosecutor Gabino S. Saavedra II prepared and signed Informations charging them with Murder, two counts of Attempted Murder, Illegal Possession of Firearms under R.A. No. 10591, and Illegal Possession of Explosives under R.A. No. 9616.

• Habeas Corpus Petition: On May 7, 2016, Chan’s wife, Edna Bernardita Chan, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus (Sp. Proc. No. SR-763) solely for her husband, alleging unlawful arrest, detention beyond the permissible 36-hour period, and defiance of the earlier bail order. On May 9, 2016, respondent issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing the Chief of Police to produce Chan and his volunteers and to make a Return.

• Hearing and Release Order: During the habeas corpus hearing on May 10, 2016, respondent directed the release of Chan and, upon being asked if the volunteers would be included, answered that he would release them on bail of ₱200,000.00 each. Respondent then issued an Order in Sp. Proc. No. SR-763, stating: “The Court orders the release of accused Alson Chan and the released (sic) of the three other accused Alfred M. Geronimo, Lito H. Jumawan and Nilo C. Malanog after posting a bail of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) each in all cases that will be filed against them.” The volunteers were not parties to the habeas corpus petition.

• Motion to Inhibit and Retirement: On May 10, 2016, complainant filed a “Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit,” which respondent granted on July 26, 2016. On April 8, 2019, respondent filed an application for optional retirement effective April 1, 2019, before the administrative complaint was resolved.

• Complainant’s Allegations: Complainant asserted that May 5, 2016, was a Muslim holiday and courts were closed; respondent nonetheless acted on the bail application without hearing or notice to the prosecutor, “hours if not minutes” after filing. These acts, complainant argued, constituted Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

• Respondent’s Defense: Respondent invoked Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96, which authorizes judges on weekends and holidays to act on bailable offenses and urgent matters under a skeletal force arrangement. He maintained that the application was meritorious, that the crime appeared to be only homicide (a bailable offense), and that no hearing was required. He contended his actions were judicial and could not give rise to administrative liability.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Misconduct: Complainant argued that respondent acted on a bail application on a holiday, without notifying the prosecutor or conducting a hearing, in violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence. She asserted that this haste and disregard of procedural requirements constituted gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct.

• Bias and Partiality: Complainant claimed that respondent’s swift action on the bail application and his subsequent order in the habeas corpus proceeding demonstrated bias and partiality, warranting administrative sanction.

• Authority under Supreme Court Circular: Respondent maintained that Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96 authorized him, as a judge, to act on bailable offenses and urgent matters on weekends and holidays. He argued that his issuance of the bail order on May 5, 2016, fell within the coverage of the circular.

• Meritorious Application and No Hearing Required: Respondent contended that he analyzed the underlying incident as involving only homicide, a bailable offense, and thus a hearing was not required before fixing bail. He stressed that the application was meritorious because Chan was allegedly arrested without warrant to derail his election campaign.

• Judicial Nature of Acts: Respondent asserted that the complaint stemmed from official judicial acts, and therefore no civil, criminal, or administrative liability could attach.

• Bail Application: Whether respondent Judge Tomarong is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct for granting Alson Chan’s bail application without notifying the prosecutor and without conducting a hearing.

• Habeas Corpus Release Order: Whether respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct for ordering the release on bail of Alson Chan’s campaign volunteers in the habeas corpus proceeding, despite them not being parties to the petition.

• Bail Application: Gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct were established. The rules on bail, particularly under Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, mandate that an accused charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua (such as murder, with which Chan was subsequently charged) may be denied bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. The determination of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence requires a hearing, and Section 18 of the same Rule mandates reasonable notice to the prosecutor. The duty to notify the prosecutor and conduct a hearing exists whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. Respondent’s failure to observe these basic and straightforward procedural requirements, despite knowing that the detention involved a killing, constituted gross ignorance of the law. The same failure evinced a flagrant disregard of established rules, amounting to gross misconduct. Respondent’s personal characterization of the offense as merely homicide could not excuse the omission.

• Habeas Corpus Release Order: Gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct were likewise established. A petition for habeas corpus is designed to inquire into the legality of a person’s confinement, not to serve as a venue for granting bail to persons who are not parties to the proceeding. By ordering the release on bail of the three campaign volunteers—who were not parties to the habeas corpus petition—respondent acted beyond the scope of the writ and in disregard of the clear principles governing habeas corpus proceedings. This separate act constituted an additional count of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

• Duties of a Judge in Bail Applications (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Flor, Jr.) — A judge resolving a bail application must: (1) notify the prosecutor or require a recommendation; (2) conduct a hearing where bail is a matter of discretion, regardless of whether the prosecution opposes or presents evidence; (3) determine whether the prosecution’s evidence of guilt is strong based on the summary of evidence; and (4) discharge the accused upon approval of the bail bond only if the evidence of guilt is not strong. Notice and hearing are required whether bail is a matter of right or discretion to enable the court to consider the guidelines for fixing bail under Section 9, Rule 114.

