XXX256611 vs. People of the Philippines

Mere denial or failure to provide financial support is not enough to sustain a conviction under either Section 5(e)(2) or Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. For Section 5(e)(2), the deprivation must be willful and committed for the purpose or with the effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her child’s movement or conduct. For Section 5(i), the denial of financial support must be willful and intended to cause mental or emotional anguish. Where the accused’s failure results from physical incapacity and financial constraints beyond his control, and no evidence shows a deliberate design to control or inflict anguish, criminal liability does not attach. The variance doctrine cannot convert a charge under Section 5(i) into a conviction under Section 5(e) because the provisions punish different acts.

AAA256611 and petitioner lived together as common-law partners from 1999 to 2002 and had two children, BBB256611 and CCC256611. After the children started school in 2005 and 2009, petitioner allegedly stopped giving consistent financial support. On August 28, 2008, he promised a monthly allowance of ₱1,000.00 for the children but remitted amounts sporadically and completely ceased in 2010. In 2012, petitioner suffered a severe vehicular accident that led to the amputation of one leg, loss of function in his left hand, and hospitalization for 40 days, incurring about ₱1,400,000.00 in medical bills. He optionally retired from the Philippine National Police, received lump-sum retirement benefits (₱761,206.68) and commutation of leave credits (₱953,685.99), and began receiving a monthly pension of ₱21,144.63. The proceeds were used to pay loans, medical expenses, and a “fixer’s” fee, and the pension was consumed by his own subsistence and travel for court hearings. He was later diagnosed with stage three prostate cancer. Alleging that petitioner still failed to give any support, AAA256611 filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, asserting she “felt mad” and suffered emotional anguish.

• The Relationship and Children: Petitioner and AAA256611 were live-in partners from 1999 to 2002 and had two children, BBB256611 (15 years old at filing) and CCC256611 (11 years old). Petitioner acknowledged paternity. AAA256611 had physical custody and worked as a police officer to support the children.

• The Promise of Support and Alleged Deprivation: AAA256611 testified that after the children started school (2005 and 2009), petitioner failed to provide financial support. On August 28, 2008, petitioner agreed to give a monthly allowance of ₱1,000.00 for both children but remitted money only sporadically, sometimes every three months. He stopped all support in 2010. Despite receiving a lump-sum retirement benefit of ₱761,206.68 and commuted leave credits of ₱953,685.99 in 2014, and a monthly pension of ₱21,144.63, petitioner allegedly gave no amount. AAA256611 stated she “felt mad.” She presented an unauthenticated handwritten letter dated June 12, 2014, purportedly from the children, expressing disappointment that their father did not keep his promise of support; neither child testified in court.

• Petitioner’s Accident and Financial Circumstances: Petitioner claimed he gave financial support from the children’s birth until 2012, including ₱1,000.00 monthly and ₱4,000.00 monthly to AAA256611’s sister as nanny. On August 3, 2012, a truck hit him while he was on his way to work. He was hospitalized for 40 days, incurring around ₱1,400,000.00 in medical expenses, as shown by hospital records and receipts. The truck company paid only ₱50,000.00. He lost one leg and the use of his left hand. His mother mortgaged a property for ₱300,000.00 at 15% interest, and he obtained two loans totaling ₱700,000.00 payable over five years. He used his retirement lump sum and leave credits to pay these loans and a “fixer’s” fee, and his monthly pension went to his maintenance, food, and travel from Mindanao to Manila for court hearings. In 2017, he was diagnosed with stage three prostate cancer. Due to his physical condition, he could no longer work. His mother corroborated his prior support and the cessation after the accident.

• Findings of the Lower Courts: The RTC found AAA256611 credible and convicted petitioner of Section 5(i), holding that the deprivation of support despite receipt of benefits caused emotional anguish. The CA affirmed that support was deprived but ruled that psychological violence was not proven; nonetheless, under the variance doctrine, it convicted petitioner of Section 5(e)(2) for economic abuse through deprivation of financial support.

• Absence of Willful Deprivation: Petitioner maintained that his failure to give financial support was not deliberate or willful but resulted from a severe accident in 2012 that left him disabled, unable to work, and burdened with enormous medical debt. His retirement benefits and pension were exhausted on loan repayments, medical expenses, and his own subsistence, including travel expenses from Mindanao to Manila for trial, and later on treatment for stage three prostate cancer. Thus, the actus reus and mens rea of Section 5(e)(2) were absent.

• Insufficiency of Evidence of Emotional Anguish: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove that AAA256611, BBB256611, or CCC256611 suffered mental or emotional anguish. AAA256611’s statement that she “felt mad” did not constitute the psychological violence contemplated by the law, and the unauthenticated children’s letter could not be given evidentiary weight. Neither child testified to authenticate the letter or describe their emotional state.

• Inapplicability of Variance Doctrine: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the variance doctrine because the Information charged only Section 5(i) and the elements of a distinct offense under Section 5(e) were not established.

• Proof of Economic Abuse: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that petitioner committed economic abuse by refusing to provide financial support to his children despite having the means from his retirement benefits and pension. AAA256611 had been solely shouldering the children’s emotional and financial needs, which caused pain and anxiety to the children.

• Acknowledged Obligation and Broken Promises: The OSG stressed that petitioner repeatedly promised to give support once his retirement benefits were released but failed to make good on his word, as shown by the children’s letter. His retention of a substantial lump sum without sharing any portion for his children amounted to deliberate withholding.

• Propriety of Conviction for Section 5(e)(2) and the Variance Doctrine: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the variance doctrine to convict petitioner for violation of Section 5(e)(2) of R.A. 9262 when the Information charged only a violation of Section 5(i), in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Acharon v. People that the two provisions punish distinct acts.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Willful Deprivation for Controlling or Restricting Conduct: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner willfully deprived his children of financial support for the purpose or with the effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or children’s movement or conduct, as required under Section 5(e)(2).

