Vergara vs. Gedorio

An order directing a lessee to pay rentals to an estate administratrix constitutes a judgment for money, enforcement of which is governed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercing payment cannot be resorted to until all other means of execution under that provision have been exhausted, and such imprisonment for failure to pay a civil debt arising from contract contravenes the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.

Berlito P. Taripe originally leased a property on Dr. A. Santos Ave., Parañaque City, to the petitioners. The property was later included in the inventory of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 12, where respondent Eleuteria P. Bolaño served as Special Administratrix. Bolaño moved to compel the lessees to pay their monthly rentals to her in her capacity as administratrix pending settlement of the estate. The probate court granted the motion and directed the lessees to remit rentals to Bolaño. Petitioners did not comply, asserting uncertainty as to whom payment was properly due, given Taripe’s competing claim.

• Nature: Petitioners, lessees of a Parañaque City property originally leased from Berlito P. Taripe, were directed by the probate court in an intestate proceeding to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Eleuteria P. Bolaño in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the estate of Anselma P. Allers. Taripe had previously collected advance rentals, creating uncertainty for petitioners.
• The Probate Order: In an Omnibus Order dated October 5, 1999, the probate court directed the lessees, including the named petitioners, to pay their monthly rentals to Bolaño beginning August 1999 and to settle arrears. Copies of the order were sent to petitioners by registered mail on October 12, 1999.
• Execution and Return: A writ of execution issued on March 3, 2000. The deputy sheriff’s return dated August 10, 2000 stated that upon meeting petitioners on June 5, 2000, collection failed because Taripe had already collected three months’ advance rentals.
• Contempt Proceedings: Respondent Bolaño filed a motion on August 4, 2000 for petitioners to show cause why they should not be cited for indirect contempt. The probate court granted the motion on September 7, 2000, requiring petitioners to explain within twenty days. Petitioners wrote the court on March 18, 2001 stating they were “freezing” rentals due to uncertainty about the proper payee. Bolaño then moved on March 20, 2001 to cite them in contempt; the hearing was set for May 11, 2001. Petitioners did not attend but later wrote on June 11, 2001 acknowledging knowledge of the hearing and the contempt order, attributing their absence to financial constraints.
• Arrest and Habeas Corpus: The probate court issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001; petitioners were arrested on December 24, 2001 in Parañaque City by Ormoc City policemen. They filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals on December 26, 2001. The CA ordered temporary release but ultimately denied the petition.

• Invalidity of the October 5, 1999 Order: Petitioners argued that they were not notified of the omnibus motion submitting the inventory that led to the order directing them to pay rentals to Bolaño; thus, the order was unlawful, and their refusal was not contumacious.
• Impropriety of Indirect Contempt: Petitioners maintained that the motion for indirect contempt was not the proper remedy to enforce the payment order.
• Invalidity of the Warrant of Arrest and Detention: Petitioners contended that the warrant of arrest and their actual arrest were unlawful, and that their temporary release should be made permanent.
• Defects in Administratrix’s Authority: Petitioners assailed Bolaño’s appointment as Special Administratrix for having been made without the required bond and argued that her powers were too limited to include filing the contempt motion.

• Service of Notice: Respondent Bolaño maintained that petitioners were properly served with copies of the omnibus motion by registered mail, as evidenced by the motion’s certification of service and the corresponding registry receipts.
• Enforceability of the Order: Respondent argued that the October 5, 1999 order was a valid directive that petitioners willfully disobeyed, justifying the contempt sanction and imprisonment until compliance.

• Due Process: Whether the probate court’s order directing petitioners to pay rentals to the administratrix was void for lack of notice, thereby barring a contempt finding.
• Proper Mode of Enforcement: Whether indirect contempt is the correct remedy to compel compliance with an order directing lessees to pay rentals to an estate administratrix.
• Constitutional Bar: Whether the contempt order and warrant of arrest violated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
• Propriety of Habeas Corpus: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for habeas corpus and ordering petitioners remanded to custody.