• Habeas Corpus Not Proper for Bail (Galvez v. Court of Appeals) — A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial. The writ is designed to relieve illegal confinement, not to grant bail to non-parties.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — A judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law when he disregards basic rules and settled jurisprudence, and the error is motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Blatant disregard of clear statutory provisions and Supreme Court circulars overcomes the presumption of regularity.

• Gross Misconduct — Misconduct is a transgression of an established rule of action, willful in character. It becomes grave (or gross) when accompanied by corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.

• Tallado v. Racoma — If a judicial remedy is still available to the complainant, an administrative complaint against a judge shall be dismissed outright. This rule, however, did not apply because the complainant—as the private offended party in a criminal case—had no legal personality to seek judicial review of the bail grant, her interest being limited to the civil liability aspect.

• Retroactive Application of Revised Rule 140 — Section 24 of the Revised Rule 140 explicitly provides for its retroactive effect, applying to all pending and future administrative cases, regardless of when the infractions were committed, effectively abandoning the previous doctrine in Dela Rama v. De Leon that favored the more lenient rule in force at the time of the offense.

• “Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. … Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.”

• “[W]hether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required in order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail.”

• “A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial.”

• “[T]he duties of a judge in resolving bail applications …: 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail … for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond …; otherwise petition should be denied.”

• Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Flor, Jr. , A.M. No. RTJ-17-2503, July 28, 2020 — Followed; enumerated the mandatory duties of judges in bail applications and held that patent disregard of these elementary rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

• Villaneva v. Judge Buaya , 650 Phil. 9 (2010) — Followed; clarified that notice and hearing are required for bail applications whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.

• Galvez v. Court of Appeals , 307 Phil. 708 (1994) — Followed; established that habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assert a right to bail.

• In re Salibo v. Warden , 757 Phil. 630 (2015) — Cited; defined the primary purpose of the writ of habeas corpus as inquiring into involuntary restraint and relieving illegal confinement.

• Department of Justice v. Judge Mislang , 791 Phil. 219 (2016) — Followed; defined gross ignorance of the law and clarified the degree of knowledge expected of judges.

• First Great Ventures Loans, Inc. v. Mercado , A.M. No. P-17-3773, October 1, 2019 — Followed; defined misconduct and grave/gross misconduct, including the required elements.

• Tallado v. Racoma , A.M. No. RTJ-22-022, August 23, 2022 — Distinguished; laid down rules on the dismissal of administrative complaints when judicial remedies are available, but held inapplicable because herein complainant lacked standing to question the bail grant.

• Dela Rama v. De Leon , A.M. No. P-14-3240, March 2, 2021 — Abandoned in part; the Revised Rule 140’s explicit retroactivity provision overrides the rule that the more lenient prevailing rules at the time of the offense should apply.

• Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution — All persons except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong shall be bailable. Applied to underscore that bail is a matter of discretion for capital offenses, requiring a hearing to assess the strength of evidence.

• Rule 114, Sections 7, 8, and 18, Rules of Court — No person charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong; the prosecution bears the burden of showing strong evidence of guilt at a hearing; reasonable notice to the prosecutor is mandatory. These provisions were violated when respondent granted bail without notice or hearing.

• Rule 102, Section 1, Rules of Court — The writ of habeas corpus extends to cases of illegal confinement or detention. Applied to delimit the proper scope of the writ and to hold that granting bail to non-parties in such a proceeding exceeded that scope.

• Section 17(1)(c), Section 18(b), Section 21, and Section 24, Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC) — These provisions governed the imposition of penalties for serious charges, the conversion of dismissal or suspension to a fine upon supervening retirement, the treatment of multiple offenses arising from separate acts, and the retroactive application of the Revised Rule. They were applied to impose a fine of ₱110,000 per act and to make the penalty uniform with the revised framework.

Chief Justice Gesmundo, Senior Associate Justice Leonen, and Justices Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Kho, Jr., and Singh. Justice Dimaampao was on leave; Justice Marquez took no part due to prior action as Court Administrator.