Villamor vs. Commission on Elections and De Dios-Batao

A motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading in an election contest affecting municipal officers under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; its filing does not suspend the five-day period to appeal, and the decision on the election protest becomes final and unalterable by the trial court.

In the May 10, 2004 elections for mayor of Carmen, Cebu, Virginio Villamor was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on May 13, 2004. His opponent, Amytis De Dios-Batao, responded with two separate challenges: a petition to annul the proclamation based on the illegal composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, filed on May 17, 2004, and an election protest instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City on May 24, 2004.

• The Elections and Proclamation: In the May 10, 2004 elections, petitioner Virginio Villamor and respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao were candidates for mayor of Carmen, Cebu. On May 13, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate.

• The Pre-Proclamation Petition: On May 17, 2004 (four days after the proclamation), respondent filed with the COMELEC Second Division a petition to annul petitioner’s proclamation, docketed as SPC No. 04-083. The petition was grounded on the alleged illegal composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers — an issue cognizable as a pre-proclamation controversy.

• The Election Protest and Dismissal: On May 24, 2004, respondent filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25, docketed as Case No. EP-2004-02. Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, an election protest must be filed within ten days from the date of proclamation. Because petitioner was proclaimed on May 13, 2004, the tenth day fell on May 23, 2004 — a Sunday. The trial court, in its Order dated June 24, 2004, dismissed the protest for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the filing on May 24, 2004 was one day late.

• The Motion for Reconsideration: Respondent received a copy of the June 24, 2004 dismissal order on June 25, 2004. Instead of appealing to the COMELEC within five days (until June 30, 2004), respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court granted the motion in an Order dated July 23, 2004, invoking the rule that when the last day falls on a Sunday, the period runs until the next working day, and further citing its inherent power under Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court to amend its orders to conform with law and justice.

• COMELEC Proceedings: Petitioner appealed the July 23, 2004 Order to the COMELEC. The COMELEC Second Division, in its April 11, 2005 Resolution, dismissed the appeal, and the COMELEC En Banc denied reconsideration on August 5, 2005. Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the pre-proclamation petition (SPC No. 04-083) on May 9, 2005 for lack of merit.

• Motion for Reconsideration as Prohibited Pleading: Petitioner contended that under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading in an election protest involving municipal officers. Its filing did not toll the five-day period to appeal; thus, the June 24, 2004 dismissal order became final when respondent failed to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period.

• Premature Admission of Election Protest: Petitioner argued that the trial court should not have admitted the election protest while the pre-proclamation petition was still pending before the COMELEC. He further maintained that, in such a situation, the period to file a counter-protest should be counted only from the COMELEC’s resolution of the pre-proclamation case.

• Permissibility of Motion for Reconsideration: Respondent asserted that a motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited pleading in an election protest and that its filing was valid.

• Trial Court’s Inherent Power: Respondent argued in the alternative that, even if the motion for reconsideration were prohibited, the trial court could reinstate the petition motu proprio before the dismissal order became final, pursuant to its inherent power to amend and control its processes under Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.

• Motion for Reconsideration in Election Protest: Whether the trial court may entertain a motion for reconsideration from an order dismissing an election contest involving municipal officers, given that Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly prohibit such a motion.

• Effect of Pending Pre-Proclamation Controversy: Whether the trial court prematurely admitted the election protest while a petition to annul the proclamation remained pending before the COMELEC, and, if so, whether the period to file a counter-protest must be reckoned from the resolution of that pre-proclamation petition.

• Motion for Reconsideration in Election Protest: The motion for reconsideration filed by respondent was a prohibited pleading. Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that in election contests affecting municipal officers, no motion for reconsideration shall be entertained and the aggrieved party must appeal within five days from receipt of the decision. Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure reiterates that “[n]o motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.” Because respondent received the June 24, 2004 dismissal order on June 25, 2004, the five-day appeal period expired on June 30, 2004 without an appeal having been perfected. The prohibited motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the running of that jurisdictional period; consequently, the dismissal became final and the trial court’s subsequent Order granting reconsideration was void. The trial court’s resort to its inherent power under Rule 135 of the Rules of Court could not override the explicit statutory prohibition, as the rules of ordinary civil procedure apply only suppletorily and when not inconsistent with election law.

• Effect of Pending Pre-Proclamation Controversy: The filing of an election protest or petition for quo warranto precludes a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to its abandonment, thereby depriving the COMELEC of authority over the proclamation’s validity. Here, respondent’s election protest of May 24, 2004 superseded the pre-proclamation petition pending before the COMELEC. Moreover, the pre-proclamation petition itself was defective: it was based on the alleged illegal composition of the Municipal Board of Canvassers but was filed on May 17, 2004 — four days after petitioner’s proclamation. Under Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and prevailing doctrine, a challenge to the illegal composition of the board must be raised immediately when the board begins to act and cannot be questioned after the proclamation of the winner. Thus, the pre-proclamation petition did not suspend the reglementary period for filing the election protest and the protest was not prematurely admitted. The issue of the counter-protest period is therefore rendered moot.