• Proof of Mental or Emotional Anguish under Section 5(i): Whether, even assuming arguendo that Section 5(i) could be considered, the prosecution established that petitioner willfully denied financial support with the intent to cause AAA256611 or the children mental or emotional anguish.

• Propriety of Conviction for Section 5(e)(2) and the Variance Doctrine: The variance doctrine was inapplicable. Pursuant to Acharon v. People, Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of R.A. 9262 penalize different acts and require distinct mental elements; the former punishes deprivation of support for the purpose of controlling the woman or her children, while the latter punishes denial of support intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish. The earlier rulings in Melgar v. People and Reyes v. People, which allowed the application of the variance doctrine between these provisions, were abandoned. Nevertheless, the central ground for acquittal was the failure of proof, irrespective of which provision was invoked.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Willful Deprivation under Section 5(e)(2): The elements of the offense were not proved beyond reasonable doubt. While the first two elements were undisputed, the third element — willful deprivation — was negated by unrebutted evidence that petitioner’s failure to provide support stemmed from a disabling accident, enormous medical expenses, and debt. He lost his leg, the use of his left hand, and was later diagnosed with stage three prostate cancer. His retirement benefits and pension were consumed by loan repayments and personal subsistence. Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals made adverse factual findings against his testimony. As to the fourth element, the record contained no allegation or proof that the deprivation was for the purpose or with the effect of controlling or restricting the actions, movement, or conduct of AAA256611 or the children. The prosecution thus failed to establish the required actus reus and mens rea under Section 5(e)(2). Mere inability to give support does not constitute the crime.

• Proof of Mental or Emotional Anguish under Section 5(i): Even if Section 5(i) were considered, no conviction could lie. In line with Acharon, a violation of Section 5(i) requires willful denial of financial support for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish. Here, no evidence showed petitioner consciously withheld support to cause such suffering. AAA256611’s feeling of being “mad” did not equate to the mental or emotional anguish contemplated by law. The unauthenticated letter attributed to the children could not be given probative value, as neither child testified to validate it, and AAA256611 did not claim to have seen them write it or heard them confide about it. Therefore, the prosecution did not prove the elements of willful denial and specific intent.

• Acharon v. People Doctrine — Mere Denial of Support Insufficient: Under R.A. 9262, mere denial or failure to provide financial support does not by itself give rise to criminal liability under either Section 5(e)(2) or Section 5(i). For Section 5(e)(2), the deprivation must be willful and committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her child’s movement or conduct. For Section 5(i), the denial must be willful and intended to cause mental or emotional anguish. Inability to support, due to accident, illness, or financial adversity, negates both the actus reus and mens rea.

• Elements of Section 5(e)(2): (1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the wife, former wife, or sexual/dating partner of the offender, or they share a common child; (3) the offender deprived or threatened to deprive the woman or child of financial support legally due; and (4) the deprivation was for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman’s or child’s movement or conduct.

• Elements of Section 5(i) concerning denial of financial support: (1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child; (2) the requisite relationship exists; (3) the offender willfully refused or consciously denied financial support legally due; and (4) the denial was for the purpose of causing mental or emotional anguish.

• Variance Doctrine Inapplicable Between Sections 5(e) and 5(i): Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of R.A. 9262 penalize distinct acts with different mental elements; therefore, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused under one provision when charged under the other. The rulings in Melgar v. People and Reyes v. People were abandoned to that extent.

• “In the recent case of Acharon v. People , the Court En Banc decreed that mere denial of financial support is not enough for a prosecution of violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262. … [T]he language of Section 5(e) is that: the denial of financial support, to be punishable, must have the ‘purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's... movement or conduct.’ The use of the word ‘deprive’ connotes willfulness and intention. Thus, the willful deprivation of financial support, therefore, is the actus reus of the offense, while the mens rea is the intention to control or restrict the woman's or her children's conduct.”

• “In other words, neither Section 5(e) nor 5(i) can be construed to mean that mere failure or inability to provide support is sufficient for a conviction.”

• “Here, records are devoid of any factual allegation that XXX256611 denied financial support for the purpose of controlling the actions or movements of AAA256611, BBB256611, or CCC256611 to make them lose their agency. The prosecution, thus, failed to prove the requisite actus reus and mens rea under Section 5(e)(2) of RA 9262.”

• Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 7, 2021 — Controlling En Banc ruling that established the elements of Sections 5(e)(2) and 5(i) of R.A. 9262, held that mere failure to provide support is insufficient, and abandoned the application of the variance doctrine between these sections. The present case was decided squarely on the authority of Acharon.

• Melgar v. People, 826 Phil. 177 (2018) and Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019 — Partially abandoned to the extent that they allowed the variance doctrine to be applied between Sections 5(e) and 5(i).

• XXX v. People, G.R. No. 252087, February 10, 2021 — Cited for the proposition that incapacity to provide support, not a willful refusal, negates criminal liability.

• Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 248616, January 12, 2021 — Cited regarding the evidentiary requirement that unauthenticated documents cannot prove mental or emotional anguish absent testimony from the putative authors.

• Section 5(e)(2), Republic Act No. 9262 — Penalizes “[d]epriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman’s children insufficient financial support” when committed “with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her child’s movement or conduct.” Applied to hold that proof of willful deprivation and the specific purpose or effect is indispensable.

• Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262 — Punishes causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation to the woman or her child, including “denial of financial support or custody of minor children.” Constructed to require willful denial intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish; mere failure is insufficient.

Leonen, SAJ (Chairperson); M. Lopez; J. Lopez; Kho, Jr., JJ.