Velasco vs. Court of Appeals

The writ of habeas corpus will not issue to discharge a person originally arrested without a warrant if, prior to the filing of the petition, a complaint or information for the same offense has been filed in court and the court has issued an order asserting its custody, such as an order denying bail; these supervening events constitute a judicial process that cures the initial illegality and bars the writ under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the filing of a motion for bail or the posting of bail constitutes voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction, waiving any objection to defects in the arrest.

Lawrence A. Larkins was the accused in several B.P. Blg. 22 cases pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued against him in those cases. Over a year later, on 20 November 1994, a woman named Desiree Alinea filed a complaint-affidavit with the National Bureau of Investigation accusing Larkins of raping her the previous day. Acting solely on that complaint, NBI special investigators arrested Larkins at his Makati office on 21 November 1994 without a warrant. The very next day, Larkins posted bail for the B.P. 22 cases; the Pasig RTC ordered his release unless he was detained for another cause. The NBI refused to release him, holding him for inquest in the rape case. The formal complaint for rape was executed on 23 November 1994 and filed with the Antipolo RTC on 2 December 1994. Larkins then sought bail and dismissal of the complaint, but the trial court denied his motions and issued a hold-departure order on 5 January 1995. Felicitas Cuyag, his common-law wife, thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari in the Court of Appeals on his behalf.

• The Warrantless Arrest: On 20 November 1994, Desiree Alinea executed a complaint-affidavit before the NBI accusing Lawrence Larkins of rape, allegedly committed on 19 November 1994 in Antipolo, Rizal. The following day, 21 November 1994, NBI Special Investigators Flor Resurreccion and Antonio Erum, Jr. proceeded to Larkins’ office in Makati, arrested him without a warrant, and brought him to the NBI Detention Cell in Manila. Alinea positively identified Larkins as the perpetrator.

• Posting of Bail in the B.P. 22 Cases: Larkins had a standing warrant of arrest in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92 for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 before the RTC of Pasig. On 22 November 1994, he posted the amount of P4,000.00 as bail in those cases. Judge Padolina of the Pasig RTC issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest and directing the NBI Jail Warden to release Larkins unless he was detained for another cause. The NBI refused to release him, maintaining that he was being held for the rape case.

• Filing of the Rape Complaint and Court Proceedings: A formal complaint for rape was executed by Alinea on 23 November 1994, certified by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson as filed for inquest, the accused not having availed of preliminary investigation or waived the period under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-11794 and raffled to Branch 71, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.

• Motions Filed by Larkins: On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through counsel Atty. Mauricio Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail, arguing that the evidence of guilt was not strong because the medical report showed no hymenal laceration and asserting his right to bail. On 6 December 1994, through new counsel Atty. Theodore Te, he filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, anchored principally on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. The prosecution vigorously opposed both motions.

• Trial Court’s 5 January 1995 Order: After considering the arguments of both sides, the trial court denied the motions for lack of merit. It ruled that the seriousness of the offense justified the denial of bail and the issuance of a hold-departure order. The court directed the Bureau of Immigration to include Larkins in its hold-departure list until further orders.

• Petition before the Court of Appeals: Unable to accept the ruling, Felicitas S. Cuyag, Larkins’ common-law wife, filed a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with the Court of Appeals, naming the NBI officials and Judge Caballes as respondents. She sought the immediate release of Larkins, arguing that the warrantless arrest was illegal and that no valid judicial process justified his continued detention.

• Supervening Events Bar Habeas Corpus: Petitioners argued that the writ of habeas corpus had become unavailable because Larkins had already been charged with the crime of rape in court and the trial court had denied his application for bail, thereby asserting its jurisdiction and custody over his person. They invoked the principle that the filing of charges and the issuance of a judicial order cure any initial illegality in the detention.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest: Petitioners maintained that the warrantless arrest was lawful under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, having been effected immediately after the commission of the offense upon the positive identification of the victim.

• Propriety of the Court of Appeals’ Grant of Habeas Corpus: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering Larkins’ release because, at the time the petition was filed, his detention was already by virtue of a valid judicial process — the complaint filed in the Antipolo RTC and the court’s order denying bail — which fell within the exceptions in Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

• Insufficiency of Mere Filing of Information: Respondent Cuyag countered that the filing of a complaint alone does not bar habeas corpus; what Section 4, Rule 102 requires is a “process issued by the court or judge,” which she limited to a warrant of arrest or a commitment order. She cited Ilagan v. Ponce Enrile and Sanchez v. Demetriou for the proposition that only the issuance of a warrant of arrest cures the defect of an invalid detention.

• Invalidity of the Warrantless Arrest: Respondent argued that the warrantless arrest did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and that the subsequent denial of bail could not retroactively validate an illegal deprivation of liberty.

• Distinction Between Habeas Corpus and Certiorari: Respondent maintained that habeas corpus should not be barred simply because certiorari might be an available remedy, and that the Court of Appeals correctly exercised its power to order release because the detention remained unlawful in the absence of a warrant or commitment order.

• Supervening Judicial Events: Whether the writ of habeas corpus may properly be granted when, after an initially illegal warrantless arrest, a criminal complaint is filed in court and the court issues an order denying bail and asserting its custody over the accused.