• **Prohibition on Motion for Reconsideration in Election Protests ** — In an election contest involving municipal officers, Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly forbid a motion for reconsideration. The remedy of an aggrieved party is to appeal to the COMELEC within five days from receipt of the decision; failure to do so renders the decision final. A motion for reconsideration, being prohibited, does not toll the appeal period, and any subsequent order of the trial court reinstating the case is void for lack of jurisdiction. The rules of ordinary civil procedure do not apply suppletorily where the election law clearly provides otherwise.

• **Abandonment of Pre-Proclamation Controversy by Filing Election Protest ** — The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes a pre-proclamation controversy or operates to abandon an earlier-filed one. The reason is to prevent conflict and confusion of authority: once a competent tribunal acquires jurisdiction over the election protest, all questions concerning the protestee’s title or the proclamation’s validity must be resolved in that proceeding.

• **Timeliness of Pre-Proclamation Petition Based on Illegal Composition of the Board ** — A pre-proclamation petition based on the illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers must be filed immediately when the board begins to act as such, or at the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity is challenged if it comes after the canvassing, or immediately at the point the proceedings become illegal. Such an issue cannot be raised after the proclamation of the winning candidate.

• “No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.” — Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. This categorical language was central to the holding that the trial court’s order of dismissal became final upon lapse of the appeal period, rendering the subsequent reconsideration a nullity.

• “The COMELEC, therefore, correctly ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in the trial court on March 20, 1990 did not suspend the period to appeal since a ‘motion for reconsideration’ is prohibited under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code.” — Quoted from Veloria v. Commission on Elections, 211 SCRA 907 (1992). This passage was applied to confirm that a prohibited motion cannot toll the jurisdictional appeal period.

• “The rules in ordinary civil procedure do not apply in election cases except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” — This principle, grounded in Rule 1, Section 4 and Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, was invoked to reject the trial court’s reliance on its inherent powers under Rule 135 to entertain a pleading that the election law explicitly proscribes.

• Veloria v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 94771, July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 907 — Followed as controlling precedent. The Supreme Court held therein that a motion for reconsideration in an election protest involving municipal officials is prohibited and does not suspend the period to appeal.

• Laodenio v. Commission on Elections , 342 Phil. 676 (1997) — Cited for the rule that a petition questioning the illegal composition of the board of canvassers must be filed immediately and cannot be entertained after proclamation.

• Dumayas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections , G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 358 — Cited for the doctrine that the filing of an election protest precludes a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to its abandonment.

• Abdulmadid P.B. Maruhom v. Commission on Elections , 387 Phil. 491 (2000) — Cited, together with earlier cases, to support the rule that an election protest or quo warranto proceeding takes precedence over a pre-proclamation case to avoid conflict of authority.

• Salipongan Dagloc v. Commission on Elections , 378 Phil. 906 (1999) — Cited for the distinction between the grounds for annulment of proclamation and those for an election protest, and for the principle that not all actions for annulment suspend the period for filing an election protest.

• **Section 256, Omnibus Election Code ** — Prescribes that appeals from decisions of regional trial courts in election contests involving municipal officers shall be taken to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now COMELEC) within five days from receipt of the decision, and explicitly states that “[n]o motion for reconsideration shall be entertained by the court.” This was the primary statutory basis for nullifying the trial court’s grant of reconsideration.

• **Section 248, Omnibus Election Code ** — Provides that the filing of a petition to annul or suspend proclamation suspends the period for filing an election protest. The Court applied this alongside case law to hold that the pre-proclamation petition here did not validly suspend the period because it was based on illegal composition and was filed after proclamation.

• **Section 19, Rule 35, COMELEC Rules of Procedure ** — Implements Section 256 by providing that the decision becomes final five days after promulgation and reiterates that “[n]o motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.” This reinforced the statutory prohibition.

• **Section 5(b), Rule 27, COMELEC Rules of Procedure ** — Requires that a petition based on the illegal composition of the board of canvassers be filed immediately when the board begins to act or at the point the proceedings become illegal. Applied to demonstrate that respondent’s pre-proclamation petition was filed out of time and could not suspend the period to protest.

• **Section 5(g), Rule 135, Rules of Court ** — Provides for the inherent power of courts to amend and control their processes to conform to law and justice. The trial court invoked this, but the Supreme Court held that it cannot override the explicit prohibition in the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., all concurred.