• Due Process: The orders of the probate court were valid and enforceable notwithstanding the absence of proof of actual receipt by petitioners of the initial motion. Petitioners’ own letters of March 18, 2001 and June 11, 2001 constituted admissions that they had actual knowledge of the October 5, 1999 order, the May 11, 2001 hearing on the contempt motion, and the contempt finding itself. Actual knowledge cured any defect in formal service; requiring further proof would be an idle ceremony.
• Proper Mode of Enforcement: The order directing payment of rentals fell within the purview of a judgment for money governed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The writ of execution was addressed to the sheriff, not to the petitioners, and commanded levy upon their personal or real property to satisfy the obligation. Under the rule adopted in Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, imprisonment for contempt as a coercive measure for a civil purpose—here, payment of money—cannot be resorted to until all other means provided under Section 9 have been exhausted and have failed. The sheriff’s incomplete enforcement did not authorize shifting the burden to petitioners through contempt imprisonment.
• Constitutional Bar: Section 20, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibits imprisonment for debt. “Debt” encompasses civil debts, defined as any liability to pay arising from a contract, express or implied. The rentals petitioners were ordered to pay constituted a civil debt. Ordering their imprisonment for failure to pay directly contravened this constitutional guarantee. The contempt power, while inherent in courts, must be exercised on preservative and corrective principles, not as a retaliatory instrument to enforce money judgments.
• Propriety of Habeas Corpus: The contempt order and the consequent warrant of arrest were unwarranted. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the probate court’s decision and remanding petitioners to custody. The petition for habeas corpus was therefore meritorious; the temporary release was made permanent.

• Imprisonment for Debt (Constitutional Prohibition) — Section 20, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. “Debt” refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense; it means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied. The obligation to pay rentals under a lease falls within this prohibition, and contempt imprisonment to compel payment violates the constitutional provision.
• Enforcement of Money Judgments under Rule 39 — A judgment or order requiring the payment of money is enforced exclusively through the mechanisms set out in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: immediate payment on demand, satisfaction by levy on property, or garnishment of debts and credits. Imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercing payment of a money judgment cannot be availed of until all these prescribed means have been exhausted and have failed.
• Preservative and Corrective Purpose of Contempt Power — The power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive, principle and on the corrective, not retaliatory, idea of punishment. Courts must wield this power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.
• Actual Notice Cures Defect in Formal Service — Where a party admits actual knowledge of court orders and proceedings, strict proof of formal service by registered mail becomes unnecessary; it would be an idle ceremony to require compliance with technical procedural requirements when the adverse party has in fact been informed.

• “The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.” — This passage articulates the controlling standard limiting courts’ contempt authority.
• “In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied.” — This formulation defines the constitutional scope of the prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
• “Imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purpose cannot be resorted to until all other means fail.” — Adopted from Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, this statement delimits the hierarchically inferior role of contempt in enforcing civil money obligations.

• Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 140 SCRA 73 (1985) — Followed as the controlling guideline: imprisonment for contempt as a coercive means for a civil purpose, such as payment of money, cannot be resorted to until all other enforcement measures have failed.
• Sura v. Martin, Sr., 26 SCRA 286 (1968) — Applied for the rule that an order for arrest and imprisonment for contempt for failure to satisfy a judgment for support on the ground of insolvency effectively violates the Constitution.
• Ting v. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 551 (2000) — Cited on the evidentiary requirements for proving service by registered mail and the principle that receipts and return cards must be properly authenticated.
• Lipata v. Tutaan, 209 Phil. 719 (1983) — Relied upon for the principle that a writ of execution is addressed to the sheriff, whose duty it is to enforce judgments; failure of the sheriff does not convert the writ into a direct order to the judgment obligor enforceable by contempt.
• Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 135180-81, August 16, 2000 — Referenced to underscore the restrained and judicious exercise of the contempt power.

• Section 20, Article III, 1987 Constitution — No person shall be imprisoned for debt. Applied to bar the imprisonment of petitioners for their failure to pay civil rental obligations.
• Section 8, Rule 71, Rules of Court — Provides for imprisonment until a contemnor performs an act within his power; deemed inapplicable because the underlying order was a money judgment, not a special judgment for a specific act enforceable under Section 11, Rule 39.
• Section 9, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Governs execution of judgments for money; its prescribed procedures (demand, levy, garnishment) must be exhausted before contempt imprisonment may be considered.
• Sections 10 and 11, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Cover execution of judgments for specific acts and special judgments respectively; distinguished from the rental payment order, which fell squarely under Section 9.
• Sections 7, 10, and 13, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Set requirements for service of pleadings and orders by registered mail and proof thereof; their strict application was obviated by petitioners’ actual knowledge.

Bellosillo, J., Quisumbing, J., and Callejo, Sr., J., concurred.