• Submission to Jurisdiction via Motion for Bail: Whether the filing of an urgent motion for bail, after the complaint for the same offense had been filed, constitutes voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction, thereby rendering the legality of the arrest no longer material to a petition for habeas corpus.

• Definition of “Process” Under Section 4, Rule 102: Whether a trial court’s order denying bail qualifies as a “process” issued by a court of record within the meaning of Section 4, Rule 102, such that the writ shall not be allowed.

• Supervening Judicial Events: The filing of the complaint for rape and the trial court’s order of 5 January 1995 denying bail were supervening events that cured any initial illegality of the warrantless arrest. Under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed when the person restrained is charged with an offense or is in custody by virtue of a judicial process. The order denying bail was an unequivocal assertion of the court’s authority to keep the accused in custody, and the filing of the complaint charged him with a crime — both events independently barred the writ. The Court reiterated that even if detention is illegal at inception, supervening events like the institution of criminal charges or issuance of judicial process render the detention lawful for purposes of habeas corpus, citing Sayo v. Chief of Police, Matsura v. Director of Prisons, Cruz v. Montoya, and Umil v. Ramos.

• Submission to Jurisdiction via Motion for Bail: By filing his urgent motion for bail on 2 December 1994, Larkins voluntarily submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court and effectively waived any objection to the irregularity of his arrest. The act of seeking bail is tantamount to posting bail, which under the consistent rulings in Carrington v. Peterson, United States v. Grant, and De Asis v. Romero, amounts to an acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction over the person. The subsequent motion to dismiss on the ground of illegal arrest, filed four days later, was an afterthought and came too late to divest the court of jurisdiction already firmly acquired.

• Definition of “Process” Under Section 4, Rule 102: The order of 5 January 1995 denying bail falls squarely within the term “process” as used in Section 4, Rule 102, which encompasses not only warrants of arrest and commitment orders but also writs, summonses, and judicial orders. Process is a generic term meaning any writ, warrant, mandate, or order issued by a court to acquire jurisdiction over a person or to compel compliance with its demands; the trial court’s order asserting its authority to keep Larkins in custody thus qualified as a judicial process that barred habeas corpus.

• Supervening Events Cure Initial Illegality of Detention — Even if an arrest was originally illegal, supervening events such as the filing of a complaint or information for the same offense in a court of competent jurisdiction, or the issuance of a judicial process (e.g., an order denying bail), cure the defect and render the detention lawful for purposes of a petition for habeas corpus. Consequently, the writ will not issue, consistent with the last sentence of Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which prohibits the discharge of a person charged with an offense in the Philippines.

• Motion for Bail as Submission to Jurisdiction — The filing of a motion for bail, or the posting of bail, constitutes a voluntary submission of the person of the accused to the jurisdiction of the court. This submission waives any objection to the legality or regularity of the arrest, and the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the accused irrespective of defects in the arrest. A subsequent challenge to the arrest is deemed too late and an afterthought.

• Broad Construction of “Process” in Habeas Corpus — Under Section 4, Rule 102, the term “process” is not restricted to a warrant of arrest or a commitment order; it encompasses all formal judicial writs, warrants, mandates, and orders issued by a court of record, including an order denying bail that manifests the court’s authority over the person detained.

• “Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.” — The ratio decidendi framing the entire analysis of supervening events.

• “The filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained … [makes] the restraint of liberty … by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available.” — Clarifying that the mere charging of the detained person bars the writ under the second part of Section 4, Rule 102.

• “It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.” — Affirming the long-standing doctrine on waiver of jurisdictional objections through bail.

• Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859 (1948) — Followed; established that persons illegally restrained may be ordered released “unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice,” acknowledging that subsequent judicial process cures earlier illegality.

• Matsura v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 (1947) — Applied; denied habeas corpus where petitioners, initially detained without charge, had already been charged with treason before filing their petition, as Section 4 prohibits discharge of a person charged with an offense.

• Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990) — Relied upon; interpreted the last sentence of Section 4, Rule 102 as forbidding habeas corpus when the person sought to be released has been charged before any court, regardless of an existing warrant of arrest.

• De Asis v. Romero, 41 SCRA 235 (1971) — Followed; held that filing a petition for bail constitutes acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction over the person, precluding a subsequent challenge to the arrest.

• Carrington v. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134 (1905) — Cited as authority that giving bail submits the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction and waives jurisdictional defects in the arrest.

• Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court — The provision that bars the writ of habeas corpus when the detained person is in custody under process issued by a court of record with jurisdiction, or when the person is charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines. The latter clause was applied directly: Larkins was a “person charged” with rape at the time of the habeas corpus petition.

• Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court (Lawful warrantless arrests) — Mentioned as the provision under which petitioners claimed the arrest was valid; the Court did not rule on its compliance but observed that arresting officers failed to deliver Larkins to the nearest police station or jail as required.

• Article 125, Revised Penal Code (Delay in delivery of detained persons) — Cited together with Rule 113 to highlight the procedural lapses of the arresting officers; not determinative of the habeas corpus issue.

• Section 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court (Hearing for bail) — The Court noted that the trial court did not conduct the required hearing to ascertain whether the evidence of guilt is strong before denying bail, but this procedural infirmity did not affect the availability of habeas corpus.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous among the members of the First Division.